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Preface
Many countries are moving towards greater reliance on market insti 
tutions, and as part of this process they are developing and strengthen 
ing their private pension systems. At the same time, the aging of 
populations is straining social security systems. As a result of these 
trends, future retirees will rely increasingly on private pensions to pro 
vide retirement income.
This book identifies important issues involved in developing and 
managing private pension systems and examines how selected coun 
tries have dealt with these issues. It discusses a wide range of experi 
ence that may be useful for policymakers to consider in developing 
pension policies.
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collaborated on related work: Stuart Dorsey, Sophie Korczyk, David 
Rajnes, and especially Lorna Dailey.
John Turner acknowledges with great appreciation his parents 
Henry and Mary, and the support of his wife Kathy Peery and his 
daughter Sarah; they bore the primary burden of his absence, which 
allowed him to write this book. Noriyasu Watanabe expresses his 
appreciation to his mother Miyako (82 years old), his daughters Maki 
and Akemi, and to his wife, Harumi.
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The Trend Toward 
Private Pensions
Economic insecurity among the elderly is a universal problem. 
Many industrialized countries have dealt with this problem by develop 
ing retirement income systems likened to a "three-legged stool." 1 This 
image refers to the three primary sources of income for the nonwork- 
ing elderly: government-provided social security, employer-provided 
pensions, and household-provided savings. 2 The three-legged stool, 
however, is more an ideal than a reality. In most countries that use this 
approach, only households with higher income—fewer than half of 
retirees—actually receive income from all three sources.
Pension systems are the result of cultural and economic forces and 
reflect different political philosophies concerning the relative roles of 
government, employers, and individuals in providing retirement 
income. In some countries, the ideas of national solidarity and commu 
nal responsibility are important, and government plays a major role in 
providing retirement income. In other countries, a high value is placed 
on individual responsibility and freedom of choice, and employers and 
workers play a larger role in determining retirement income. Historical 
experiences concerning inflation and the development of capital mar 
kets also influence the development of pension systems. The result is a 
diversity of systems among countries.
Regardless of the institutional arrangements of pension systems, 
population aging is a fundamental force that affects the way retirement 
income is provided. As populations age, the political power of the older 
generation increases, but so also does the cost of providing retirement 
benefits. The net effect is manifested in increasing payroll tax rates and 
cutbacks in benefit generosity. These changes reduce the rate of return 
on social security benefit programs, favoring the development of 
funded private pensions.
In addition to demographic changes, the shift towards private 
pensions may also be due to a move in many countries towards greater 
reliance on market institutions. This move has resulted in some 
countries from the fall of Communism. The trend has been more
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widespread, however, with many countries seeking to reduce the role 
of government in economic life.
Pension retirement benefits provided by private-sector employers 
are an increasingly important source of retirement income in the 
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe. 3 Spain 
in 1987 (Ruano 1995) and Italy in 1993, for example, countries that 
have not had well-developed pension systems, have adopted compre 
hensive legislation to encourage and regulate private pension plans. 
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe are studying Western models 
to develop reforms of their retirement income systems. Countries in 
Latin America, following the lead of Chile, are moving towards pri 
vate-sector pension systems. In 1993, Peru adopted a version of Chile's 
pension system, followed by Argentina in 1994 (Campbell 1994). 
Colombia has passed legislation calling for similar reforms. In the 
United States, there has been a long-run trend of employer-provided 
pensions providing a growing share of U.S. retirement income (Chen 
1992).4 In short, these developments suggest that over the next decade, 
the growing importance of private pensions—the privatization of 
retirement income—will be worldwide.5
The primary purpose of private pensions traditionally has been to 
provide retirement income, a purpose sometimes called "welfare capi 
talism." Private pension systems, however, are increasingly being 
called on to serve other functions. For example, the 1993 private pen 
sion legislation in Italy was a response to the government's declared 
aim of increasing savings and capital accumulation, supporting and 
enlarging the domestic financial market, and creating the capacity to 
absorb the large amount of assets to be sold during the process of 
privatizing public enterprises.
Pension Terminology
Pension terminology varies among English-speaking pension 
experts. While in many countries social security programs include a 
wide range of benefits, social security refers, in this book, to a govern 
ment-provided retirement income program. Employer-provided pen 
sions include those provided by private-sector employers and those
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provided by public-sector employers for their employees. This book 
focuses on private pensions. A private pension plan is an employer-pro 
vided plan or an employee group-sponsored plan that provides retire 
ment benefits for private-sector employees.
In an international comparison of pension plans, the variety of bene 
fit arrangements blurs the distinctions among different types. Plans 
providing cash benefits to older workers differ as to who sponsors 
them, who is covered by them, and what purposes they are used for. 
Pension plans for government-owned enterprises are plans in the pri 
vate sector for enterprises that are owned by the government. Savings 
plans are employer-sponsored plans that may be used for retirement or 
for other purposes. Disability plans for older workers may allow a 
worker to retire with a pension, but require the worker to have a medi 
cal condition that affects the ability to work. Unemployment compen 
sation plans for older workers may provide benefits that function as 
retirement benefits, but they require that the worker qualify as unem 
ployed. Severance pay plans may provide retirement benefits for older 
workers, but they generally pay benefits regardless of the age at job 
separation. When discussing private pension plans, it is worth keeping 
in mind that other plans serve similar purposes.
A private pension plan may be voluntary or mandatory. This book 
considers the mandatory pension plans in France and Switzerland to be 
private pension plans because the assets of these plans remain under 
private-sector control. While some plans serve multiple purposes, plans 
used primarily for providing retirement income are considered in this 
book to be retirement plans.
Overview
Social security powerfully influences private pensions. Social secu 
rity benefit expenditures have been growing in the developed countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).6 Social security expenditures as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) are a measure of the public burden of provid 
ing old-age benefits. Table 1.1 shows that measure for the G7 coun 
tries—the major democratic, developed economies. Between 1960 and
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1985, social security expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product doubled in France, nearly tripled in Italy, and quadrupled in 
Japan. In 1985, this percentage covered a fairly broad range, from a 
low of 5.3 percent in Japan, to a high of 15.6 percent in Italy. Expendi 
tures as a percentage of GDP will continue to grow, due to the large 
increases in old-age dependency that will begin to occur early in the 
twenty-first century (table 1.2). Population aging will be a particularly 
serious problem in Japan. Because of long life expectancy, low fertility, 
and low immigration in Japan, the projected old-age dependency ratio 
(the ratio of the population aged 65 and older to the population aged 20 
to 64) in the year 2025 will be nearly 50 percent higher than in the 
United States at that time. Increasing expenditures on social security 
have also been caused by a growth in the percentage of the aged who 
are beneficiaries (the maturing of social security systems), and by 
increases in benefit generosity in past years.
Table 1.1 Social Security Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross 









































SOURCE: Mitchell (1993). 
NOTES: The percentage is the ratio of annual public expenditure on pensions to current-year 
GDP. Public pensions in this table include both transfers through social programs and pension 
payments to retired government employees. Privately sponsored pensions are not included, nor 
are tax expenditures granted to private and/or public plan savings. Figures for Germany refer to 
the former West Germany.
With social security growing relative to the economy, a number of 
OECD countries are facing pressures to reduce their social security 
benefits. Future social security benefits have been lowered by legisla 
tion: in the United States in 1983, in Japan in 1985 and 1994, in the 
United Kingdom in 1980 and 1986, in Germany in 1989, in France and
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Italy in 1993, and in Sweden in 1994. The United States, Germany, and 
Japan have scheduled increases in the age for full benefits and a higher 
reduction in benefits at early retirement. When the change is fully 
implemented in the United States in 2022, benefits at early retirement 
will be reduced by 12.5 percent below what they would have been had 
no reduction occurred.7


































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce (1993, p. 122)
NOTE' The old-age dependency ratio is measured here as the number of persons 65 years and
over per 100 persons 20 to 64 years.
In some countries, rather than directly lowering social security ben 
efits, changes have been made that indirectly have that effect. France, 
for example, has raised the qualifying period for full benefits from 37.5 
years to 40 years, has raised the base earnings for computing benefits 
from 10 to 25 years, and has changed the indexing of the earnings used 
in computing the base from wage indexing to price indexing. These 
changes will reduce social security benefits by 8 percent. Similar 
changes have been made in Italy (Graham 1994). Thus, while social 
security expenditures are growing relative to the economies of a num 
ber of countries, legislative changes in place will cause the generosity 
of social security benefits to decline.
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Effects of Shifting Towards Private Pension Systems
Government policy makers presumably base retirement income sys 
tems on the relative merits of private pensions and social security. 
There are important differences between the two: (1) private pensions 
generally do not cover the entire private-sector workforce, while social 
security generally does; (2) private pensions are at least partially 
funded through investments in the private sector, while social security 
generally is unfunded or has limited funding through holdings of gov 
ernment bonds; (3) social security frequently provides complete index 
ation for postretirement inflation, while private pensions provide 
partial or no indexation; and (4) social security benefits are fully porta 
ble between jobs, while private pension benefits in defined benefit 
plans generally are not. 8 (When a pension benefit is fully portable 
between jobs, a job change causes no loss of future retirement bene 
fits.)
Private pensions and social security may differ in how they affect 
workers and retirees. A reduction in social security could have the most 
serious consequences for low-income workers not covered by private 
pensions, who depend primarily on social security for their retirement 
income. Whether that effect occurs, with a consequent worsening of 
the income distribution, depends on how social security benefits are 
reduced. If social security is reduced across-the-board, as will happen 
in the United States in the next century, then it appears the shift 
towards private pensions would cause a worsening in the income distri 
bution and an increase in poverty. 9
Private pensions are at least partially funded in most OECD coun 
tries, while social security is generally unfunded. Thus, a shift away 
from social security toward private pension plans may increase 
national savings. A survey of studies suggests that a one-dollar 
increase in funding of a private pension plan increases aggregate sav 
ings on average by 40 cents and decreases nonpension savings by 60 
cents (Pesando 1992). Researchers do not agree on the size of this 
effect, however, although most researchers have found at least a small 
positive effect. In the countries of Eastern Europe, which have poorly 
developed capital markets and thus fewer competing assets through 
which to save, the effect of private pensions on net savings would prob-
The Trend Toward Private Pensions 7
ably be greater than in countries with well-developed capital markets. 
Studies of the effect of social security on savings generally find a nega 
tive or insignificant effect (Feldstein 1974).
Because of differences in the degree and type of funding, social 
security and private pensions are subject to different risks. Funded pri 
vate pension systems face financial market risks. Inflation risk is 
greater for private pension benefits than for social security benefits 
because private pension plans lack full inflation protection after retire 
ment. Also, funded private pension systems are more at risk due to 
inflation than are unfunded public systems because of fixed rates of 
return on some investments. Unfunded systems depend on wage pay 
ments, which tend to keep pace with inflation better than do financial 
rates of return. Because defined benefit private pensions are generally 
not portable between jobs, they also have greater risk of benefit loss 
due to job change than does social security. Workers face risks associ 
ated with changeable political commitments to social security systems, 
but also face risks concerning changeable laws affecting private pen 
sions.
Private pensions are more expensive to administer than social secu 
rity systems because of the economies of scale in administering social 
security. On the other hand, private pensions offer greater flexibility 
because they can be tailored to the needs of small groups of workers.
Private Pension Systems and Policies
In developing pension policy, it may be useful to understand the 
experience of other countries with similar economies as they confront 
problems concerning retirement income. For example, many countries 
have legislated pension rules to protect workers against pension benefit 
loss at job change. All countries face the problems of demographic 
change and of inflation eroding the purchasing power of retirement 
benefits. All countries must decide on the tax treatment of their pension 
systems.
Private pension systems and policies can be analyzed by comparing 
across pension systems, treating each country as an entire entity, or by 
comparing across countries on individual issues without discussing
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entire pension systems. The first approach provides an understanding 
of the major issues as to how different countries structure their pension 
systems, but comparisons on individual policies are not as clearly 
drawn. The second approach provides a clearer international compari 
son on individual issues, but the major comparisons on system struc 
ture are lost. This book adopts the second approach because that 
approach is more useful for analyzing particular policy issues. It is 
designed for readers wishing to learn about how different countries 
address particular policy issues, rather than for those wishing an over 
view of pension systems in different countries. This decision reflects 
the availability of good country studies. 10
A Selective Summary of Pension Trends
This book discusses issues that arise as countries adopt and expand 
private pension systems. In doing so, it identifies a number of interna 
tional trends in various aspects of pension policy and systems. First, 
there is a trend towards greater privatization of retirement income. This 
is occurring through explicit privatization of social security and 
through legislative cutbacks in the generosity of social security bene 
fits. Chile has almost entirely privatized its system of retirement 
income, and other countries have adopted partial versions of its system. 
The United Kingdom and Japan both allow for partial privatization of 
social security through "contracting out," which is known in the United 
States (in the context of health care) as "pay or play." Germany has a 
privatized system of pension benefit insurance.
Second, the aging of populations in developed countries is raising 
the cost of providing social security benefits, but it is also making the 
tax subsidies to support private pension systems more expensive. Pre 
sumably in response to this, a number of countries have reduced the 
generosity of the tax subsidies for private pension plans.
Third, in many countries there is a trend towards defined contribu 
tion plans. This is at least partly the result of increasing regulation of 
defined benefit plans. In some cases, it is the result of government pol 
icy mandating the provision of defined contribution plans.
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Fourth, pension plans are investing increasingly in foreign securi 
ties. Regulations inhibiting foreign pension investments have been 
reduced or eliminated in some countries. In other countries, increased 
foreign investment seems to be driven by a realization of the financial 
benefits afforded by the greater diversification.
Fifth, many countries have reduced the loss of benefits suffered by 
workers who change jobs. Pension portability has been enhanced by 
reducing the years required for vesting and, in some countries, by 
indexing (up to a ceiling inflation rate) the benefits of workers leaving 
a job before retirement age.
Sixth, in most countries with pension systems the coverage rate of 
workers has increased over the past twenty years. In more recent years, 
this trend has stabilized or slightly reversed in some countries.
NOTES
1. Outside of the United States, the images of three pillars or three tiers are more commonly 
used.
2. Earnings, disability programs, unemployment insurance, and poverty programs also pro 
vide income for the elderly.
3. Reynaud (1994a) characterizes this analytical focus on the public/private division as an 
Anglo-Saxon approach. In France, analysis is based on whether a pension is a basic pension or a 
complementary pension. Reynaud also notes that when faced with the complexity of pension sys 
tems, analysts tend to practice ethnocentnsm, applying a familiar analytical framework that does 
not always correspond to the logic of the pension system being analyzed.
4. Because of the declining generosity of social security starting in the year 2000, it can be 
expected that private pensions in the United States will provide a larger share of retirement 
income in the future.
5. These trends suggest that there will be a convergence of retirement income policies as many 
countries react to the changing demographic and political environment.
6. These countries include Japan, Canada, Australia, the United States, and the countries of 
Western Europe.
7. Generally, when referring to an aspect of social security or pension law where the primary 
source of the information is the law itself, secondary references are not given.
8. Multiemployer denned benefit plans are an exception. They allow unionized workers to 
change jobs within a single union and geographic area without losing benefits. For other excep 
tions see Turner (1993a).
9. This is the conclusion of Pestieau (1992).
10. Readers wishing to learn about particular countries should refer to the listing of countries 
in the index. In addition, readers wishing an overview of the pension systems in Canada, Japan, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom can refer to Turner and Dailey (1991). Readers wishing 
an in-depth analysis of the U.S. pension system can refer to Turner and Beller (1992). Additional 
country studies available include: Chile (Diamond and Valdes-Pneto 1994); Japan (Clark 1991b); 
Ireland (Hughes 1994); Germany (Bodie, Mitchell, and Turner 1995); France (Reynaud 1994b); 
and Mexico (Cross 1994). The World Bank (1994) discusses the overall structure of retirement 
income systems.

Basic Issues in Structuring 
Pension Financing
An International Survey
Pension financing methods are important in the overall structure of 
pension systems. A wide range of approaches have been adopted by 
different countries in dealing with some of the basic financing issues.
Issues
The issues discussed below represent fundamental questions about 
retirement income financing that must be addressed in designing new 
pension systems or changing established ones. As a convenient reference 
for comparing the structure of different pension plans, table 2.1 provides 
an overview of the retirement income systems of the G7 countries.
1. To what extent should retirement income be privatized? Alterna 
tively stated, What should be the relative roles of social security and 
private pensions? The fundamental measure of the privatization of 
retirement income is the percentage of retirement income provided 
through the private sector.
Private pensions differ in their role as a source of retirement income 
depending largely on how generous the social security program is. 1 In 
Italy, for example, social security benefits are generous and there is lit 
tle role for private pensions. In Germany, the social security system 
provides generous benefits, even at relatively high incomes, and private 
pensions are provided mainly to middle- and upper-income workers. In 
Chile, most benefits are provided through the private sector, though 
with extensive government regulation. In Japan and the United King 
dom, social security benefits are moderate and private pension cover 
age is more extensive. Japan and the United Kingdom have retirement 
income systems that allow firms and workers to partially privatize their 
retirement income by voluntarily withdrawing from part of social secu 
rity. Those programs are described in the next chapter.
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2. Should the private pension system be voluntary or mandatory? In 
France, Finland, Chile, Mexico, Switzerland, Sweden and Australia, 
most employees are required to be covered by a pension plan.
Even in countries where private pensions are mandatory, however, 
small employers, workers younger than a minimum age, and those 
working fewer than a minimum number of hours may be excluded. 
Switzerland uses such a system. In France, however, all workers 
(excluding the self-employed) are covered from the first hour of work.
In Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, employers voluntarily decide whether to provide a pension 
plan. In countries where pension plans are voluntary, the government 
requires that plans meet minimum standards concerning which work 
ers are included and by how much the plan is funded in advance of 
benefit payments.
In the Netherlands, providing a plan is voluntary for some employ 
ers. In other industries, however, employers are required to participate 
in an industrywide plan. Some groups of self-employed workers are 
also required to belong to such a plan. There are eighty-one industry 
wide pension plans, of which sixty-six are compulsory for all employ 
ers and employees in the industry (Lutjens 1995). Issues concerning 
pension coverage are discussed in chapter 7.
3. If private pension plans are voluntary, should the government 
encourage them or simply permit them? Most countries with well- 
developed pension systems encourage pension plan provision by grant 
ing tax preferences and occasionally direct subsidies. Since April 1993, 
the government in the United Kingdom has provided a subsidy of 1 
percent of covered earnings to workers over age 30 who leave the earn 
ings-related social security system and participate instead in an indi 
vidual pension plan. In Canada, Japan, and the United States, pension 
plans receive tax preferences that allow money to accumulate tax free, 
but no direct subsidies are offered. In New Zealand, no special tax 
preference or subsidy is provided to pensions. For tax purposes, pen 
sions are treated exactly like other forms of savings. The tax treatment 
of pensions is considered in greater detail in chapter 4.
4. Who is best able to bear the inherent financial risks in pension 
plans? The primary decision as to who bears the pension financial risks 
is made when policy makers or employers determine whether pension
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plans should be defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, or a 
mixture of both types. Countries where defined benefit plans predomi 
nate include Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands. Countries where 
defined contribution plans predominate include Australia, Chile, and 
Singapore. In Canada and the United States, a mix of both defined ben 
efit and defined contribution plans is provided. In the United States, 
and to a lesser extent Canada, as well as in other countries, there has 
been a trend towards defined contribution plans. Risk-bearing in pen 
sion plans is considered in more detail in chapter 5.
5. Should there be mandatory insurance for pension benefits? In 
Chile, Finland, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
province of Ontario in Canada, and the United States, the government 
requires that benefits in some plans be guaranteed. In Japan, Germany, 
and Sweden, mandatory pension benefit insurance is provided through 
private-sector institutions. This insurance covers the risk that the spon 
soring firm will declare bankruptcy without having fully funded its 
pension plans. It also covers the risk of financial malfeasance by the 
plan sponsor. In Australia, there is no government insurance for pen 
sion benefits. Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Switzerland insure or 
guarantee defined contribution plans. Pension insurance programs are 
considered in chapter 5.
6. Who should pay for pension plans? Should the funding for pen 
sion plans come from employers, employees, or both? In Japan and the 
United States, the money provided for pension plans comes predomi 
nantly from employers. In Argentina and Chile, it comes entirely from 
employees. In the United Kingdom and Canada, both employers and 
employees provide money for pension plans. From an economic point 
of view, however, employees indirectly pay for pension benefits 
through reduced wages (Montgomery, Shaw, and Benedict 1992). 
Thus, the source of funding may be unimportant in determining who 
ultimately pays for benefits. In practical terms, however, the source of 
funding is an important design consideration in developing a pension 
system. The question of who should pay for pensions is considered in 
chapter 6.
7. Should benefits be funded in advance? Most countries, with the 
exception of France, require at least some advance funding for pension 
benefits. The French, argue that requiring no advance funding avoids
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financial market risk and the expense of asset management in financial 
markets, and that a social benefit of a pay-as-you-go national private 
pension system is an increase in social cohesion as the retired and 
working generations share in the economic downturns or economic 
success of a country.
In Germany and Japan, some plans are fully funded in advance, 
some are partially funded, and some have no advance funding. In Can 
ada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plans 
receiving preferential tax treatment are required to be funded in 
advance. However, the advance funding is generally less than the pen 
sion liabilities of ongoing plans. These issues and the remaining four 
are discussed in chapter 6.
8. To what extent should pension portfolios be regulated? In Ger 
many, the government does not regulate the investments of some types 
of pension plans. In the United Kingdom, pension portfolios are gov 
erned by the general requirement that all investments be prudently con 
sidered. In addition, no more than 5 percent of a plan's funds can be 
invested in assets of the sponsoring employer. In Chile, allowable pen 
sion portfolios are regulated in greater detail. In Canada and other 
countries, excluding the United States, the percentage of a portfolio 
that can be invested in foreign securities is restricted.
9. What types of organizations should be allowed to sponsor pension 
plans? In most countries, employers are allowed or encouraged to pro 
vide pension plans. In many countries, large multiemployer, industry, 
or union organizations are also allowed to sponsor pension plans. 
These countries include the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Germany, and 
the United States.
10. Should individual plans be allowed? In some countries, workers 
can receive pensions through individual plans that are not tied to a par 
ticular employer. These countries include Argentina, Chile, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. In other countries, pensions 
are provided exclusively through plans that are tied to a particular 
employer. These countries include Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Japan.
11. What types of institutions should be allowed to manage pension 
funds? In Chile, only special institutions established specifically to
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manage pension funds are allowed to do so. In most countries, includ 
ing Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, insur 
ance companies and banks are allowed to manage pension funds. In 
France, insurance companies are allowed to manage funded pension 
plans, but banks are not allowed to do so. In some countries, such as 
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, investment 
managers are allowed to manage pension funds. In many countries, 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom, but not Japan, 
employers are allowed to manage pension funds internally.
Conclusion
These eleven issues of pension finance are basic questions to con 
sider when designing or modifying pension policy. The following 
chapters address each issue in greater detail.
NOTE
1. To a lesser extent, the relative size of pnvate pensions is affected by government disability 
and unemployment insurance programs. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, disability and 




What should be the roles of social security and private pensions? For 
both ideological and economic reasons, a minority of pension experts 
have advocated the complete privatization of pensions, with retirement 
income financed by the employer or the individual rather than by gov 
ernment under the social security system (Nusberg 1988). This 
approach has appealed to conservatives for ideological reasons because 
it greatly reduces the role of the government by substituting private- 
sector institutions. Conservatives have also argued that a program that 
allows workers and employers to voluntarily privatize part of social 
security would be desirable because it would increase their range of 
choices. Privatization has also had appeal for economic reasons; it is 
argued that the substitution of a funded private-sector system for an 
unfunded public one would increase national savings.
For most pension experts, it has traditionally been inconceivable 
that social security could be abolished (O'Higgins 1987). They take the 
position that coexistence rather than dominance or replacement should 
be the key feature of the relationship between social security and pri 
vate pensions.
The optimal mix of public and private provision, defined benefit and 
defined contribution, funded and pay-as-you-go can presumably be 
determined within an optimal portfolio framework, considering each 
alternative as a possible asset in the retirement income portfolio. Each 
type of pension plan has different characteristics concerning its risk, 
expected rate of return, and covariance with other retirement income 
sources. In actuality, the determination of the retirement income mix is 
more complex because it also has elements of public choice affecting 
the level of benefits provided by social security. With a declining inter 
nal rate of return to social security in many countries, there is political 
support for reducing the role of social security.
This chapter discusses three countries that have pension programs 
for privatizing social security. They can serve as important models for 
any other countries considering whether to partially or completely 
privatize their social security systems.
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Mandatory Individual Accounts: Chile
In 1924, Chile was the first country in the Western Hemisphere to 
initiate a defined benefit social security system. Because of the high 
cost of that system, the government ended it in 1981. In its place, the 
Chilean government introduced a new system of funded individual 
accounts managed through the private sector. With this arrangement, 
Chile has succeeded in largely privatizing its social security system, 
and in the process has revolutionized thinking about retirement income 
systems.
Because of its financial success and because of the philosophy of 
retirement income provision that it represents, the Chilean pension 
reform has attracted worldwide attention, particularly among countries 
lacking a well-developed pension system (World Bank 1994). The 
Chilean pension system has been proposed as a model for Poland and 
other Central and Eastern European countries, and it has been adopted 
in modified form in Mexico, Argentina, and other Latin American 
countries.
Chile has a compulsory system of individual retirement accounts 
that covers nearly all workers. The system includes civil servants, but 
excludes the armed forces. 1 The self-employed have the option of par 
ticipating, but most do not.
Contributions and Benefits
Employee contributions for old-age benefits are 10 percent of earn 
ings in Chile. In addition, employees must pay for disability and survi 
vor's insurance, and they also pay a commission. The average cost of 
these additional features was 3.2 percent of covered wages in 1990. All 
employee pension contributions are tax deductible. Employers do not 
contribute.
Employees are allowed to make additional voluntary, tax-deductible 
contributions. Until 1990, those contributions were limited to an addi 
tional 10 percent of earnings, but since 1990 there has been no limit on 
those contributions. Withdrawals from voluntary contributions are lim 
ited to annuities. This restriction, which limits the ability of workers to 
use their savings, may explain why few individuals make voluntary 
contributions.
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There is a ceiling on earnings subject to the mandatory contribu 
tions. The ceiling is about 5.25 times the average salary of all covered 
workers. The nominal amount of the ceiling is indexed, rising each 
year at the rate of inflation. In 1994, the annual ceiling was roughly 
equal to $17,000. Only about 4 percent of contributors earned more 
than the ceiling (Diamond and Valdes-Prieto 1994).
Individual retirement accounts are managed by large privately oper 
ated fund management companies. 2 These specialized companies only 
manage pension fund accounts, and each company may only manage 
one fund. In 1992, there were thirteen such companies. Retirement 
annuities are provided separately by life insurance companies; by the 
end of 1992 there were nineteen such companies.
Employees are allowed only one tax-deductible account. Contribu 
tions are withheld from pay by employers and transferred monthly to 
the pension fund chosen by the employee. Employees may select 
which fund they wish to use and may transfer their account balances to 
another after four months.
Employee contributions to individual pension accounts are tax- 
deductible, and the interest earned is tax-free. Pensions benefits are 
treated as taxable income. In contrast to this favorable tax treatment of 
individual accounts, employer-provided pension funds are given no tax 
advantages. This is in sharp contrast to the tax advantages given to 
employer-provided plans in most OECD countries.
Retirement benefits are available at age 65 for men and at age 60 for 
women. Pension benefits may be taken at those ages whether or not an 
individual continues to work. They are available earlier if the pension 
payable is either (1) at least 50 percent of the average indexed earnings 
of the individual in the last ten years, or (2) at least 110 percent of the 
legal minimum wage.
Workers must take their retirement benefits either as an indexed 
annuity, a phased withdrawal, or a combination of the two. Benefits 
cannot be taken as a lump-sum payment. Pension fund management 
firms do not provide annuities. At retirement, the individuals must con 
tract with an insurance company to convert their account balance to an 
annuity or contract with the pension fund management company to 
receive benefits over their lifetime.
If an individual purchases an annuity from an insurance company, 
that annuity must be fully price-indexed. The government guarantees
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the annuity payments of insurance companies in case an insurance 
company fails. For low-wage workers, the government guarantees a 
minimum pension. For all workers, the government guarantees 100 
percent of the minimum pension and 75 percent of their pension above 
that level. An individual who contracts with the pension fund manage 
ment company continues to bear the risk of fluctuations in the invest 
ment rate of return. With phased withdrawals, the individual's annual 
benefit is recomputed each year, taking into account the investment 
performance of the fund and whether the worker's spouse or other ben 
eficiaries have died.
In converting the account balance at retirement to an annuity, life 
insurance companies consider the difference in life expectancy 
between men and women, along with any other relevant factors. With 
equal account balances, single men receive higher benefits than do sin 
gle women. This practice differs from the treatment of men and women 
in pension plans in the United States and Western European countries. 
For married workers in Chile, a survivor's benefit must be provided for 
the spouse and for minor children.
There are two ways in which the Chilean system is not completely 
privatized. First, the government provides a lump-sum benefit at retire 
ment for all persons who had at least twelve months of coverage under 
the old system during the sixty-month period ending October 1980. 
The lump-sum benefit is derived from special government bonds, 
called recognition bonds, transferred to workers switching into the new 
system. The amount of the bond is based on the age, salary, and sex of 
the individual. These bonds pay a 4 percent real rate of return, gener 
ally considered to be a high real rate of return for a long-term invest 
ment instrument. In fact, however, this rate was about a third of that 
earned in Chilean financial markets during the 1980s. The bonds are 
financed out of general government revenues.
A second quasi-governmental feature of the Chilean pension system 
is that if the benefit provided by the lump sum and the individual's 
accumulated account balance is below a certain level, a guaranteed 
minimum benefit is paid. The minimum benefit is payable to individu 
als who have contributed to the old and new pension systems for at 
least twenty years. The minimum benefit is financed out of general tax 
revenue on a pay-as-you-go basis.
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The minimum pension benefit discourages some workers from com 
plying with pension contribution regulations. Low-income workers 
may conceal income and avoid fully paying into a fund in some years 
since they would receive little more than the minimum amount if they 
contributed. The minimum pension is set at a relatively high level—85 
percent of the legal minimum wage. The legal minimum wage is about 
half of the average wage for the country. Thus, a worker with average 
wages is guaranteed a pension of about 40 percent of earnings. This 
may explain why many low-wage Chilean workers do not contribute to 
the system.
Participants in poor health may prefer to receive benefits as sched 
uled withdrawals because, in the event of early death, remaining 
account balances are inherited by dependents. This arrangement is 
more generous than the survivor's benefit paid by an annuity. An 
advantage of scheduled withdrawals to low-wage workers is that if the 
retiree lives a long time and his or her benefit falls below the guaran 
teed minimum, the government will make up the difference.
Both the lump-sum benefit to workers who participated in the previ 
ous system and the guaranteed minimum benefit are costs for the Chil 
ean government. Each year there is an additional interest cost on the 
bonds given to workers who had been in the old system. This cost will 
eventually diminish as that generation of workers dies. The guaranteed 
minimum benefit will remain, however, as a permanent ongoing cost to 
the Chilean government.
Pension Fund Investments
When the Chilean funded pension system began in 1981, allowable 
investments were strictly controlled to limit financial risks. The major 
ity of assets were invested in government bonds, with the next largest 
amount invested in bank deposits, both indexed against inflation. The 
large share of pension assets invested in government bonds was partly 
because the poorly developed capital markets in Chile offered few 
other financial assets in which to invest. No funds were invested in 
stocks until 1986.
The portfolio mix of Chilean pension funds continues to be 
restricted by law. The rules are primarily designed to assure that pen 
sion funds are conservatively invested with at least some diversifica-
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tion, and to assure that the investments are made primarily within 
Chile. The rules generally specify maximum limits on investments. 
The complete set of limits is detailed, but table 3.1 shows some of the 
more important. The government has changed these limits several 
times, gradually making them more flexible
Table 3.1 Pension Portfolio Restrictions in Chile, 1994__________
Maximum percentage 
Asset type of pension portfolio
Mortgages 80 
Bonds of private and publicly owned
businesses 50 
Government bonds 45 
Common stocks 30 
Foreign securities 12 
Securities of a single company 7 
SOURCE: Chilean pension regulations.
The Chilean government permits pension funds to invest outside the 
country. In 1994, a minimum of 6 percent and a maximum of 12 per 
cent of a plan's assets could be invested internationally. The govern 
ment restricts the types of foreign investments allowed, again to 
control risk.
For domestic stock investments, only government-approved stocks 
can be purchased. This restriction limits the participation of the larger 
pension funds in the Chilean stock market. Government approval is 
determined through a system that classifies stocks according to risk. 
Government-approved stocks consist of a small group of state-owned 
firms in the process of privatizing. In 1992, there were only 38 publicly 
traded firms in which the pension funds could invest. By comparison, 
large U.S. pension plans often have portfolios of more than 1,000 
stocks.
Government pension investment regulations also protect Chilean 
financial markets. Regulations limit a pension fund management com 
pany to no more than 30 percent of a bond issue. In addition, a fund 
can hold no more than 7 percent of the stock of a particular company in
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which no investor owns more than 50 percent of the shares, and no 
more than 1 percent in firms with more concentrated ownership.
Another restriction on investments is that Chilean pension funds are 
prohibited from investing in pension fund management companies or 
in insurance companies. This prevents conflicts of interest involving 
pension fund management and pension fund investments.
Chilean pension funds have been far more active in domestic debt 
markets than in domestic capital markets. In June 1992, the funds held 
52 percent of the corporate bonds of both public and private enter 
prises. The large supply of funds available to finance corporate debt 
has lowered financing costs and reduced dependence on foreign financ 
ing.
When a privately managed pension system invests in government 
bonds rather than in private sector assets, it can be considered a mixed 
or government-sector system rather than a privatized system. Social 
security system funds for most countries are invested exclusively in 
government bonds. The Chilean system has gradually become more 
privatized as it has increasingly invested in the private sector.
Chile, like many other countries, has privatized a number of for 
merly nationalized industries. Its experience exemplifies the role that 
pension plans can play in privatization. Pension funds played a crucial 
role in Chile's program to privatize nationalized industries between 
1985 and 1989. Through pension fund purchases, stock was sold indi 
rectly to workers via what was called "institutional capitalism." Pen 
sion funds were heavy investors in public utilities and other state- 
owned companies. The total equity positions of the Chilean pension 
funds in previously state-owned companies privatized during that 
period varied in 1990 between 10 and 35 percent of each firm's equity, 
with an average of about 25 percent. Investments in privatized firms 
account for about 5 percent of pension fund portfolios, but that is 
nearly 90 percent of their equity investments (Vittas and Iglesias 1992). 
This large percentage in part reflects the importance of privatized com 
panies in the Santiago Stock Exchange. In 1989, stock in privatized 
enterprises accounted for 60 percent of the stock trading on the Santi 
ago Stock Exchange (Luders 1993).
In privatizing companies during the mid 1980s, the government first 
offered shares to the pension funds through competitive bidding at the 
Santiago Stock Exchange because the funds had trained financial ana-
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lysts who could analyze the value of the shares. Sales to the pension 
funds became the way of establishing a market price for shares not 
traded before, or when their market had been very thin (Luders 1993). 
Thus, pension funds played an important role in the development of 
private-sector financial institutions in Chile.
Regulation of Pension Fund Management Companies
The market of pension fund management companies is highly con 
centrated, the four largest having 75 percent of the participants. In 
1994, pension fund management companies employed more than 
8,000 people out of a population of about 12 million (Adrian 1994).
The government does not restrict the ownership of the management 
companies. They generally are operated by private Chilean financial 
groups or banks, or by foreign banks or insurance companies with 
minority Chilean ownership. Some of the fund management companies 
were owned by the government during the 1980s, but they have since 
been privatized.
Commissions charged by pension fund management companies are 
competitively set. Commissions measured relative to the size of 
account balances have been falling, and in 1990 they averaged 2.3 per 
cent of account balances (Vittas and Iglesias 1992).
Besides regulating the type of fees charged, the government super 
vises management companies to minimize mismanagement or fraud. 
Management companies are required to report their operating expenses 
and investments to the government, which publishes the reports.
To protect pension participants, the government regulates the allow 
able minimum annual rates of return received by pension funds. It 
requires a minimum rate of return of the lesser of: (1) the average 
return on all funds less 2 percentage points, and (2) half the average 
return on all funds. If plans do not achieve the minimum return, they 
must make up the difference from their reserves. This restriction on 
rates of return further limits the portfolios Chilean pension funds are 
willing to hold because of the disincentive to have portfolios that differ 
greatly from the typical portfolio of other pension management compa 
nies.
Other countries have followed Chile's lead. In 1993, the Peruvian 
government launched a voluntary system of individual privatization for
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retirement pensions. The Peruvian system follows closely the Chilean 
model. Contributions to the system are financed at the rate of 1 percent 
of the worker's earnings paid by the employer and 8 percent paid by 
the employee. Argentina also started a system in 1994 in which indi 
viduals may continue in the social security system or may contribute 
11 percent of earnings to individual accounts, but new workers must 
establish individual accounts (Campbell 1994).
Conclusions
The Chilean pension system has encouraged the development of 
Chilean financial markets. In addition to providing a market for finan 
cial assets, it has created a demand for financial intermediaries. It has 
done this is by encouraging the growth of life insurance companies 
through the sale of annuities to retirees. A second way human capital 
has increased in Chilean financial markets is that pension fund man 
agement companies have developed competent professional portfolio 
management departments to assess investment opportunities in Chile.
Pension funds do not have a long history in Chile, but they have 
withstood the test of a major recession. In 1982, the Chilean Gross 
Domestic Product fell 14.3 percent. Unemployment reached nearly 30 
percent, and the economy stagnated until 1985. Some of the pension 
fund management companies became insolvent due to the drop in com 
mission income. However, none of the pension funds, which are finan 
cially separate from the pension fund management companies, 
experienced financial problems.
Because of the very high real rates of return earned on Chilean pen 
sion plan investments, the pension system has been a financial success. 
Those rates of return are partly due to the success of the Chilean econ 
omy and partly due to the government policy of providing high real 
rates of return on government debt.
The Chilean pension funds had assets in 1992 equaling 40 percent 
of the Gross Domestic Product. The pension system is the principal 
source of savings in Chile, providing 72 percent of all domestic invest 
ment in 1991 (Cohen 1994b).
Some analysts have questioned whether a 10 percent contribution 
rate will provide adequate retirement benefits when rates of return 
decline to more normal levels. Roughly in 2020, the first group of
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workers who have spent their entire career contributing to the new 
Chilean pension system will retire. At that point and in future years, it 
will be much clearer whether the contribution rate was adequate, given 
the rates of return experienced in the system over a worker's career. 
Workers believing that the 10 percent contribution rate is too low to 
provide an adequate retirement have the option of voluntarily contrib 
uting a higher percentage. An argument could be made, based on pater 
nalism by the government and myopia or lack of discipline by workers, 
that the mandatory contribution rate should be increased slightly to 
assure an adequate retirement benefit.
The Chilean pension system has had high administrative costs, 
partly because of competition between pension fund management 
companies for clients. While it might appear that competition would 
result in low fees, the expenses for advertising and sales force neces 
sary for a private market system are not present in a government-run 
system. In Argentina's pension system, most advertising has been 
banned.
Workers in Chile bear more financial market risk than workers in the 
United States, because U.S. workers have a defined benefit social secu 
rity system that is not directly affected by financial market risk. This 
aspect of risk bearing may ultimately be viewed as an important weak 
ness of the Chilean system. With the Chilean economy growing at a 
steady pace, that weakness has not been evident. However, one aspect 
of risk is lower in Chile. By privatizing management of its social secu 
rity system, Chile has succeeded in greatly insulating old-age benefits 
from the risk of change due to political forces (Diamond and Valdes- 
Prieto 1994).
"Pay-or-Play" Pensions: Japan and the United Kingdom
"Pay-or-play" refers to a government benefits policy for workers 
that has two options. Under "pay" the firm contributes to a mandatory 
government-sponsored program. Under "play" the firm provides a ben 
efit plan that substitutes for the government program and in exchange 
pays a reduced mandatory contribution.
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Pay-or-play permits firms to voluntarily privatize government bene 
fit programs. Such a policy differs from the pension system in Chile 
where privatization is mandatory for all new workers. The extent to 
which privatization occurs under pay-or-play depends on the voluntary 
choices made by firms, and in some variants by workers. Firms and 
workers presumably pick the private-sector option if it minimizes their 
long-run costs for providing a desired level of benefits.
"Pay-or-play" has been used to refer to policy options for health 
care reform. The term has not been used to refer to similar pension pol 
icy options, but it applies equally well to them.
To understand how a pay-or-play policy could privatize social secu 
rity, and how, once started, such a policy might evolve, we can look to 
the experience of the United Kingdom and Japan. The pay-or-play 
option for pensions originated in the United Kingdom in 1961, but was 
discontinued for a period. It has continuously operated there since 
1978. Such a system has operated in Japan since 1966. 3 Firms that 
meet certain criteria can withdraw, or "contract out," from part of the 
Japanese and British social security systems.
Contracting out allows firms to voluntarily privatize part of the 
social security system by paying a reduced contribution to social secu 
rity when they provide a replacement private pension plan of sufficient 
generosity.4 This option expands the range of choice open to the private 
sector while assuring adequate retirement income.5
The current forms of contracting out in Japan and the United King 
dom have evolved from simpler programs. The initial programs may 
provide insight into how such a program could be started, while the 
historical development in those countries suggests possible refinements 
to a system after the initial framework has been established.
The Japanese and British defined benefit pay-or-play systems com 
pete with the Chilean mandatory defined contribution system as a 
model for pension reform. The patterns of risk-bearing in the Chilean 
defined contribution option are much different from the Japanese and 
British defined benefit systems. Although pension experts have debated 
the relative merits of defined benefit and defined contribution plans, 
defined benefit plans have traditionally been preferred by most workers 
and employers.6
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Japan
Pay-or-play pensions in Japan can only be understood in relation 
ship to the Japanese social security system. The Japanese social secu 
rity system has a program called the National Pension, where benefits 
are based on the number of years for which the individual has made 
monthly contributions. Monthly contributions are equal for all contrib 
utors, not based on earnings. In 1991, the flat rate benefit plan was 29 
percent of total social security benefits and 10 percent of social secu 
rity tax payments (Turner and Rajnes 1995). Japanese social security 
also has an earnings-related segment called Employees' Pension Insur 
ance. Benefits from Employees' Pension Insurance are based on a flat 
rate times average earnings times years of service. Employers can con 
tract out of part of the earnings-related segment of the program and 
establish plans called Employees' Pension Funds.
Unlike the U.S. social security system, the earnings-related benefit 
formula of the Japanese social security system is not progressive in that 
it does not provide higher benefits relative to covered earnings for low- 
wage workers. The lack of income transfers within the earnings-related 
part of the Japanese social security program facilitates contracting out 
because there are no systematic incentives for high-income workers to 
contract out at the expense of low-income workers.
A Japanese employer can qualify three ways to contract out of the 
social security Employees' Pension Insurance. First, large employers 
can contract out. When this option was first available, the size require 
ment for a firm to be eligible was 1,000 full-time employees, but it has 
been reduced so that a firm with 500 full-time employees can contract 
out.7 Second, a controlled group of employers can contract out. A con 
trolled group is a group of allied employers having substantially the 
same ownership. Initially, 5,000 employees were required, but this has 
been reduced to 800. Third, a group of smaller employers in the same 
industry can form a multiemployer group in order to contract out. Ini 
tially, 5,000 employees were required in such a group, but that number 
has been reduced to 3,000. A liberalization of the rules allows firms to 
form groups composed of employers in different industries within the 
same region. The minimum size for such a regional group is also 3,000 
employees.
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In 1992, data on contracted-out plans indicated that there were 547 
single-company plans, 612 allied company plans, and 566 multiem- 
ployer plans (Pension Fund Association 1993).
The Japanese government requires a minimum number of employ 
ees in a contracted-out pension plan because of concern for the finan 
cial stability of the plan. The volatility of plan finances is greater for 
plans composed of smaller employers because smaller employers have 
a greater risk of bankruptcy than larger employers. For that reason, 
contracted-out plans composed of small employers have a higher mini 
mum number of employees than plans where only large employers par 
ticipate.
Besides the minimum size requirement, four other requirements 
must be met for establishing a contracted-out plan. First, the firm must 
have made a profit for each of the preceding three years. Second, at 
least half of the full-time employees of the firm must vote in favor of 
establishing a plan. Third, if a union represents at least a third of the 
employees, it must approve the plan by a majority vote. Fourth, the 
firm must have had a stable or growing labor force for the preceding 
three years. Once a firm has established a contracted-out plan, it can 
continue such a plan even if it later fails to meet the initial size and 
profitability requirements.
As a result of contracting out, the payroll tax rate for Employees' 
Pension Insurance was reduced in 1994 by 3.2 percentage points, from 
14.5 percent to 11.3 percent (table 3.2). The payment of contributions 
and the reduction in rates is shared equally by the employer and the 
employee. As the payroll tax rate has risen over time, the percentage by 
which contracting out reduces the total has fallen considerably. In 
1994, contracting out reduced the payroll tax rate by 22 percent, in 
comparison to 44 percent or more in 1966.
These contracted-out plans must participate in a national Pension 
Fund Association, a nonprofit, private-sector organization heavily 
influenced by the government through the Ministry of Health and Wel 
fare. The Association provides several services. First, it insures the 
benefits in the plans. If an employer were to go bankrupt, the Pension 
Fund Association guarantees the benefits provided by the plan and 
pays beneficiaries. 8 Second, the Association assures that there is no 
loss of benefits for employees changing jobs. The amount that has been 
accumulated for a job-changing employee is transferred to the Pension
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Fund Association. Third, for a fee, the Association provides adminis 
trative and record keeping services for smaller employers. In this way, 
smaller employers can gain economies of scale in plan administration. 
The Association also consults with plans at no charge concerning 
administrative problems. Fourth, the Association researches issues 
concerning the administration and structure of plans.
Table 3.2 Reduction in the Social Security Tax Rate Due to 



















































The government's goal is to have 50 percent of the full-time labor 
force (private and public) participating in a contracted-out pension 
plan. The percentage has been growing over time, reaching 36 percent 
in 1993. Growth has been due to the reduction of the minimum size 
requirement and to regional groups of small employers being allowed 
to participate.
While many U.S. pension experts oppose contracting out for pen 
sions, the system has operated successfully in Japan for many years. 
An alternative and considerably more complex system of contracting 
out has also existed in the United Kingdom.
United Kingdom
While virtually every developed country has a social security sys 
tem, the United Kingdom is virtually unique in giving every employer 
and employee the option of contracting out of part of social security.
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Contracting out in the United Kingdom has developed into a highly 
complex system.
Like Japan, the United Kingdom has a two-tier social security sys 
tem supplemented by a voluntary private pension system. The main 
part of social security benefit expenditures is a flat rate benefit, called 
the National Insurance benefit. Unlike in Japan, where the flat rate ben 
efit is relatively unimportant, in the United Kingdom it is more than 
two-thirds of social security benefits. This benefit is financed primarily 
by employer and employee contributions, but is also partly financed by 
government payments. In 1993, government contributions were set at a 
level not to exceed 20 percent of benefit payments. The program is 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
As in the Japanese system, it is not possible to contract out of the 
British flat rate benefit, although such a policy has been discussed. The 
National Insurance program provides a uniform benefit to all recipi 
ents, varying as in Japan by years of work but not by previous earnings. 
It does, however, vary by marital status, being about 60 percent higher 
for married workers. The Chilean system, in contrast, does not provide 
higher benefits based on marital or family status, but does provide 
higher benefits based on gender and other indicators of life expectancy.
The British social security system also provides an earnings-related 
benefit, called the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERFS), 
where benefits are financed by a payroll tax levied within an earnings 
band.
The flat rate pension has been frozen in real terms, keeping pace 
with inflation but not with growth in real wages. Over time, it will 
gradually become a less important aspect of the British retirement 
income system. The earnings-related part will gradually grow in rela 
tive importance, reaching about a third of the total cost of social secu 
rity pensions by the year 2030.
The British system differs considerably from the Japanese in the 
conditions under which contracting out can occur. While the Japanese 
restrict contracting out to certain firms or groups of firms, the British 
allow all firms to contract out of the earnings-related part of social 
security so long as they provide a benefit at least as generous. Most 
contracted-out defined benefit plans provide benefits considerably 
greater than the minimum required. Contracted-out defined benefit 
plans must base benefits on years of service and final earnings.
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While the British have no restrictions as to the types of firms con 
tracting out, or to their likely financial stability, the government 
attempts to assure that firms fully fund their contracted-out plans. The 
Occupational Pensions Board, an agency of the national government, 
has the statutory responsibility to ensure that employers fully fund the 
accrued liabilities for Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP) benefits at 
least equal to benefits that would have been provided by the social 
security system. The plan's actuary must provide a regular certificate to 
this effect, and the Occupational Pensions Board relies heavily on this 
oversight provided by actuaries.
In addition, the British social security system insures that the GMP 
be paid. If a firm goes bankrupt, the state assumes responsibility for 
paying the benefit by reinstating the worker in the State Earnings- 
Related Pension Scheme. Contracted-out salary-related defined benefit 
plans must pay at least the GMP, which in 1994 was approximately 18 
percent of the worker's average indexed salary up to the ceiling salary. 
That percentage will rise to 25 percent as the system matures, but then 
will gradually fall to 20 percent in the early part of the twenty-first cen 
tury as a result of legislative changes.
In the United Kingdom, firms may unilaterally contract out. They 
are required to consult with the relevant unions if their workforce is 
unionized, but the decision is the employer's. About 50 percent of 
workers in the private and public sectors combined are covered by an 
employer-provided pension. Virtually 100 percent of public-sector 
pensions are contracted out. In the private sector, 78 percent of mem 
bers of pension plans are contracted out (Daykin 1995).
When an employee joins a pension plan that is contracted out, the 
administration is simple. All that is required is for the employer's pay 
roll department to deduct contributions for social security at the lower 
contribution rate that applies for contracted out plans. When year-end 
filings are made to the Department of Social Security, the worker's 
change from contracted-in to contracted-out status will be recorded. 
However, when an employee ends a job with a pension plan that is con 
tracted out and moves to one that is not contracted out, the administra 
tion is more complicated. Whenever an employee leaves a contracted- 
out plan, the government needs to know: (1) if contracted-out benefits 
are being preserved in the plan; (2) if contracted-out benefits are being
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transferred to another plan, and who will be liable for paying them; and 
(3) if the worker will be contracted out in the new job.
A job leaver with less than two years of service in a contracted-out 
defined benefit plan may pay a premium to the government to restore 
the social security earnings-related benefits as if they had not been con 
tracted out.
Contracting Out with Defined Contribution Plans
As in Japan, the contracting-out option in the United Kingdom has 
been expanded over time to make it available to more people. Before 
the Social Security Act of 1986, the only way a firm or worker could 
contract out was by the firm providing a replacement defined benefit 
plan. Since 1988, firms can also contract out using a money purchase 
defined contribution plan. Unlike a salary-related defined benefit plan, 
there is no Guaranteed Minimum Pension in a contracted-out money 
purchase plan. The employer and employee simply contribute to the 
contracted-out plan at least the amount they would have contributed to 
the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme. An employer may offer 
both a contracted-out money purchase plan and a contracted-out 
defined benefit plan and allow workers to choose.
The participant in a contracted-out money purchase plan has "pro 
tected rights." These are the benefits secured by the value of the assets 
based on the social security contributions that would have been made 
had the worker not contracted out. Benefits based on protected rights 
can only be taken as an annuity at retirement age, and then no earlier 
than age 60. The conversion to an annuity must be at a unisex rate, and 
the pension must provide survivor's benefits to a widow or widower 
who has dependent children or is age 45 or older.
In addition to allowing firms to contract out, British law has allowed 
workers to contract out individually since 1988. Workers can opt out of 
the employer's contracted-out plan and subscribe instead to a personal 
defined contribution plan called an Appropriate Personal Pension. For 
personal pension plans, contracting out means authorizing the govern 
ment to pay a rebate of social security contributions into a personal 
plan. This option represents a fundamental change in the British pen 
sion system from compulsory to voluntary membership in employer- 
provided pension plans.
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Appropriate Personal Pensions purchased with contracting-out 
rebates must be taken as an annuity, with 3 percent a year increases and 
a benefit to a surviving spouse of half the member's pension. Addi 
tional contributions can be used for other benefits.
Appropriate Personal Pensions can be chosen by all employees— 
including those whose employer does not offer a pension plan, those 
whose employer offers a contracted-out plan, and those whose 
employer offers a contracted-in plan. However, Appropriate Personal 
Pensions are not financially advantageous for low-income workers. 
Because the contributions of low-income workers into these plans are 
necessarily small, the fixed costs of establishing and maintaining such 
plans are too high a percentage of the contributions to make them prof 
itable.
Like any personal pension, an Appropriate Personal Pension can be 
arranged directly with the provider with no involvement of the 
employer. Providers include insurance companies, banks, building 
societies, unit trusts, and friendly societies. 9 Since the employer will 
often be unaware that the worker has an Appropriate Personal Pension, 
the existence of such a pension plan has no effect on the worker's 
social security contributions, which continue to be paid in full. A 
rebate from the Department of Health and Social Security to the pro 
vider of the Appropriate Personal Pension Plan is paid after the end of 
each tax year. Personal income tax paid on the employee's share of the 
social security contribution is also rebated. The rebate does not include 
interest on the social security contributions or income tax payments, 
which could have been paid in part more than 12 months earlier. 10 By 
this method, contracting out can be back-dated to the beginning of the 
tax year as late as the end of the tax year.
An employee may opt out of a company's contributory pension plan 
where he or she may be contributing as much as 5 or 6 percent of earn 
ings in favor of a contracted-out personal pension plan requiring only a 
2 percent contribution. The ultimate retirement benefit in that case 
would be reduced.
The policy of allowing nonparticipation in an employer-provided 
pension plan complicates the financial calculus for the employer decid 
ing whether to contract out. If all young employees opt out of the 
employer's contracted-out plan and the older, high-cost employees 
remain in, it may not be financially beneficial for the employer to pro-
Privatizing Retirement Income 39
vide such a plan. Any financial advantage to a firm of contracting out 
will depend on the age-sex composition of the employees covered by 
the plan.
Between 1988 and 1992, it has been estimated that the British gov 
ernment paid 10.5 billion pounds in the form of rebates on social secu 
rity contributions to people taking out personal pensions. However, not 
all of the money spent on personal pensions has gone directly to 
increasing pension benefits. Insurance industry experts estimate that 
companies selling personal pensions typically take between 4 percent 
and 13 percent of contributions in commissions and charges for sales 
agents and management fees (Cohen 1994c).
In contracted-out defined contribution plans, the worker bears the 
investment risk. If the actual benefit based on the assets in the defined 
contribution plan is lower than what the worker would have received 
from a contracted-out defined benefit plan, the government does not 
make up the difference. Similarly, if the actual benefit is higher, the 
government does not reduce the social security benefit it provides. 
Thus, while contracting out through a defined benefit plan does not 
affect a worker's entitlement or risk, contracting out through a defined 
contribution plan does: it alters the worker's risk because the govern 
ment defined benefit plan is replaced by a private-sector defined contri 
bution plan.
As of 1992, more than 300,000 men and women who contracted out 
of the social security State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme through 
a personal pension probably were going to receive lower benefits on 
retirement than if they had remained contracted in. That is because the 
rebate system gives more than a young person would need to buy pen 
sion benefits equivalent to the social security State Earnings-Related 
Pension Scheme benefits, but far less than an older person would need 
(Cohen 1994c).
Contracting out through use of a personal pension plan is a revers 
ible decision. Workers can later change their minds and rejoin the gov 
ernment program, but that option is available only once. For workers 
who opt out of their employer's contracted-out pension plan, the 
employer need not give the option to rejoin. Employers who allow 
workers to rejoin may require evidence of good health so that the 
employer's death benefits are not exploited.
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For early job leavers, the contracted-out plan is required to provide 
cost-of-living adjustments to the value of accrued benefits between the 
date of job leaving and retirement. 11
Both the Japanese and British governments have been reluctant to 
impose the full cost of postretirement inflation indexing on firms with 
contracted-out plans. In the United Kingdom, the government pays 
much of the cost of indexation equal to the increase in the Retail Price 
Index for the Guaranteed Minimum Pension after the worker retires. 
For benefits accruing after 1988, the firm is obligated to pay the cost of 
indexation up to 3 percent a year. For workers covered by a contracted- 
out defined contribution plan, the annuity benefits must be indexed for 
inflation up to 3 percent a year. For inflation higher than 3 percent, the 
government provides full indexing on the Guaranteed Minimum Pen 
sion.
Contracting-Out Rebate
The reduction in the social security contribution when contracted 
out is based on the estimated cost to plans of providing the Guaranteed 
Minimum Pension. However, the government has generally included 
an additional margin in the rebate partly as an incentive for contracting 
out, especially for plans with nontypical age distributions.
With these three methods of contracting out—defined benefit plans, 
employer-provided money purchase plans, and personal pension 
plans—social security benefits are reduced by an amount based on the 
worker's earnings while contracted out. This reduction is the same for 
each method. The reduction is intended to be at least sufficient so that 
the contribution of that amount to the contracted-out plan would pro 
vide the worker the same level of benefits as would have been provided 
through social security alone.
The contracted-out rebate has been independent of both the age and 
sex of the worker. The cost of an employee's contracted-out benefit, 
however, rises with age. At age 25 it is between 2 percent and 3 percent 
of earnings. At age 55, it may be 9 percent or more. Because of the 
constancy of the rebate across ages, the likelihood of having a better 
financial deal through a personal pension than through the government 
program declines as workers age. Different investment advisers sug 
gest different ages for contracting back into the government program. 
For example, Prudential advises men aged 49 and women aged 42 to
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rejoin. Because women can retire at a younger age than men, it is more 
expensive to provide women a given level of benefits. For that reason, 
the age for optimally rejoining social security is lower for women than 
men. The calculations underlying these figures depend on assumptions 
about annuity rates at retirement and investment returns before then.
Between April 6, 1988 and April 5, 1993, incentive payments of 2 
percent of covered earnings in addition to the regular rebate were made 
to workers in newly contracted-out plans. Incentive payments of 2 per 
cent were also made to workers in Appropriate Personal Pensions. In 
this way, the British government has subsidized contracting out 
through personal plans. Also, workers who had been in contracted-out 
employer-provided plans for less than two years could receive the 2 
percent incentive payment if they started an Appropriate Personal Pen 
sion. Because of this subsidy to workers leaving the earnings-related 
part of social security, the British government decided to raise by 1 
percent the base rate that workers pay into social security. About two- 
thirds of contracted-out workers are in employer-sponsored plans and 
one-third are in personal pension plans.
The contracting-out incentives continue to change over time in the 
United Kingdom. A 1 percent incentive for Appropriate Pension Plan 
holders over the age of 30 began in April 1993. The British government 
has announced its intention to consider a more finely tuned age-related 
rebate structure starting in 1996.
Other incentives encourage contracting out. First, pension contribu 
tions of workers are tax deductible, while their social security contribu 
tions are not. Second, social security benefits are only payable at age 
65 for men (60 for women), while contracted-out benefits can be pro 
vided earlier.
Over time, the contracting out rebate has fallen in the United King 
dom (table 3.3), while it has risen in Japan. This decline has occurred 
in part due to the decline in the generosity of the earnings-related pen 
sion. In contracted-out plans, the percentage of the social security lia 
bility that is contracted out has varied around one-third without a trend.
The rebates are periodically reviewed and have been reduced after 
considering the underlying economic and demographic assumptions. 
Calculation of the rebate is based on assumptions about the age/sex/ 
earnings profile of the population contracted-out and on assumptions 
about future investment returns and earnings growth, as well as other
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actuarial assumptions. The economic assumptions used in calculating 
the 1988/89 rebate were an 8.5 percent investment return and a 7 per 
cent annual growth in earnings. The assumptions provide a generous 
rebate. The rebate reduction in 1988 was due in part to the reduction 
that year in the accrual rate for future social security State Earnings- 
Related Pension Scheme benefits. The terms for contracting out 
became less favorable in 1993 and could result in many workers in 
contracted-out plans rejoining the State Earnings-Related Pension 
Scheme program. The 1 percent incentive for workers over age 30 is 
designed to counteract that.
Table 3.3 Contracting-Out Rebate in the United Kingdom, 1978-1994 
























Tax rate before rebate
(b) 






















NOTE: The tax year runs from April 6 through April 5 of the following year. A 1986 law 
increased the number of wage classifications on which employers are to pay payroll taxes, 
accounting for the range of tax rates shown. EE stands for employee and ER stands for employer.
Contracting out can be thought of as a means of borrowing from the 
state. The firm or worker receives contribution rebates now, but will 
have to meet future pension obligations. Moreover, in the United King 
dom it is a form of indexed borrowing because of the requirements for 
indexation of benefits. It follows that the attractiveness of contracting 
out will depend on the rate of return that can be earned on pension plan 
assets versus the implicit rate of return earned on contributions to 
social security. As population aging reduces the internal rate of return 
to social security, contracting out will be more attractive.
Critique of Contracting Out
Attractive features of contracting out include reduced reliance on 
the government and greater reliance on the private sector, greater
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incentives for private savings and investment, and more flexibility in 
shaping pension plans.
With contracting out, a largely underfunded public pension program 
is replaced by a private pension program designed to be fully funded 
and invested in the private sector. Thus, an advantage of contracting out 
is that it may increase savings and the national capital stock.
Contracting out expands the options open to firms and workers for 
providing for retirement income. The expanded choice provides greater 
flexibility and may allow individuals to better provide for their retire 
ment in the manner they choose.
In both Japan and the United Kingdom, there were already well- 
developed private pension plans when the social security earnings- 
related benefit program was started. Contracting out was a way to pro 
tect the interests of the middle class who had substantial pension 
rights. 12 Thus, contracting out can be thought of as a way of providing 
the option for higher-income workers who are covered by a private 
pension to decline full participation in social security.
A redistributive social security system where it was possible to con 
tract out fully from the redistributive portion would not be viable 
because all the high earners would contract out, leaving nothing to be 
redistributed to the low earners. In the United Kingdom, the higher- 
earnings employees in contracted-out plans pay considerably more in 
social security taxes than do the lower-earnings employees, but both 
receive the same flat benefit. In 1994, individuals earning less than a 
minimum amount, the Lower Earnings Limit of 56 pounds per week, 
paid nothing. Those earning 56 pounds per week or more paid a 2 per 
cent rate on the first 56 pounds, and 10 percent on earnings between 56 
pounds and the Upper Earnings Limit of 420 pounds. The rate the 
employer paid varied from 4.6 percent to 10.4 percent, increasing with 
the employee's earnings with no ceiling. Thus, the redistributive aspect 
of the system is maintained both on the tax and on the benefits side. 
The replacement rate from British social security falls from 76 percent 
for workers earning 25 percent of the national average earnings to 14 
percent for workers earning 300 percent of the national average earn 
ings (table 3.4).
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Table 3.4 British Social Security Earnings Replacement Rates at
Different Earnings Levels, 1994 
Earnings as a percentage of national






SOURCE: European Commission (1994).
Financing the Transition
A difficult problem in privatizing social security is how to pay for 
existing social security liabilities during the transition period from a 
fully state-run program to a privatized program. This is known as the 
"paying twice problem." The problem arises because the first working 
generation in a privatized social security system must pay for the social 
security benefits of the current generation of retirees, and it must pay 
for its own retirement benefits under the new system. The transition to 
the new system must make that generation worse off, since that genera 
tion would only need to pay for the benefits of current retirees under 
the old system.
This critique of the transition to a privatized social security system 
ignores private intergenerational transfers. So long as other intergener- 
ational transfers are being made, those transfers can be increased or 
reduced to offset the intergenerational transfers caused by the transi 
tion to a privatized system. When generations care about each other, 
transfers will be made to restore the original intergenerational distribu 
tion of income.
When Japanese employers establish Employees' Pension Funds, the 
size of the government social security program is reduced. The size of 
contributions is reduced immediately, and the level of benefit payments 
is reduced in the future. If the Japanese social security system had 
operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, it would have been necessary to 
raise the social security payroll tax rate when contracting out was 
started in order to make up the lost revenue needed for current benefit
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payments. The Japanese social security program is not operated on a 
pay-as-you-go basis, however, but rather is partially funded. For that 
reason, an increase in tax rates was not required when the Japanese 
contracting-out option was begun.
Financing the transition in Chile was easier than it would be in many 
countries because Chile had a relatively young population, and the lia 
bilities to be financed were relatively small in comparison to the total 
population.
In the United Kingdom, contracted-out defined benefit plans only 
need to replace the level of benefits that would have been provided by 
social security, while in Japan the contracted-out benefits must be at 
least 30 percent higher than social security benefits. Many employer- 
provided contracted-out plans in the United Kingdom provide higher 
benefits than the minimum required, but that is not the case for the per 
sonal contracted-out plans (Appropriate Personal Pensions). There is 
concern that people relying on those plans will end up with low retire 
ment income.
State-run social security systems presumably have a cost advantage 
over private systems. Because participation is mandatory, state-run sys 
tems incur no advertising costs. They also may enjoy economies of 
scale. However, their incentives for efficiency are fewer, since they 
have no profit motive.
When contracting out is an individual decision, greater responsibil 
ity is placed on the individual for becoming informed and making pru 
dent decisions concerning retirement financing. There is also the 
possibility pension service providers will exploit the lack of knowledge 
of workers. There is considerable concern in Britain that more than two 
million people who have contracted out may have been wrongly 
advised by insurance companies to leave the social security earnings- 
related program or employer-provided plans and take out personal pen 
sions.
A criticism of the British contracting-out system is that it is too 
complicated. While complexity has the advantage that it may create a 
range of choices, it also increases costs because it creates a demand for 
the services of actuaries and other highly paid benefits consultants.
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Adverse Selection
Critics of contracting out cite adverse selection as a problem for the 
financing of such plans. With adverse selection, firms with employees 
for whom benefits can be provided less expensively leave the govern 
mental program. This exodus of low-cost firms raises the average cost 
for firms remaining in the governmental program, which causes a fur 
ther exodus of firms with relatively low cost.
A requirement that only large firms can contract out limits adverse 
selection to the extent that large firms have workforces with age distri 
butions similar to that of the national workforce. The Government 
Actuary's office in the United Kingdom has argued that the age struc 
ture of the British workforce does not differ greatly across firms. How 
ever, in Japan, as in the United States, some large computer software 
companies have young workforces, for example, while some steel-pro 
ducing companies have older workforces. Benefits are generally less 
expensive to provide for younger workforces through contracting out 
than through the government program.
Adverse selection is also limited by not allowing firms to freely 
withdraw from contracting out. In Japan, a firm must have the approval 
of its employees to end an Employees' Pension Fund plan.
Adverse selection is also limited in Japan because the earnings- 
related part of the Japanese social security system is not redistributive 
from high- to low-income workers. The redistributive aspect of the 
U.S. social security system makes contracting out more difficult to 
establish, since high-income workers and firms would tend to favor 
contracting out while low-income workers and firms would tend to 
favor remaining fully in the system. That problem has been solved in 
the United Kingdom, however, where redistribution occurs through 
higher social security tax rates paid by higher-income employees in 
contracted-out plans.
In spite of the incentive for adverse selection in the Japanese system, 
and the possibility of adverse selection by small firms joining regional 
or industry groups, the average age in contracted-out plans is similar to 
the average age in the Japanese workforce, according to government 
actuaries.
Nonetheless, to limit adverse selection in Japan, one proposal being 
considered would vary the terms of contracting out based on the aver 
age age of the employees in the firm. Firms with an older average age
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would be allowed more favorable terms for contracting out because it 
is more expensive for those firms to provide the required benefits. A 
similar proposal on an individual basis is being considered in the 
United Kingdom.
Conclusions
The British and Japanese systems provide a program for voluntarily 
privatizing government benefits. Together they have had more than 50 
years of experience with their programs. Both programs have been 
modified several times, consistent with the desire to encourage firms 
and workers to contract out.
Compared to the Chilean approach of privatizing social security 
through a mandatory defined contribution plan, the British and Japa 
nese approaches have more options and allow firms to select the form 
in which retirement income is provided. They also provide risk diversi 
fication in that pay-as-you-go and funded systems are subject to differ 
ent risks. Pay-as-you-go systems are subject to the risk of demographic 
changes, while funded systems are subject to financial market risks.
British and Japanese workers in defined benefit plans do not bear the 
risks of pension asset value fluctuations, while those risks are borne by 
Chilean workers and by British workers in contracted-out defined con 
tribution plans. Both defined benefit and defined contribution 
approaches, however, offer funded alternatives to unfunded social 
security systems.
NOTES
1. Participants in the previous social security system had the option of remaining in that sys 
tem. Because participation in the new system was offered on generous terms, few did.
2. The companies are known as Admmistradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs).
3. See Clark (1991b) for a description of the Japanese pension system and Turner and Dailey 
(1991) for a description of the British and Japanese systems.
4. The term "contract out" is synonymous with "pay-or-play," and is the term that has been 
used in describing such an option for pensions
5. In the United States, state governments that have historically not participated in social 
security are allowed to opt out, but there are no requirements concerning alternative retirement 
plans they might provide.
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6. In addition, pay-or-play pensions in Japan provide a possible model for privatizing U.S. 
unemployment insurance, where large firms could privately contract out for such insurance.
7. Part-time employees are not counted in determining whether an employer is large enough to 
meet the minimum size requirement.
8. The insurance program has operated since 1989. As of 1993, no plans had terminated with 
insufficient assets.
9. A unit trust is a mutual fund where the price of units is determined by the managers based 
on the net asset value of the fund Investors can buy into the trust or redeem an earlier investment 
based on the value of units. A friendly society is a type of small financial institution in the United 
Kingdom, owned by its members, that offers sickness, retirement, unemployment, and death ben 
efits, as well as savings plans, to its members.
10. An advantage of a contracted-out money purchase plan is that the rebate is paid directly in 
the plan with no delay.
11. The contracted-out plan can choose between three methods for revaluing benefits: (1) 
complete indexation, (2) a fixed 7 percent per year, and (3) 5 percent per year or full indexation if 
lower
12. The situation was similar to that in the United States, where workers in the railroad indus 
try and workers in state, local, and federal government were not required to participate in social 
security when it was started.
4
Tax Policy Towards 
Private Pensions
Tax policy is both the engine and the brakes of the private pension 
system. It both encourages firms to offer pension plans and discourages 
or regulates particular features. It encourages the formation and growth 
of pension plans by providing them favorable treatment compared to 
that of other assets. All countries with well-developed pension systems 
provide preferential tax treatment for saving through pensions. The tax 
system regulates private pensions by setting conditions under which 
favorable tax treatment can be received. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, these requirements are the primary legal constraints on pri 
vate pension plans (Daykin 1995). At times the regulatory aspects of 
tax policy may discourage firms from offering plans, counteracting the 
policy aspects designed to encourage their formation.
The tax treatment of pensions is the result of compromises made 
within the political arena. While the broad goals of pension tax policy 
are similar across developed countries, specific policies and practices 
vary significantly. This chapter examines tax policy differences across 
countries. 1 By focusing on differences, insights can be gained into the 
tax treatment of pensions in individual countries. Differing policies 
and practices also demonstrate the range of options available to policy 
makers.
Overview
The most common approach to taxing pensions is to allow a tax 
deduction for contributions, allow investment earnings to accumulate 
tax free, and tax benefits when paid to workers. New Zealand is the 
most notable current exception to this approach: pensions funds there 
are taxed on the same basis as a fully taxable savings account. 2
Favorable tax treatment for pensions is justified by the argument that 
it encourages retirement savings and that without a tax subsidy families
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would save too little (Ippolito 1990a). Possible explanations for insuffi 
cient savings are that some families may be myopic, not fully anticipat 
ing future needs, or that they may lack the discipline to save adequately 
for future needs.
By encouraging pensions through preferential tax treatment, govern 
ments incur a cost in lost tax revenue. This is the revenue that would 
have been received if the savings had otherwise occurred in taxable 
form. As populations age and the cost of tax preferences for pensions 
rises, it is not surprising to find governments seeking to reduce the loss 
in tax revenue.
Some of the tax provisions concerning pensions are not designed to 
raise or reduce tax revenue, but rather are designed to regulate plans by 
influencing the behavior of pension fund managers or pension partici 
pants.
Pension plans in the United States must meet requirements of the 
Internal Revenue Code in order to qualify for favorable tax treatment. 
To be tax-qualified, a plan must meet minimum standards regarding 
participation, vesting, nondiscrimination against lower paid workers, 
and other criteria. When plans do not meet these standards, the 
employer's contribution must be included in the employee's taxable 
income in order to be tax deductible for the employer.
In the United Kingdom, some actions by pension plans or employ 
ees are not forbidden or required, but instead are encourage or discour 
aged by the use of taxes. For example, tax penalties are levied on plans 
that are overfunded and fail to withdraw the surpluses from the plan. 
This policy encourages plans to withdraw their excess assets and return 
them to the employer. The opposite policy is followed in the United 
States. No tax is levied on excess assets if they remain within the pen 
sion plan. However, a minimum tax of 20 percent is levied on excess 
assets of overfunded plans when those plans terminate and the assets 
are returned to the employer. The tax rate is increased to 50 percent if 
the employer does not also transfer a portion of the excess assets to a 
replacement plan or increase the benefits in under the terminating plan.
Tax systems can be compared in terms of whether they distort 
choices made by workers and employers. These choices include: wages 
versus pensions, deferred wages versus pensions, other fringe benefits 
(such as health insurance) versus pensions, social security versus pen 
sions, current consumption versus future consumption, defined benefit
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versus defined contribution plans, individual plans versus employer- 
provided plans, self-employment versus corporate employment, lump- 
sum benefits versus annuities, and pension investments in some types 
of assets versus others. The analysis of each of these issues will be 
demonstrated by using a particular country or countries as an example. 
Private pensions are composed of three transactions: pension contri 
butions, investment earnings, and disbursements. These three transac 
tions plus pension assets are the primary points at which pensions have 
the potential to be taxed.
Contributions
Employer Contributions
The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and most other coun 
tries with well-developed private pension systems allow employer con 
tributions to be tax deductible. In this way, employer costs for wages 
and contributions to pension plans receive equal treatment with respect 
to corporate income taxes. Thus, the tax system does not distort the 
choice of employers between paying current wages and paying future 
pension benefits. There is still a tax distortion between paying deferred 
wages and paying pensions, however, since there is no equivalent man 
ner for a firm to set aside money to pay for deferred wages.
Employer contributions to a pension plan are not taxed as income to 
the employee, which avoids both personal income and social security 
payroll taxation at the time the contributions are made. Because 
employees pay tax on pension benefits when received in retirement, 
they entirely avoid social security taxation. This reduces the tax burden 
for workers, but it also reduces their future social security benefits in 
countries, such as the United States, where benefits are related to tax 
able earnings (Burkhauser and Turner 1985).
In Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, employers 
may deduct 100 percent of contributions for retirement annuity bene 
fits. Contributions for past service liability are also tax deductible.
In Australia, by contrast, employer contributions are taxed at a rate 
of 15 percent to the employee. However, the difference between the 15
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percent rate and the employee's marginal personal income tax rate can 
still be considerable (Asinta 1994).
Employee Contributions
In the United Kingdom, Canada and most other countries, employee 
contributions also are tax deductible. In Belgium, however, only 30 to 
40 percent of employee contributions are tax deductible. In New 
Zealand, neither employee nor employer pension contributions are tax 
deductible. In the United States, employee contributions for most types 
of pension plans are taxable under both the personal income tax and 
social security payroll tax. Thus, the U.S. tax code treats employer and 
employee contributions differently.
Employee contributions to salary reduction plans, however, are an 
exception to the rule that employee contributions are taxed in the 
United States. The most common type of salary reduction plans are 
401(k) plans. In salary reduction plans, employee contributions are 
deductible from before-tax earnings under the federal income tax but 
still are liable for the social security payroll tax so as not to erode the 
social security tax base. 3
The primary effect of not allowing employee contributions to be tax 
deductible for most types of U.S. pension plans is that most plans are 
funded entirely by employer contributions. Since employees probably 
bear the cost of employer contributions through reduced wages (Mont 
gomery, Shaw, and Benedict 1992), the lack of deductibility of 
employee contributions appears to have little effect on the cost of pen 
sion plans to employers or employees. According to this argument, the 
tax deductibility of employee contributions to 401(k) plans would not 
be a particularly advantageous feature of those plans, and the fact that 
this feature is not available to defined benefit plans would not particu 
larly disadvantage them.
In the United States, if an individual does not use his or her allow 
able tax deduction for pension contributions to a defined contribution 
plan within the tax year, it is generally lost. The tax treatment of contri 
butions to defined contribution plans in Canada allows individuals 
greater flexibility in the timing of their contributions. An individual's 
unused contribution allowance in each year is carried forward indefi 
nitely for use in subsequent years, subject to certain dollar limits. Sim-
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ilarly, contributions not deductible in the year in which they are paid 
may be deducted in subsequent years.
This flexibility for contributions to defined contribution plans was 
introduced to achieve equal footing with the flexibility available to 
employers for contributions to defined benefit plans. Employers in 
most countries have flexibility in their contributions to defined benefit 
plans, so long as their plans are not overfunded to the extent that fur 
ther contributions are not allowed.
Registered Retirement Savings Plans are the Canadian equivalent of 
Individual Retirement Accounts in the United States. Contributions to 
the Canadian plans must be made within 60 days of the end of the year 
in order to be deductible for the year. A similar provision in the United 
States is available for contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts. 
However, in Canada failure to contribute by the deadline does not 
cause the deduction to be lost. Unused contribution amounts, subject to 
a prescribed seven-year limit, may be carried forward and deducted 
when made (Hewitt Associates 1990).
Contribution Limits
Countries generally set a maximum on allowable tax deductible 
contributions. The maximum is often expressed as both a maximum 
percentage of earnings and a maximum amount. Maximums are set to 
limit the government's loss of tax revenues and to limit the tax prefer 
ences received by high-income workers.
In the United States, maximum contributions to a pension plan on 
behalf of an employee are lower when the employee is covered by 
more than one plan, and when the plan is top heavy, which refers to 
plans (mainly found in small firms) where a disproportionate amount 
of the benefits accrue to the owners and higher-paid employees of the 
firm. Limits are placed on the maximum employee earnings that can be 
used to determine benefits or contributions. There are also contribution 
limits based on the extent to which defined benefit pension assets 
exceed or fall short of liabilities.
In the United States, there are maximum limits for both defined ben 
efit and defined contribution plans. The limits set the amount that can 
be contributed to a defined contribution plan and the maximum benefit 
that can be received from a defined benefit plan. For a defined contribu-
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tion plan, the annual limit is the lesser of 25 percent of compensation 
or $30,000. The $30,000 limit will be adjusted to equal one-fourth of 
the dollar limit on which benefits can be calculated for defined benefit 
plans, after that limit, which is price indexed, exceeds $120,000. 
Defined benefit plans are limited in the actuarial assumptions they can 
make, which prevents plans from claiming unreasonably large tax 
deductions.
The tax treatment of pensions in Canada is based on the principle 
that all workers should have equal access to a tax-preferenced pension 
plan, whether or not their employer provides a pension plan. This is 
viewed as an important principle of interpersonal equity. To achieve it, 
each worker's maximum contributions to a Registered Retirement Sav 
ings Plan is reduced by a Pension Adjustment to reflect the assessed 
accrual of benefit value under employer-provided defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans. This integration of employer-provided 
plans with individual plans assures that all workers are able to set aside 
roughly an equivalent amount in a tax-preferred retirement plan.
This is a major difference between the tax treatment of pensions in 
Canada and in the United States. No attempt has been made in the 
United States to equalize the treatment between employer-provided 
plans and individual plans. U.S. pension tax policy greatly favors 
employer-provided plans over individual plans. Since 1981, maximum 
deductible contributions to an Individual Retirement Account have 
been frozen at $2,000. For middle- and upper-income workers, maxi 
mum tax deductible contributions are roughly ten times higher in 
employer-provided plans than in Individual Retirement Accounts.
In Canada, tax deductible contributions to retirement arrangements 
by or on behalf of individuals are limited to the lesser of 18 percent of 
the prior year's earnings and dollar limits that will be wage indexed 
starting in 1995 from a base of $15,500 in 1994. The figure of 18 per 
cent for the maximum allowable contribution was chosen because it is 
roughly consistent with the existing limit on benefit formulas of 2 per 
cent of earnings per year of service that applies to pension benefits pro 
vided by defined benefit plans (Wyatt 1990).
In Japan, employee contributions to an Employees' Pension Fund, 
which is the contracted-out type of plan, receive a tax deduction 
because such plans are similar to social insurance. For a Tax-Qualified
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Pension plan, employees may receive a tax deduction for contributions 
up to a low maximum of 100,000 yen a year (about $950).4
In the United Kingdom, the maximum allowable tax deductible con 
tributions for personal pension plans increase with age, rising from 
17.5 percent of earnings for those under age 36, to 40 percent for those 
ages 61 to 74 (table 4.1). The idea behind this policy is that older work 
ers are more aware of their retirement income needs and may be more 
motivated to save for their retirement. In the United States and other 
countries, the amount does not vary by age.
The 25 percent limit for employer plans in the United States is con 
siderably higher than the 18 percent limit in Canada, but considerably 
lower than the 40 percent limit for older workers in the United King 
dom. These differences, however, may be of little economic signifi 
cance if few workers wish to contribute more than the 18 percent limit. 
The difference is most likely to be constraining for older workers and 
higher income workers, who would more likely wish to contribute a 
high percentage of their salary to a pension plan.
Perhaps because the aging of populations has raised the level of total 
tax deductions for pensions in many countries, there has been a trend in 
countries with developed pension systems toward reducing the maxi 
mum amount that can be deducted. This has occurred in the United 
States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
Table 4.1 Maximum Allowable Percentage of Salary Contributions to a 















SOURCE: British Tax Law.
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Tax Treatment of High-Income Workers
Because most countries have progressive income tax systems, with 
higher-income workers paying higher marginal tax rates, the tax 
deductibility of contributions is relatively more beneficial for higher 
income taxpayers. In the mid 1990s, higher-income taxpayers in the 
United Kingdom effectively received a tax rebate of 40 percent on pen 
sion contributions, while basic rate taxpayers, who were the large 
majority, received a 25 percent rebate. While pension tax policy can be 
criticized as favoring middle- and upper-income taxpayers, a broader 
analysis of tax policy that includes redistribution through social secu 
rity would provide a better measure of the transfers made by the gov 
ernment to different income groups to provide retirement income.
The tax treatment of pension plans is more generous for high- 
income workers in the United States than it is in Canada. The maxi 
mum dollar amount of contributions to defined contribution plans is 
considerably higher in the United States, and the maximum percentage 
of earnings that may be contributed is also higher. Both of these fea 
tures benefit high-income workers.
Book Reserve Plans
For book reserve plans in Germany, Austria, Luxembourg and 
Japan, firms may take a tax deduction even though they make no con 
tribution to the plan. A book reserve plan is one where the firm indi 
cates the pension liabilities in its financial accounts but does not set 
aside money in a separate fund. The tax deductible amount is deter 
mined by calculating the contribution that would be necessary to fully 
fund the accrued liability.
In Germany, book reserve liabilities are not deductible for employ 
ees younger than age 30, and limitations are placed on the actuarial 
assumptions to prevent employers from deducting unreasonably large 
amounts. In Japan, only 40 percent of the accrual of book reserve is tax 
deductible. In the United States, firms receive no tax deduction for 
their unfunded pension liabilities.
In Japan, it is cheaper for employers to accumulate the money nec 
essary to pay benefits through an Employees' Pension Fund plan or a 
Tax-Qualified Pension plan than it is to accumulate money to pay ben-
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efits through a book reserve plan. The present tax laws are not favor 
able for book reserve plans. However, many large companies have 
book reserve plans because they can use the money that would have 
been put into a pension plan as working capital in the firm. The popu 
larity of book reserve plans in Japan in spite of their relatively unfavor 
able tax treatment indicates the high value that firms appear to place on 
the availability of this form of corporate financing.
Investment Earnings
In Canada, the United States, and the majority of countries with 
well-developed private pension systems, investment earnings on pen 
sion assets accumulate tax free. Pension plans receive dividends, capi 
tal gains, and interest payments and pay no tax on those earnings. 
However, taxation of pension investment earnings is becoming increas 
ingly common. In Australia, they are taxed at 15 percent, while capital 
gains are taxable at 15 percent after adjustment for inflation. This dis 
parate treatment of capital gains and investment earnings distorts the 
pension portfolios of Australian pension funds towards investing in 
stocks providing capital gains rather than dividends.
In Belgium, pension funds face a tax rate of 10 percent on interest 
income, and 20 or 25 percent on dividends and income from property. 
In Ireland, a tax was placed on pension fund investment income in 
1988, including realized capital gains, on a one-time-only basis (Stew- 
art 1995). In the Netherlands, pension investment income is taxed to 
the extent that it exceeds a real rate of return of 3.5 percent. Both real 
ized and unrealized capital gains are included in the calculation of the 
real rate of return. The tax rate is 40.5 percent. In Sweden, pension 
investment income is taxed at 10 or 15 percent, compared to a general 
income tax rate of 30 percent.
In the United Kingdom, pension plans received a full rebate from 
the government for many years on the pro rata share of the corporate 
income tax paid by companies in which they owned stock. It was rea 
soned that because pension plans are tax-exempt investors, they should 
not be forced to pay the corporate income tax indirectly before receiv 
ing income from their investments on corporate stock. A change in tax
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law in 1993 modestly reduced the rebate. In the United States, corpora 
tions pay corporate income tax and then pay dividends out of after-tax 
corporate income. Pension plans are not taxed on those dividends, but 
they do not receive a rebate for the corporate income tax that was paid. 
In this respect pensions receive more favorable tax treatment in the 
United Kingdom than in the United States.
Defined benefit plans in Canada and the United Kingdom offer 
employers the possibility of a windfall tax shelter for surplus funds. 
Since an employer able to withdraw those funds will have received the 
benefit of tax deductions, employers have an incentive to contribute 
more to their pension plans than is required to assure adequate funding. 
Employers in Canada and the United Kingdom are allowed to with 
draw surplus funds without terminating a plan, whereas in the United 
States the only way to withdraw surplus funds is to terminate. To dis 
courage overfunding, Revenue Canada (the federal tax collecting 
authority) has set contribution limits. By denying tax deductibility to 
contributions when funding reaches a certain level, Revenue Canada 
and Inland Revenue in the United Kingdom have limited contributions 
to plans with surpluses.
Assets
Pension assets are not taxed in most countries. Because of the large 
size of pension assets in several countries, however, taxation has 
become an appealing possible source of government revenue. Such a 
tax offsets the loss in government revenue from other aspects of prefer 
ential tax treatment that pensions receive. It also, however, offsets the 
incentive effect that encourages firms and employees to establish plans.
In Belgium, there is a 0.17 percent tax on pension fund assets. In 
Japan, a tax of 1.17 percent per year is levied on the assets of Tax- 
Qualified Pension Plans. This tax is considered to be the recovery by 
the government of interest on income tax not paid during the period of 
tax deferral. It generally does not apply to the assets in contracted-out 
plans (Employees' Pension Fund plans).
Special corporate tax payments on pension assets have grown in 
Japan, as private pension plans have developed (table 4.2). The 
amounts in 1991 were 950 million yen for Employees' Pension Fund 
plans (paid by 30 plans) and 12.7 billion yen for Tax-Qualified Pension
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Plans. Many groups, including the Japan Employers' Association, have 
proposed abolishing the taxation of pension assets.
In Japan, as in other countries that allow book reserve plans, the 
funds that would have been set aside had those plans been funded are 
invested in the working capital of the company. Company earnings are 
subject to the corporate tax, which is roughly 50 percent (including a 
regional tax).






















SOURCE Japanese Advisory Council on Social Security.
Disbursements
Lump-Sum Distributions
Some countries provide preferential income tax treatment for bene 
fits received as a lump-sum payment, rather than as an annuity. The 
economic justification for this policy is unclear. Annuities provide a 
form of insurance—they assure that the retiree will not outlive his or 
her income. Lump-sum payments do not provide this insurance, and 
thus appear to be a less desirable form in which to receive retirement 
benefits. However, social security benefits, which are paid as annuities, 
provide this type of insurance. In some cases, workers appear to indi 
cate by their choice of a lump-sum benefit that the social security pro 
gram provides them adequate insurance against outliving their 
resources. Employees often do not have much information as to how to
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invest their lump-sum benefits, however, and may be overly conserva 
tive in managing such investments.
In Japan, an Employees' Pension Fund plan must pay a life annuity 
for benefits contracted out from the Employees' Pension Insurance 
social security program. However, 93 percent of all Tax-Qualified Pen 
sion Plans have a lump-sum benefits option, and more employees 
choose that option than annuity benefits. The popularity of lump-sum 
benefits arises in part because of the more favorable tax treatment of 
lump-sum benefits than of annuities.
Japanese retirees can deduct lump-sum payments up to a certain 
amount from their retirement income. The deductible amount increases 
with an employee's years of work. The amount that it increases by is 
greater for years of work exceeding twenty (table 4.3).
Table 4.3 Taxation of Lump-Sum Benefits in Japan, 1994 
Years of service Deduction amount
Less than 3 0.8 million yen
3 to 19 0.4 million yen x (years of service)
20 or more 0.7 million yen x (years of service -20) + 8.0 million yen
Taxable amount = (lump-sum benefit - deduction amount) x 1/2. 
SOURCE: Japanese Income Tax Law, Section 30.
In the United Kingdom, part of a pension may be received at retire 
ment as a tax free lump sum. This is limited to 1.5 times final annual 
pay, with a smaller multiple for retirement with less than twenty years 
in the pension plan. Ireland and Australia also provide preferential tax 
treatment for retirement benefits received as a lump sum rather than as 
an annuity.
In the United States, lump-sum distributions at retirement have been 
granted special income averaging provisions for tax purposes, but 
lump-sum distributions from Canadian pension plans have been pro 
hibited.
Annuity Benefits
The taxation of benefits is the most common way for pensions to be 
taxed. Any payment from a Canadian or U.S. pension plan, whether on 
death, retirement, or termination of service, is taxable income. In Ger-
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many, pensions financed through the book reserve method are taxed as 
normal income when received as benefits, except that 40 percent is tax 
free up to an annual ceiling. If benefits are funded through direct insur 
ance with an insurance company, company contributions are consid 
ered taxable income. Accordingly, the retirement benefits are tax free if 
paid as a lump sum, or taxable only to a certain extent if paid as an 
annuity. The taxable percentage of the benefit depends on the age of 
the worker at retirement. This percentage is 29 percent at age 60, 26 
percent at age 63, and 24 percent at age 65. Thus, the tax treatment of 
pension benefits in Germany is used to encourage delayed retirement.
In Japan, pension and social security annuities are subject to special 
income tax treatment and are tax free up to a certain amount per year. 
The deduction is composed of a flat amount, plus a deduction that var 
ies with the size of the annuity. The percentage deducted declines in 
increments for benefits exceeding certain levels. 5
Annuity benefits paid by an Employees' Pension Fund plan are sub 
ject to the same tax as social security benefits. The tax is applied after 
certain deductions are made (table 4.4). For a married annuitant under 
age 65, the maximum annuity on which no tax would be paid is 1.75 
million yen per year (about $16,500). For the annuitant who is age 65 
or older with a spouse who is age 70 or older, the maximum annuity on 
which no tax would be levied is 3.05 million yen (about $29,000).
Table 4.4 Maximum Level of Tax-Free Pension Annuities in Japan, 1994 
Annuitant Maximum tax-free annuity
Under age 65
Single 1.05 million yen $ 9,900 
Married 1.75 16,500
Age 65 and older
Single 2.25 21,200 
Married 2.95 27,800 
Spouse age 70 or older____3.05_______________29,000
SOURCE: Japanese Income Tax Code, Section 35.
In a Tax-Qualified Pension Plan, annuity benefits after excluding the 
amount equal to employee contributions are subject to the same tax as 
on an Employees' Pension Fund plan.6
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In the United States, pension benefits received at retirement are 
taxed under federal and state personal income taxes, but not the social 
security payroll tax. A participant generally recovers tax free the 
amounts that were previously included in taxable income, which would 
be non-tax deductible contributions made by the participant. Due to the 
progressivity of the income tax system, workers frequently have lower 
marginal income tax rates in retirement than while working.
Implicit Taxes
Even when an explicit tax is not levied on pension benefits, an 
implicit tax may cause the net increase in retirement income to be less 
than the amount paid by the pension fund. In the United States, social 
security benefits are taxable for retirees whose income exceeds a cer 
tain level.7 For some U.S. workers, there is double taxation of pension 
benefits at retirement. This occurs if pension benefits raise income to a 
level where social security benefits are taxable. Each extra dollar of 
pension benefits raises the recipient's tax payments by the tax on the 
pension benefit and by the increased tax on the social security benefit.
In Canada, the income-tested component of the social security sys 
tem discourages participation in employer-sponsored pension plans for 
workers with low lifetime earnings. For each dollar of retirement 
income exceeding a certain amount, social security Guaranteed Income 
Supplement benefits are reduced by 50 cents. The net result is that 
Canadians with low lifetime earnings face a 50 percent tax rate on pri 
vate pension income in retirement.
Increases in private pension benefits in Sweden will reduce the min 
imum benefit provided by the Swedish social security system by the 
rate of 50 percent (a reduction of one kroner for every two kroners 
increase in pension benefits) starting in 1996, until the minimum bene 
fit is reduced to zero. This private pension benefit reduction is an 
implicit tax of 50 percent on those benefits.
Consumption Taxes
The tax treatment of pensions moves the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, and other countries toward a consumption tax sys 
tem. Under a consumption tax, retirees generally pay higher taxes than
Tax Policy Towards Private Pensions 63
under an income tax raising equal revenue. Under such a system, con 
sumption expenditures are taxed but savings (including investment 
earnings) are not. Earnings saved through a pension are not taxed until 
received in retirement when they are presumably consumed, which is 
the way they would be taxed under a consumption tax system. For 
other types of savings, a worker's earnings are taxed and then if the 
worker saves and receives investment earnings on the savings, the earn 
ings are taxed again. A consumption tax avoids the double taxation of 
savings and thus does not distort the decision between current con 
sumption and future consumption. This is a desirable aspect of a tax 
system, given the concern in many countries over inadequate savings, 
but its effect on total savings is diminished by the reduction in other 
savings.
In Japan, investment earnings for nonpension savings are taxable at 
a rate of 20 percent (a 15 percent national income tax and a 5 percent 
regional tax). For people age 65 and older, however, the investment 
earnings on savings are not taxable. Employer contributions to 
employee savings are deemed to be wage income to the employee and 
are immediately taxable.
In the United Kingdom, tax treatment is more favorable for pensions 
than for social security contributions and benefits. Employee pension 
contributions are deductible, while employee social security payments 
are not. Pension benefits can be taken, at least in part, as a tax free 
lump sum, while social security benefits cannot.
Conclusions
While a number of comparisons across countries have been made, 
contrasts between the United Kingdom and the United States illustrate 
the insights that can be gained. The United Kingdom provides more 
favorable tax treatment for private pensions than does the United 
States. It allows employee contributions to be tax deductible, and it 
allows lump-sum benefits at retirement to be received tax free (both 
subject to restrictions). The United States allows neither. The United 
Kingdom gives pensions a partial rebate on corporate income tax paid
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the companies in which pensions hold stock. Pension plans in the 
United States receive no such rebate.
Countries have developed a wide variety of tax rules for pension 
plans. However, all countries with well-developed pension systems 
provide some form of tax preference for pensions. The most common 
form is to allow contributions and investment earnings to be made and 
received tax free, but to tax pension benefits at receipt. Pension partici 
pants are taxed once, when they receive benefits. This taxation com 
pares to the double taxation of other savings, where wage income is 
taxed and the subsequent investment earnings are also taxed.
NOTES
1. Sections of this chapter are based in part on Dilnot (1995).
2. This tax treatment has greatly reduced the amount of savings through pensions. To some 
extent, lost pension savings have been channeled into other forms of savings; for example, greater 
investment in owner-occupied housing.
3. They are not deductible under the state income tax in some states.
4. There are no employee contributions to such plans because they are not funded.
5. The tax treatment of Japanese pensions is explained in Clark (1991b).
6. Book reserve plans do not pay annuity benefits, so this tax question does not arise for them.
7. Fifty percent of social security benefits are taxable at the personal income tax marginal rate 
for income exceeding a certain level and 85 percent of benefits are taxable for higher incomes.
5 
Pension Risk and Insurance
Risk-bearing is a fundamental aspect of pension systems. An impor 
tant aspect of risk-bearing is the distinction between defined benefit 
and defined contribution plans. In some countries, specific programs 
have been established to insure or guarantee benefits against risk.
Pension Risk in Defined Benefit and Defined 
Contribution Plans1
Financial risk is inherent in pension plans. It must be borne by some 
party—workers, employers, an insurance company, the stockholders 
and bondholders of the company, taxpayers, or other employers. Risks 
may differ between categories of workers, such as between long-tenure 
and short-tenure workers, or between men and women.
To the extent that the entity who bears the risk controls the invest 
ment of pension portfolios, the allocation of risk-bearing may affect 
financial markets. For example, individuals tend to be more conserva 
tive when investing their defined contribution plan portfolios than the 
professional money managers who generally are responsible for invest 
ing the defined benefit plan portfolios.
The rules that specify the conditions of benefit payment effectively 
determine who bears pension risk. An employer's first decision when 
considering the amount of pension risk to bear is whether to provide a 
defined benefit or defined contribution plan. 2
It is traditionally argued that in defined benefit plans the employer 
bears the entire risk. The employer promises the worker a fixed benefit 
independent of the rate of return on pension assets. In financial terms, 
the defined benefit pension liabilities of the firm are independent of the 
investment performance of the pension plan. The firm acts in effect as 
an insurance company; it insures pension participants against financial 
risk. In publicly held firms, defined benefit plan risk is ultimately borne 
by corporate stockholders. Workers have no financial interest in the 
pension fund, since their benefits are independent of the performance
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of the fund, according to the traditional argument. The conclusion that 
workers bear no risks in defined benefit plans, however, assumes that 
the plans are fully funded, or that there is no risk of the firm defaulting 
on its pension liabilities, or that the pension liabilities are fully insured.
In defined contribution plans, the worker is said to bear the entire 
risk. After contributing to the worker's account, the employer has no 
further liability.
In actuality, workers and employers in both types of plans shift risk 
to each other and to other parties. They do so through collective bar 
gaining when a union is involved, they seek alternative risk-bearing 
arrangements through competition for workers and jobs in the labor 
market, and they influence government to enact laws regulating risk- 
bearing or to insure benefits.
The government, responding to political interests, influences the 
pension risk-bearing of employers and workers. For example, govern 
ment may affect the choice between defined benefit and defined contri 
bution plans. Sometimes it mandates a particular type of plan, such as 
the mandatory defined contribution plans in Chile. It may provide 
options, such as allowing workers to opt out of defined benefit plans 
and participate in personal pension (defined contribution) plans in the 
United Kingdom. It may affect the relative costs of the two types of 
plans, such as in the United States where government regulations have 
added to the costs of defined benefit plans.
Coverage by a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan 
are not mutually exclusive—a worker can be covered by both types of 
plans offered by the same employer. In the United States, 40 percent of 
workers covered by an employer-provided pension plan are covered by 
both a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan (Turner and 
Beller 1992). A study in Bavaria, Germany indicated that a large per 
centage of employers who offered a defined benefit plan offered volun 
tary participation in a defined contribution plan as an option (Ahrend, 
Forster, and Walkiewicz 1990).
The Trend Toward Defined Contribution Plans
In a number of countries, there has been a movement towards 
defined contribution plans. Defined contribution plans are increasingly 
popular in the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada,
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Germany, and Ireland. Defined contribution systems have been man 
dated in Australia, Chile, and Switzerland. While in Japan and the 
Netherlands defined benefit plans dominate, in Denmark and Sin 
gapore defined contribution plans are the primary or sole type of plan. 3
The United States and Australia both have a sizable percentage of 
participants in defined contribution plans. Australia has slightly more 
participants in insured defined contribution than defined benefit plans 
(52 percent), but it should be noted that data for noninsured plans are 
not available (table 5.1). In Canada and the United Kingdom, by far the 
largest number of participants are in defined benefit plans. Defined 
benefit plans have been dominant worldwide.
For many years, defined benefit plans were more popular than 
defined contribution plans in the United States, but that has changed. 
Since 1984, more workers have participated in defined contribution 
than defined benefit plans, and the disparity is growing. There are more 
assets in defined benefit plans than in defined contribution plans, but 
that is partly because defined benefit plans generally pay annuities out 
of the plan, while defined contribution plans generally pay lump sums, 
and thus disburse their money to retirees much more quickly. 4 It is also 
partly because when an employee participates in both a defined contri 
bution and defined benefit plan, which is the case for about 40 percent 
of pension participants, the defined contribution plan is typically a sec 
ondary plan that is less generous.
Two explanations for the trend away from primary defined benefit 
plans in the United States have been advanced. 5 First, some researchers 
have attributed it to increasing regulation, beginning with the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and con 
tinuing through tax and pension regulations passed during the 1980s. 
Many of these regulations have increased the cost of defined benefit 
plans relative to defined contribution plans. Other regulations, such as 
the top-heavy regulations for vesting, have reduced the advantages of 
defined benefit plans to small businesses. Plans for state and local gov 
ernment employees are not affected by the regulations, and there has 
been no trend towards defined contribution plans among those employ 
ees. They are predominantly defined benefit plans. Second, some stud 
ies have indicated that the changing composition of industry and the 
workforce has had an important role in the trend. Defined benefit plans 
are more likely to be found in union firms and in manufacturing indus-
Table 5.1 Defined Benefit Versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans, 1988 
(percent)
Participants, assets, plans
By number of participants
Defined benefit
Defined contribution
By size of assets
Defined benefit
Defined contribution
















































SOURCE: Dailey and Turner (1992).
a. Relates to insured plans only.
b. Plans and participants do not total 100 percent as there are composite plans in addition.
— Data not available.
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tries. These key correlates of plan type have declined. Unionism has 
declined and there has been a trend away from employment in manu 
facturing and toward services. The remaining policy issue is the degree 
to which the drop in defined benefit pensions is attributable to regula 
tory changes. While all studies examining this issue attribute some role 
to regulatory changes, they disagree on the importance of that role. 6
The 1980s witnessed tremendous growth in 401(k) plans in the 
United States, a type of defined contribution plan named after the sec 
tion of the Internal Revenue Code that enabled it. Between 1984 and 
1990, participants in 401(k) plans grew by 12 million, while partici 
pants in defined benefit plans declined by 3.8 million. The number of 
workers participating in defined contribution plans other than 401(k) 
plans declined, so that the total growth of workers in defined contribu 
tion plans was 4.8 million (table 5.2). These aggregate statistics sug 
gest that 401(k) plans have to some extent replaced previously existing 
plans.
Table 5.2 Active Worker Participants in Defined Benefit, Defined
Contribution, and 401(k) Plans in the United States, 











































SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (1993) and author's calculations.
When workers are given greater choice, they are forced to rely more 
on themselves. With the trend toward defined contribution plans, where 
workers bear the investment risk and where they can generally cash out 
their pension when they change jobs, the U.S. pension system is shift-
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ing away from employer responsibility and toward individual responsi 
bility for retirement income.
Mixed Uses for Plans
While defined benefit plans are designed for retirement savings, 
some defined contribution plans have elements of both a general sav 
ings plan and a retirement pension plan. For example, 91 percent of 
firms listed on Japan's eight stock exchanges provide Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs), which are a form of defined contribution 
plan that invests primarily or entirely in stock of the employer. These 
plans are not considered to be retirement plans, however (Jones and 
Kato 1993). Workers cannot withdraw shares while employed until 
they have been in the plan for twenty years, and then can withdraw 
some.
Workers in the United States often cash out their pension plans, pri 
marily their defined contribution plans, when changing jobs and some 
times do not consider them to be retirement plans. In the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands, by contrast, after several years 
in the plan a worker cannot cash out a pension plan until retirement.
Not all plans are readily categorized as defined contribution or 
defined benefit plans. In many types of plans the investment risk is 
shared between the employer and the worker. The mandatory, 
employer-provided, pay-as-you-go pension plans in France are an 
example of plans where risk is shared, and thus they are neither a pure 
defined benefit nor pure defined contribution. In these plans, there is 
little financial market risk because they have little funding. There is 
risk as to the adequacy of the contributions being paid into the system, 
however. They must be considered defined benefit plans because the 
ultimate benefits are not based on the investment of contributions to an 
account. However, the generosity of the plans is adjusted according to 
the financial status of the pay-as-you-go funds, and thus the risk in the 
plans is shared between the workers and employers. 7
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Determination of Risk-Bearing
How firms and workers divide pension risk-bearing can be analyzed 
as being specified through a contract. Some aspects of this contract are 
explicit—determined by law or written into the pension benefit for 
mula or collective bargaining agreement. Other aspects are implicit 
agreements as to conditions under which the firm will provide cost-of- 
living adjustments to retirement benefits, reduce the worker's real pay, 
lay off the worker, or terminate the pension plan.
An implicit contract could take the following form: The firm prom 
ises the worker an ongoing pension plan and long-term employment, 
so long as the worker maintains a given level of productivity and the 
firm's financial status maintains a minimum level. If the firm's finan 
cial status deteriorates, the worker may bear some risk through reduced 
pay, including reduced pension accruals or plan termination.
Pension risks can be analyzed according to their source. Risks arise 
from uncertainties of labor supply and demand, from uncertainty as to 
life expectancy, from financial market variables, and from political 
change. The following sections examine who bears these risks in dif 
ferent pension systems.
1. Job Tenure and Wage Risk
Workers. In defined benefit plans, the benefit at retirement—and 
thus the annual accrual of benefits while working—usually depends on 
the worker's final salary. Defined benefit plans are generally back- 
loaded, meaning that the accrual of pension benefits increases relative 
to salary the longer the worker has been in the plan and the nearer the 
worker is to retirement. In some defined contribution plans the percent 
age of pay the employer contributes to the plan increases with 
employee age or tenure.
While many workers in Japan, primarily men, have lifetime job 
security, workers elsewhere generally have uncertain job tenure with 
their firm and uncertain future wages. Backloading features make plans 
riskier for workers uncertain whether they will have long tenure with 
the firm than for workers who expect no job changes. Firms presum 
ably impose this risk on workers to insure against hiring and training 
losses related to workers who quit before retirement.
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Basing benefits in defined benefit plans on final average wages 
would appear to provide workers with retirement income maintenance 
insurance not available in defined contribution plans or in career-aver 
age defined benefit plans. 8 However, because wage paths are uncertain 
early in worklife, individuals bear risk when their retirement benefits 
depend so heavily on final salary. While backloading does hedge 
against inflation (because wages tend to keep pace with inflation), final 
earnings can sometimes be low due to poor health or changes in market 
conditions. This risk frequently is reduced by basing pension benefits 
on the highest rather than the final salary, by averaging over several 
years, and by providing special disability benefits for early retirement 
due to poor health.
Defined contribution plans provide "wage diversification" because 
they are based on career wages. Career-average defined benefit plans 
also have wage diversification, since they are based on wages earned 
over many years.9
Firms. The protection offered to workers is risk borne by the firm. 
To the extent that this risk is largely diversifiable to employers 
(because they can diversify it across a number of workers) and nondi- 
versifiable to individual workers, the replacement rate stability would 
be an advantage of defined benefit plans to workers.
2. Early Retirement Risk
Defined benefit plans in the United States often provide early retire 
ment benefits greater than what would result from an actuarially fair 
reduction in benefits. This feature of defined benefit plans insures an 
initial benefit level to employees who are unable to work past early 
retirement. Defined contribution plans cannot protect against this risk, 
since their level of benefits is determined by the individual's account 
balance.
3. Implicit Contract Risk
Workers bear the risk that firms break their implicit contracts. Sup 
pose, for example, that a firm with a defined benefit plan that tradition 
ally granted cost-of-living adjustments to its retirees is sold. The new 
owners discontinue providing cost-of-living adjustments or terminate 
the plan without providing a successor plan. If the workers had 
accepted lower wages anticipating a pension that was partially indexed 
after retirement, they would suffer a loss. 10
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4. Longevity Risk
Workers who do not annuitize their benefits risk outliving their 
assets. Because defined benefit plans generally provide annuities and 
defined contribution plans generally provide lump-sum benefits, the 
longevity risk is greater in defined contribution plans. However, this 
difference is not inherent. In Japan, some types of defined benefit plans 
provide benefits as a lump sum, while in Chile, the mandatory defined 
contribution plans require workers to annuitize their benefits or take 
them in installments over time.
5. Demographic Risk
Both unfunded and funded pension plans face demographic risk due 
to an increasing old-age dependency ratio raising the cost of providing 
retirement benefits. Changes in the percentage of the population that 
are elderly can be predicted years in advance, and thus would be con 
sidered cost factors rather than risk factors. When pension systems are 
set up, however, not all demographic changes are predictable years into 
the future, and thus pension systems face an element of demographic 
risk.
In unfunded pension plans, such as in France, the ratio of beneficia 
ries to covered workers acts like a price measuring the cost to workers 
of providing benefits to beneficiaries (Doescher and Turner 1988). 
When there are five workers for every retiree, it costs workers $.20 to 
provide an extra dollar of benefits to beneficiaries. When there are two 
workers for every retiree, the cost is $.50.
Funded systems are affected by demographic risk through the effect 
of population aging on the tax subsidy to pensions. The generosity of 
such subsidies is likely to be reduced during periods when a large age 
group is receiving them. Funded systems are also negatively affected 
by reduced market rates of return caused by aggregate dissavings.
Because defined benefit plans are generally backloaded, the expense 
of such plans depends on plan demographics. Thus, as population ages, 
the annual expense of defined benefit plans will increase.
6. Financial Market Risk
Workers. The generosity of some defined benefit plans may depend 
on the financial market performance of the plan's portfolio. Multiem- 
ployer plans in the United States are an example. They are collectively 
bargained between a union and a group of employers. The level of ben-
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efits in multiemployer defined benefit plans usually is set as a fixed 
amount per year of service and does not depend on worker earnings. In 
addition, the level of employer contributions is also fixed through the 
collective bargaining agreement.
Every few years when the collective bargaining agreement is rene 
gotiated, the fixed amount is increased. The size of these increases may 
depend on the financial performance of the plan's assets. Retirees ben 
efit from favorable investment performance because if the plan reaches 
its maximum allowable funding, the required contributions of employ 
ers frequently are used to give retirees a one-time bonus.
Workers also may bear some of the risk of poor financial perfor 
mance by defined benefit plans through reduced wages. When required 
to make additional cash contributions to the pension plan because of 
poor plan performance, employers may offer smaller wage increases or 
less generous increases in pension benefits. Data from a small survey 
of Canadian plan administrators suggest that some workers received 
benefit increases in response to favorable investment performance of a 
defined benefit plan, while workers were less likely to suffer from poor 
financial performance of a plan (Pesando and Hyatt 1992).
Top managers of firms are often major beneficiaries of the pension 
fund. While managers often also hold common stock or stock options 
in the firm, their pension benefits may be a substantial part of their 
expected retirement wealth. Because of the limit on the level of bene 
fits insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation in the United 
States, the benefits of top managers are at greater risk than are those of 
rank-and-file workers. Thus, managers will presumably consider the 
impact of their pension decisions on their own economic interests as 
beneficiaries, rather than single-mindedly promoting the interests of 
shareholders. 11
Although in many situations defined benefit plans hold less financial 
risk for workers than do defined contribution plans, the reverse can also 
be true. Consider a career-average defined benefit plan with no postre- 
tirement indexing. Accrued benefits at retirement are thus purely nomi 
nal and have the investment characteristics of a long-term bond. Since 
inflation and investment risk are virtually synonymous for fixed 
income securities, retirees in such plans bear substantial investment 
risk. In contrast, workers in a money-purchase defined contribution
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plan that invests in Treasury bills would be exposed to less inflation/ 
investment risk.
Because workers bear the investment risk in defined contribution 
plans, firms often allow or require them to determine their pension 
investments by choosing among several investment funds. In contrast, 
defined benefit plans do not provide workers with a risk-return 
choice. 12
Firms. Funded pension plans have financial market risk arising from 
the assets in their portfolios. Defined benefit plans can reduce the 
financial market risk to retirement benefits by risk-sharing between 
retirement cohorts. When a retirement cohort experiences a large 
decline in the value of pension assets due to a fall in financial markets, 
the firm can efficiently absorb such risk by spreading it over the 
cohorts for which it insures benefits.
Because pension plan liabilities have a long time horizon, the typi 
cal pension fund can absorb more investment risk during intermediate 
periods than can the average market investor. This gives defined benefit 
plans an advantage over defined contribution plans for bearing finan 
cial market risk. It allows defined benefit plans to hold riskier portfo 
lios and to expect higher return than defined contribution plans.
Insurance Companies. Employers providing defined benefit plans 
and employees in defined contribution plans can shift risk to an insur 
ance company by buying allocated annuity contracts. With these con 
tracts, the plan pays premiums on a per participant basis toward 
immediate or deferred annuity payments.
Government. In defined benefit plans where the employer contribu 
tion is tax deductible (as in most plans in most countries, but not in 
New Zealand), some of the financial market risk is borne by the gov 
ernment. If the assets the plan invests in suffer a capital loss, the 
employer's contributions to the plan are increased. These increased 
contributions reduce the employer's taxable profit and tax payments. 
Similarly, if plan investments receive a high rate of return, the firm's 
contributions to the plan are reduced and its taxable income increases. 
Thus, the government shares both the upside and downside investment 
risk in defined benefit plans. The Canadian data, however, suggest that 
firms may modify this outcome by sharing upside returns with employ 
ees.
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Through the tax system, the government also bears some financial 
risk for defined contribution plans. If a defined contribution plan suf 
fers a financial loss, workers' retirement benefits are reduced. If those 
benefits are taxable, worker tax payments in retirement will be lower, 
making after-tax benefits fall less than before-tax benefits. If the bene 
fits are not taxed in retirement, there would be no risk-sharing by the 
government. 13
7. Risk Due to Wrongdoing
Workers and Firms. Funded plans risk wrongdoing by employers 
and fund managers. Both defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans face malfeasance risk. Malfeasance can be misappropriation of 
plan assets or it can result from placing plan assets in overly risky 
investments. The Maxwell pension scandal in the United Kingdom 
exemplifies both types of malfeasance. Before his death in 1991, Rob 
ert Maxwell stole more than 440 million pounds ($730 million) from 
pension funds of firms he controlled. He invested some of the funds in 
his own companies, which were having financial problems.
Some countries have sought to reduce the risk of malfeasance by 
requiring that employer representatives be on the board of trustees of 
pension funds. For example, starting July 1, 1995, all pension funds in 
Australia with five or more members must be administered by a trustee 
group comprising 50 percent member and 50 percent employer repre 
sentatives. A similar arrangement was proposed by the Goode Com 
mission in the United Kingdom in its report following the Maxwell 
affair (Pension Law Review Committee, 1994). In the Netherlands, 
plans have equal employee and employer representation (Lutjens 
1995), as do multiemployer plans in the United States, as well as plans 
in France (Reynaud 1994b). In Spain, the majority of trustees must 
represent employees (Ruano 1995). In these plans, employers cannot 
determine the investment of plan assets. Rather, investment is deter 
mined by the employer and employee groups that manage the plans.
Government and Insurance Companies. In the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Finland, and the province 
of Ontario, Canada a mandatory program insures against the risk of 
malfeasance for some defined benefit plans. Through this insurance, 
the risk is borne by other employers, by an insurance company, or 
directly by the government, meaning taxpayers. In contracted-out
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defined benefit plans in the United Kingdom, the government guaran 
tees a minimum level of benefits through the social security system.
Some countries without formal insurance programs partially insure 
defined benefit plans on an ad hoc basis. For example, a governmental 
fund was established in the United Kingdom to partially compensate 
members of the Maxwell pension plans for their losses. Malfeasance 
risk may also be borne by pension service providers, who in most 
countries have at least an implicit responsibility to protect pension par 
ticipants from such risk.
Chile, Mexico, Switzerland, and Argentina provide government 
guarantees for defined contribution plans if their rate of return falls 
below specified levels (Campbell 1994). Plans in these countries are 
not subject to risk due to underfunding because of the requirements of 
their pension system, but they are subject to malfeasance and financial 
market risk.
For both defined benefit and defined contribution plans, govern 
ments reduce malfeasance risk by writing and enforcing regulations, 
by judicial remedies, and by requiring plans to report information to 
the government or make it available to plan participants. Regulations 
and the filing of reports impose costs on firms, and the reduction in risk 
should be balanced against the increased costs.
8. Risk Due to the Financial Performance of the Plan Sponsor 
Workers. All pension plans to which employers contribute are 
affected by the financial risks facing the sponsoring employer or 
employers. This type of risk varies across plan type. 14 In profit sharing 
plans, a type of defined contribution plan in the United States, the 
employers' annual contributions can vary at their own discretion. 
These plans give employers flexibility, reducing their risk by lowering 
their fixed financial obligation. Workers bear some of the risk by 
receiving lower pension contributions when the firm performs poorly. 
While this arrangement increases the variability in employee compen 
sation, it reduces their risk of being laid off.
In money-purchase defined contribution plans, the contribution is 
fixed, such as a fixed percentage of the worker's earnings. Because the 
required payment is fixed, the firm and not the worker bears risk in 
these plans. If the firm has financial problems, it may terminate the 
pension plan. If a money-purchase plan is terminated, plan accruals to
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date of termination are unaffected, and workers receive the amount in 
their accounts. In a defined benefit plan, however, workers receive ben 
efits based on their earnings at the time the plan is terminated. These 
benefits generally are lower than the benefits the workers would have 
accrued to date had the plan continued until the their retirement age.
Funding a pension plan collateralizes the interests of workers in 
their retirement benefits, reducing the risk to workers, but increasing it 
for shareholders and debtholders in the event of financial distress or 
bankruptcy. Without funding, or with underfunding, and without insur 
ance of benefits, the risk of bankruptcy to benefit levels in defined ben 
efit plans is borne entirely by workers. 15 This is the case in the United 
Kingdom for benefits that are not contracted out and in Japan for Tax 
Qualified Pension Plans.
The risk to a firm's stockholders depends in part on whether the risk 
of the defined benefit plan investments are positively correlated with 
the risk of the firm. If a firm fully funds its defined benefit plan in a 
diversified portfolio, the correlation between the financial performance 
of the plan and the firm would presumably be small. However, if a firm 
were to completely fund the plan by investing in firm assets, the corre 
lation would be maximized. To the extent that firms underfund or use 
book reserve funding, they have implicitly invested plan assets in 
assets of the sponsoring employer. Such plans, unless otherwise 
insured, pose greater risks for workers.
Stockholders. Rules regarding the priority of pension participants in 
the bankruptcy of the sponsoring firm can affect which parties bear this 
risk. If pension participants are given top priority in bankruptcy, then 
some of the risk of defined benefit plans is shifted to stockholders, 
bondholders, and creditors of the firm.
9. Interest Rate Risk
Workers wishing to convert a defined contribution account balance 
into annuitized benefits face interest rate risk. The higher the interest 
rate, the higher the worker's annuitized benefit at retirement, given the 
level of assets in the plan. 16
Because defined benefit plan benefits are paid as an annuity at retire 
ment, workers do not face interest rate risk. Defined benefit plans in 
effect guarantee the interest rate for computing retirement annuities. 
Thus, the interest rate risk is shifted to the firm.
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10. Inflation Risk
Inflation risk affects initial real benefits of job changers and real 
benefit levels during retirement for all pension recipients. Job changers 
in defined benefit plans face inflation risk from the point they leave the 
firm. 17 The real value of their nominal final salary is eroded due to 
inflation between that point and the time they receive benefits. While 
few if any plans anywhere voluntarily index benefits for early leavers, 
they are required to do so in the United Kingdom up to an inflation rate 
of 5 percent per year.
Annuitized pension benefits have the financial characteristics of a 
long-term bond. Thus, they face inflation rate risk. Once an initial level 
of retirement benefits is set, benefits will erode in real value due to 
inflation if that level is not periodically increased. Workers, however, in 
participant-directed defined contribution plans who do not annuitize 
their account balance can choose the asset composition of their pension 
wealth and thus their preferred risk-return tradeoff.
In the United Kingdom, for contracted-out guaranteed minimum 
benefits accruing since April 1988, the pension plan must provide cost- 
of-living adjustments after retirement of up to 3 percent annually. For 
inflation rates higher than 3 percent, the government social security 
program provides cost-of-living adjustments for the difference.
When inflation adjustments to pension benefits depend on the finan 
cial performance of the underlying assets in the pension plan or of the 
sponsoring firm, workers in defined benefit plans bear some of the 
risks. 18 They bear the risks in part because the risks affect the level of 
their benefits. Because women live longer than men, the postretirement 
inflation risk has a greater effect on women's lifetime retirement bene 
fits than on men's.
Because workers presumably must pay through reduced wages for 
"inflation insurance" for a defined benefit plan, they may prefer partial 
rather than full indexing of their pension plan, especially since social 
security in most countries provides at least partial indexing. Private 
pensions would be more likely to index for inflation after retirement in 
such countries as the United Kingdom, where the social security bene 
fits are relatively low. However, more complete inflation indexation of 
pension benefits is provided in Germany, where social security benefits 
are relatively generous.
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11. Risk of Political Change
Firms face the risk that laws and regulations will be changed, mak 
ing it more costly for them to provide a pension plan. For example, the 
law regulating vesting may be changed so that firms are required to 
vest workers after a shorter period of time, the extent that pensions are 
subsidized through the tax code could be reduced, 19 or court rulings 
could make firms liable for benefits in circumstances where they had 
not been liable before.
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans Combined
The risk-return mix may be optimized for workers participating at 
the same time in both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. 
When offering both types of plans, firms effectively provide a defined 
contribution plan with a guaranteed minimum benefit. Employers and 
workers can trade off the level of the minimum benefit against the size 
of the expected defined contribution benefit. Combining the two offers 
the downside protection of defined benefit plans, yet allows workers to 
invest in high expected return assets. By offering a voluntary, supple 
mental defined contribution plan—such as a 401(k) plan in the United 
States or Additional Voluntary Contributions in the United Kingdom— 
firms allow workers greater flexibility. Workers who desire high sav 
ings can participate in such plans, while coworkers who wish for rela 
tively high current consumption are not forced to save by participating 
in them.
A mixed public-private pension system in which many workers have 
both defined benefit and defined contribution plans offers the most 
diversification against risks. Risks are reduced in a mixed system 
because social security and private pensions are subject to different 
risks that are not perfectly correlated. A pay-as-you-go social security 
system is subject to risks to the level of its contribution base, usually 
national wage earnings, but is not directly subject to financial market 
risk. The United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States exemplify 
such a system.
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Conclusions
Risk-bearing depends on the institutional features of the pension 
plan and on the actions taken by workers and employers. It is com 
monly thought that employers bear all the risks in defined benefit plans 
and workers bear the risks in defined contribution plans. For both types 
of plans, however, that is frequently not true. In defined contribution 
plans, workers can shift some of the risk to insurance companies. In 
Chile, some of the defined contribution plan risk is borne by the gov 
ernment. In the United States, some of the defined contribution plan 
risk can be shifted back to employers, who can be sued for mismanage 
ment of the plan. Workers bear risks in defined benefit plans that arise 
from risks to the employer and, for funded plans, from risks associated 
with the assets in which the plan invests.
The relative riskiness to workers of defined benefit and defined con 
tribution plans depends on the particular circumstances being com 
pared. For workers in financially weak firms with underfunded plans 
that do not provide postretirement cost-of-living adjustments, defined 
benefit plans may be fairly risky. For workers in financially secure 
firms with money-purchase defined contribution plans that are invested 
in products guaranteed by insurance companies, there may be little 
risk.
Insolvency Insurance
A growing number of countries have mandated some form of benefit 
insurance or guarantee. Finland, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the 
United States all have pension insolvency insurance programs for 
defined benefit plans, as does the province of Ontario, Canada. The 
United Kingdom guarantees a minimum benefit in contracted-out 
defined benefit plans. In Australia, the government has the power to 
impose a tax of 0.05 percent per year on fund assets of pension plans to 
pay for the financial loss suffered by a fund as a result of fraud or theft.
These insolvency insurance programs may affect capital markets by 
influencing the types of investments that pension plans make. In some 
cases, the ability of pension plans to hold equities is limited by regula-
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tion. In other cases where such regulations do not exist, plans may be 
induced to increase their holdings of risky assets because the downside 
risk of losses is partially insured by the insolvency insurance program.
The rationale for insolvency insurance differs greatly across coun 
tries. In several countries, insolvency insurance has been instituted to 
allow firms to use pensions for self-financing. In Germany and Swe 
den, pension insurance is solely for this purpose, and firms that use 
pension assets to finance their activities are required to insure their 
pension liabilities.
In the United States, insolvency insurance protects workers against 
firm bankruptcy and insufficient pension funding in plans that are set 
up to be fully funded. In the Netherlands, there is no need for such 
insurance because pension regulation assures that funded pension 
plans do not become significantly underfunded. 20 Japan provides insol 
vency insurance for funded plans, but because it has strict regulations it 
has never had an insurance claim. The United States is the only country 
with an insolvency insurance program for funded plans in which a con 
siderable amount of underfunding is permitted.
Germany
The German pension insolvency system was established in 1974, the 
same year as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the 
United States. The German Employers' Association joined with the 
Federation of German Industries and the Federation of German Life 
Insurance Companies to form a mutual insurance association known as 
the Pensions-sicherungs-Verein (PSVaG). Shortly thereafter, Ger 
many's parliament designated the PSVaG as the sole carrier of manda 
tory pension insolvency insurance.
The PSVaG insurance premium is not risk-related, but is payable at 
a uniform rate based on the company's total pension liabilities and the 
total claims against the insurance system for a given year. Each com 
pany's share of total payments equals its share of total insured liabili 
ties. Thus, the system uses pay-as-you-go financing of the liabilities as 
terminations occur. The PSVaG insures plans that are financed through 
the book reserve method. PSVaG insurance premiums have averaged 
less than 2 percent of the annually accruing liabilities.
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The insured event is the insolvency of the employer since under 
book reserve financing an employer's insolvency also means that the 
pension plan is insolvent. When an employer goes into receivership or 
liquidates, the PSVaG purchases single premium annuity contracts 
from a consortium of the major German insurance companies to cover 
the benefits owed to present and former workers and their survivors. 
The benefit insurance has a high ceiling, it is limited to 300 percent of 
the ceiling on benefits under social security.
Between its inception and the end of 1989 the German system had 
3,930 cases of insolvency (Windel 1991) and spent more than 5 billion 
DM ($3.3 billion) in protecting the benefits of more than 347,000 
employees. It had 185 insolvency claims in 1992.
Japan
In 1989, Japan established a pension insolvency insurance program 
that covers about half of the pension-covered labor force. The Pension 
Guarantee Program is managed by the Pension Fund Association, a 
private-sector organization which is heavily regulated by the Japanese 
Ministry of Health and Welfare.
In spite of a major economic downturn in Japan in the early 1990s in 
which the Nikkei-Dow Jones stock index lost half its value, the pro 
gram has had no insolvency terminations. To initially qualify for cover 
age, a firm must meet minimum size requirements, have earned a profit 
for the preceding three years, and have a stable or growing workforce. 
Thus, the insured firms have a low probability of bankruptcy, at least 
during the early years following establishment of their contracted-out 
pension funds.
An important issue in the development of the Japanese pension sys 
tem has been how to protect the value of pension benefits. With the 
decrease in asset prices in the early 1990s, the number of bankrupt 
companies has grown. Furthermore, the financial situation of trust 
banking companies, which manage pension funds, has grown weaker, 
as has that of the life insurance industry.
When the Employees' Pension Fund plans were established in 1966, 
all life insurance companies were required to guarantee a 5.5 percent 
investment rate of return for Employees' Pension Fund plans. On April 
1, 1994, the guaranteed rate was reduced to 4.5 percent. There is grow-
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ing support for deregulation, however, so that all companies could 
decide on their own rate. The Ministry of Finance intends to establish a 
Guarantee Fund for protecting insurance consumers. This would be the 
first time such a fund has existed in Japan.
Lump-Sum Retirement Plan (Book Reserve Plan)
In the recession that followed the oil shock of 1973, company bank 
ruptcies increased in Japan. Many employees lost their jobs, and firms 
could not pay their wages and lump-sum retirement benefits. The regu 
lations of bankruptcy law, labor law, and commercial law were insuffi 
cient to protect workers.
To solve this problem, a law was enacted in 1976 that guarantees 80 
percent of unpaid wages. It also requires the employer to guarantee 
lump-sum retirement benefits through a contract with a financial insti 
tution. The percentage of employers who guarantee their book reserve 
plans through a financial institution increased from 12 percent in 1981 
to 24 percent in 1989 (table 5.3). The law has not been strictly 
enforced, however, and many employers have ignored it. Among firms 
with 1,000 or more employees, only 16 percent guarantee their book 
reserve plan.
Table 5.3 Percentage of Firms that Guarantee Their Book Reserve 
______Plan With a Financial Institution in Japan, 1981 and 1989
Firm size












SOURCE: Japan Labor Department.
Tax-Qualified Pension Plan
Corporate tax law requires that the present value of a Tax-Qualified 
Pension Plan be paid to the employee when an employer in Japan goes 
bankrupt. However, Tax-Qualified Pension Plans do not have a pension 
insurance system. This is perhaps the most serious unsolved problem 
concerning Tax-Qualified Pension Plans.
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Employees' Pension Fund Plan
The Pension Guarantee Program established in 1989 only insures 
Employees' Pension Fund plans, and those plans are required to partic 
ipate in the insurance program. An Employees' Pension Fund plan can 
be terminated with insufficient assets only if: (1) the sponsoring com 
pany declares bankruptcy; (2) the business of the sponsoring company 
or the industry deteriorates; or (3) other unavoidable circumstances 
occur under which continuation of a fund is deemed to be extremely 
difficult.
The level of contributions to the pension benefit insurance program 
is computed for size groupings of employers, primarily on the basis of 
the statistical likelihood of termination and the unfunded liability if ter 
minated. The required contributions per participant decrease gradually 
as the number of participants increases, because the risk of termination 
with an unfunded liability is smaller for larger plans (table 5.4). The 
amount of the required contribution is recalculated every year based on 
the average number of participants in the plan in the previous year.
Table 5.4 Schedule of Contributions to the Pension Guarantee Program 
in Japan, 1994
Number of 



































SOURCE- Pension Fund Association.
*Number of firms is for the fiscal year 1992, other figures are for 1994 due to different informa 
tion sources.
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Sweden
The Swedish pension insolvency insurance program was founded in 
1961 to give companies an opportunity both to retain pension capital 
within the firm and offer pension security for employees. It is a mutual 
insurance company that is owned by the 2,500 policy-holding compa 
nies that have purchased insurance. Nearly all of the liabilities of the 
insurance program (95 percent) are for a single pension plan, the ITP. 
The ITP is a plan for salaried employees based on a collective agree 
ment between the Swedish Employers' Confederation and the Swedish 
Federation of Salaried Employees in Industry and Services. It covers 
more than 500,000 private-sector employees.
Firms participating in the ITP can either use the book reserve 
method and retain the pension capital within the firm, or insure the 
pensions by making contributions to the SPP Insurance Company. If 
the book reserve method is used, the Swedish insolvency insurer (the 
FPG) guarantees the benefits against the risk of the company becoming 
insolvent. If the company becomes insolvent, the insolvency insurer 
purchases insurance through the SPP.
The United States21
The United States has a mixed system of pension insurance in which 
government and private guarantees compete. An employer can contract 
with a private insurance company to assume, through the purchase of 
annuities, all or part of its defined benefit pension obligations. Employ 
ers most commonly do this when a worker reaches retirement. The 
sponsor then pays a premium to the insurance company, and the insur 
ance company becomes the guarantor of the retiree's pension bene 
fits.22
Most defined benefit plan sponsors do not insure the pension liabili 
ties for their workers through private insurance companies. They thus 
must buy insurance through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC).23 The PBGC is an agency of the federal government funded 
entirely through premium payments made by firms that sponsor 
defined benefit plans.
The PBGC was created by the Employee Retirement Income Secu 
rity Act of 1974 (ERISA). Before ERISA, when companies would not
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or could not pay, plan participants lost benefits to which they were enti 
tled. ERISA shifted the burden of underfunded plans terminated by 
employers from the plan participants to the PBGC and, through premi 
ums, to sponsors of other pension plans.
Pension insurance protects against the risk that a defined benefit 
plan will terminate without sufficient funding to pay guaranteed bene 
fits and the sponsoring firm will be unable to cover the shortfall. The 
federal government does not insure defined contribution plans.
Pension funding improved in the United States between the early 
1980s and the early 1990s, but the PBGC is still concerned about its 
exposure to a small group of highly underfunded plans. Though only 
17 percent of the labor force belongs to unions, the plans that are 
highly underfunded are all union plans.
PBGC has two pension guarantee programs—one for single 
employer plans and another for multiemployer plans. This section 
focuses on the insurance program for single employer plans, since 
PBGC's financial problems are entirely due to that program. 24
PBGC guarantees basic retirement benefits. It does not guarantee 
special benefit supplements, such as special early retirement benefits 
which end when a worker reaches age 62 and becomes eligible for 
social security. It also does not guarantee benefits above a fairly high 
indexed ceiling ($2,353 per month in 1992). 25 There are one million 
high-income workers in underfunded plans who have benefits exceed 
ing PBGC's guarantee ceiling (Lockhart 1992).
Firms can only terminate an underfunded plan in a distress termina 
tion. This means generally that a firm must be in bankruptcy proceed 
ings in a federal bankruptcy court and receive a ruling from a federal 
judge to terminate an underfunded plan.
A firm can enter bankruptcy proceedings without ending its business 
and liquidating. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code allows firms to 
reorganize and continue operations. Management is given four months 
to propose a reorganization plan, but judges regularly extend that 
period for years.
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a firm continues operating its business 
with the goal of formulating a plan for paying back all or part of its 
debt. Terminating its underfunded pension plans may be an important 
part of the plan for reorganizing. In some cases, the main reason a firm
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enters Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to terminate its underfunded pension 
plans.
A reorganizing company can terminate its underfunded plans only 
when a bankruptcy court judge determines the alternative is to liqui 
date the company. A firm that terminates an underfunded plan is liable 
to PBGC for the underfunding. The liability also extends to all mem 
bers of a controlled group of firms. A controlled group of firms is all 
firms with 80 percent or more common ownership. Thus, if a firm 
declares bankruptcy, affiliated companies are responsible for the pen 
sion liabilities of the bankrupt firm. A firm with affiliated companies 
can terminate an underfunded plan only if the firm and all other firms 
with common ownership are in bankruptcy.
Employers who terminate underfunded pension plans and the 
employers' controlled group are liable to PBGC for the plans' funding 
up to 30 percent of the net worth of the controlled group. However, 
PBGC recoveries in bankruptcy are typically small because of the low 
value of firms in bankruptcy.
PBGC can initiate termination of an underfunded defined benefit 
plan if the plan sponsor has not made the minimum required contribu 
tions and PBGC believes that not terminating the plan would unreason 
ably increase its unfunded liability.
A firm cannot terminate a collectively bargained pension plan if its 
collective bargaining agreement does not permit it to do so. Frequently, 
a collective bargaining agreement stipulates that a pension plan cannot 
be ended without union approval. However, firms can circumvent this 
restriction by forcing PBGC to initiate the termination. For example, 
when LTV Corporation informed PBGC that it would not contribute 
further to its collectively bargained plans, PBGC terminated them. 26 
Because employees would continue to accrue benefits until the plans 
were terminated, delaying termination would have substantially 
increased PBGC's liability.
PBGC Exposure
Bankruptcy courts do not treat PBGC claims uniformly, making it 
difficult to estimate PBGC's recoveries and potential net claims. 
ERISA provides that the PBGC shall have a priority claim in bank 
ruptcy court for missed premiums and contributions and for a portion 
of the plan's underfunding. This provision is not, however, written into
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Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Some bankruptcy judges honor the 
ERISA provision; others do not.
PBGC's deficit is the difference between its liabilities and assets. Its 
liabilities are measured as the present value of benefits payable by 
PBGC to beneficiaries of plans that have been terminated with insuffi 
cient assets. Its assets include the assets of plans that have terminated 
and been taken over by PBGC, as well as PBGC premiums and invest 
ment earnings.27 This measure of the deficit has been criticized because 
it does not allow for a reserve against greater-than-anticipated future 
claims.
Most of the large claims against PBGC have come from collectively 
bargained (union) plans. These plans are flat benefit plans, which pro 
vide a retiree a specified monthly dollar benefit for each year of ser 
vice. Federal tax laws do not permit these plans to be funded for future 
benefit increases because the increases are not a legal requirement until 
the labor contract is renegotiated. Because benefits are usually 
increased at three- or five-year intervals, new liabilities are added 
before old ones are completely funded, leaving the plans chronically 
underfunded.
In contrast, final salary plans, which base benefits on salary in the 
last few years before retirement, are almost always overfunded relative 
to insured liabilities if they terminate. This is because their funding 
methods anticipate increasing salaries and therefore benefit levels. 
Consequently, typical final salary plans have funding ratios of 145 per 
cent, while flat benefit plans have funding ratios of 75 percent. Because 
they are generally well funded, final salary plans can absorb large 
changes in interest rates, actuarial assumptions, and investment perfor 
mance without becoming underfunded. Flat benefit plans cannot.
Premiums
Premium rates that plan sponsors must pay are not set by PBGC but 
by Congress, through legislation that the President must sign. Because 
of this cumbersome procedure, premiums are changed infrequently. 
Since 1987, underfunded plans have had to pay higher premiums than 
fully funded plans. In 1994, the premium for fully funded plans were 
$19 per participant. The premiums for underfunded plans were $19 per 
participant plus $9 per $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits per
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participant, up to a maximum premium of $72 per participant. 28 
Starting in 1995, the maximum is being phased out over several years.
In the past, new defined benefit plans have typically granted credits 
for past service, and have started with an initial unfunded liability and 
low funding ratio. The PBGC premium structure may discourage the 
formation of new defined benefit plans by charging relatively high pre 
miums for plans that start with past service liabilities they do not 
immediately fund.
PBGC does not guarantee insurance annuities purchased by pension 
plans. Thus, though benefits are insured up to retirement, workers lose 
federal benefit insurance at retirement if their company buys an annuity 
for them. PBGC does not insure those annuities because insurance 
companies have been considered secure providers of retirement bene 
fits. Also, in most states insurance companies are insured by state 
insurance company guarantee funds. If an insurance company fails, 
pensioners holding annuities must rely on state insurance guarantee 
laws.
Concluding Remarks
The United States and Japan are the only countries that have insti 
tuted programs of insuring the benefits of funded pension plans. In 
Japan, the plans that are insured are tightly regulated as to funding lev 
els, and there has never been a claim against the insurance program. 
Thus, the United States is the only country that has an insurance pro 
gram for funded pension plans that are permitted to become under 
funded.
The federal regulations of defined benefit plans have a number of 
provisions that permit insured plans to become underfunded. The 
severity of the effect of these provisions on the purposive underfunding 
done by pension-sponsoring firms is unclear. There are costs associated 
with exploiting these provisions, the primary one being damage to a 
reputation as a good employer. A firm in financial distress, however, 
can take actions that increase its potential claim on PBGC.
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Conclusions
Countries have developed different ways of controlling the risks 
inherent in providing retirement income through private pension plans. 
They regulate pension provisions directly as well as indirectly through 
the tax system. They attempt to reduce the likelihood of financial 
wrongdoing by requiring financial reporting, by maintaining pension 
law enforcement programs, and by involving workers as trustees. 
Firms and workers may shift the risks to insurance companies. Several 
governments have mandated programs for insuring pension benefits, 
but some of these insurance programs have had financial difficulties of 
their own.
NOTES
1. This section is taken largely from Turner (1995).
2. In denned benefit plans, the pension benefit is determined by a formula that usually 
involves the worker's earnings and tenure. For example, the worker's annual benefit could equal 
the average of the worker's highest three annual earnings times years of work times a generosity 
factor of 0.01. Thus, a worker having an average of highest three annual earnings of $50,000 and 
having worked 30 years would have annual benefits of $15,000.
By contrast, in denned contribution plans, the eventual benefit the worker receives depends on 
the amount contributed to the plan and the rate of return received on pension plan investments. For 
example, the worker could have a plan where the employer contributes 5 percent of salary. This 
amount would be deposited in an account for the employee, along with the investment earnings on 
the assets in the account At retirement, the worker would have an account balance that he or she 
could receive as a lump sum or convert to an annuity
3. This chapter does not provide a complete comparison of defined benefit and defined contri 
bution plans, but focuses only on the issue of risk-bearing. This is an important issue in evaluating 
pension plans, but issues such as the effect of pension plans on worker productivity, job turnover, 
and retirement age are also important The chapter also does not consider how much risk should 
be held in defined benefit and defined contribution plans, and who should bear that risk.
4. The number of total participants in defined benefit plans has continued to exceed that in 
defined contribution plans because of the larger number of beneficiaries in defined benefit plans. 
There are relatively few beneficiaries in defined contribution plans because generally those benefi 
ciaries receive lump-sum benefits and then are no longer counted as participants
5 See Chang (1991), Clark and McDermed (1990), and Ippohto (1990b).
6. This disagreement is partly due to differences in methodology. Each of the studies that 
examines this issue directly estimates the portion of the trend away from defined benefit plans due 
to only one of the two factors: the changing propensity of firms of a given type to offer a plan or 
the changing composition of types of firms. Each attributes the remaining portion of the trend to 
the other factor, even though it was not directly estimated. This procedure may overestimate the 
portion of the trend due to the factor that was not directly estimated (see Chang 1991).
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7. It might be better to classify these as hybrid plans in which both benefits and contributions 
adjust. Some analysts note that the benefits adjust, and then by default call the plans defined con 
tribution plans.
8. Career-average defined benefit plans are those in which the benefit is based on the worker's 
annual earnings averaged over his or her career.
9. In both defined benefit and defined contribution plans in the United States, workers who 
have declared bankruptcy have their pension assets protected against the claims of creditors.
10. A related example of implicit contract risk is the decision by some companies to change or 
eliminate health insurance protection for retirees.
11. The points in this paragraph were made by Light and Perold (1985).
12. In some instances, participants in U.S. defined contribution plans can sue the plan sponsor 
over poor investment performance. In defined contribution plans where the sponsor directs the 
investments, the participant could sue if the sponsor did not act prudently in choosing invest 
ments. In cases where the participant directs the investment, the participant can sue the sponsor if 
the sponsor did not prudently consider the investment options offered to participants.
13. The extent of risk-sharing by the government may affect the relative amounts of risk that 
are borne in defined benefit and defined contribution plans. The higher the personal income tax 
rate relative to the corporate income tax rate, the greater the risk-sharing with the government in 
defined contribution plans relative to defined benefit plans.
14. While workers may face risk as to their ability to participate in a pension plan, this analy 
sis focuses only on workers covered by pension plans. It does not consider risks associated with 
vesting rules, as well as those eliminated by disability and death benefits.
15. Defined contribution plans are always considered to be fully funded.
16. This risk is partially offset because higher interest rates may decrease the value of stocks, 
bonds, and other assets held in the plan.
17. This argument does not apply to defined benefit multiemployer plans, where job changers 
who remain within the plan do not suffer portability losses.
18. This point has been suggested by Pesando and Hyatt (1992).
19. Bodie (1990) has argued that integrated pension plans, where decreases in social security 
benefits would cause increases in pension benefits, protect workers against the risk of adverse 
changes in social security benefit levels. However, the demographic and economic factors causing 
the government to reduce social security benefits may also cause firms to reduce their future pen 
sion benefits.
20. Pension investments in the Netherlands are determined by a joint employer-employee 
group rather than employers alone.
21 This section is largely based on Turner (1993).
22. Since almost all 50 states have state-sponsored insurance company guaranty funds, those 
state funds then become the ultimate guarantor of the pension benefits.
23. A third of the assets in the private pension system are invested through insurance compa 
nies. Data are not available on the percentage of defined benefit assets that are insured, but it is 
probably between 35 and 45 percent. However, only assets that have been used to purchase an 
insured annuity are exempt from PBGC insurance. The percentage of defined benefit assets in that 
category is not known. Few plans purchase insured annuities for their workers, but more purchase 
them for their retirees.
24. Multiemployer plans cover the unionized employees of two or more employers. They are 
administered by an equal number of trustees representing the union and the employers They are 
common in industries with a mobile labor force, such as trucking, mining, the building trades, and 
entertainment.
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25 The ceiling is $2,353 per month for benefits payable as a single life annuity at age 65. The 
maximum guarantee is adjusted if taken in any other form. The ceiling does not apply for benefi 
ciaries who have been receiving benefits for three or more years.
26. If PBGC's decision to terminate a plan is contested, district court approval is required.
27. Assets are recorded at market value.




Private pension plans control an increasingly large share of world 
capital markets. Thus, pension financing has become an important 
aspect of the financial structure of a number of countries. This chapter 
compares the different ways pension plans are financed and examines 
statistics on several aspects of pension financing for major private pen 
sion systems.
The comparison of institutions for financing private pensions 
focuses on the risks in each system and the steps taken to reduce them. 
The discussion extends the treatment of risk in the previous chapter by 
examining how risks vary under different financing methods. 1
Unfunded Systems
Future pension benefits are inherently risky. Funding reduces this 
risk, but funding levels and methods vary considerably across coun 
tries, and some countries have pension plans where no money is set 
aside in a separate fund.
France has an unfunded pay-as-you-go private pension system that 
arose from the French experience following World War II. High post 
war inflation decimated the value of French pension funds that existed 
at the time. A national pay-as-you-go system was adopted in part 
because it is not directly subject to financial market risk. 2 Such a sys 
tem is subject, however, to demographic risk. Reductions in the fertil 
ity rate and increases in life expectancy raise the ratio of retirees to 
workers. 3
Book reserve funding is used by most plans in Germany4 and Aus 
tria, by many plans in Japan and Sweden, and by some plans in Italy. 
With book reserve funding, plan assets are like nontradeable, interest- 
bearing notes issued by the sponsoring employer to the plan. Book- 
reserved pension assets are considered in these countries to be invested 
in the sponsoring firm. These plans are subject to risks facing individ 
ual firms, and for this reason countries often require that these plans 




Germany differs from other countries in the ways that it finances 
pension benefits. There are four ways that a German pension fund can 
be financed: book reserve, support funds, pension funds, and direct 
insurance. The choice among these financing options is made by 
employers, based in part on their differing tax implications.
The most popular method of financing German pensions is the book 
reserve method. Under this method, a company establishes a book 
keeping pension liability account in its corporate accounts and claims a 
tax deduction each year for the increase in pension liabilities. Thus, the 
company takes an income tax deduction before it makes a cash transac 
tion. Book reserves provide a source of internal financing for corpora 
tions. This was particularly popular following World War II, when 
companies needed to obtain financing and the devastation of the bank 
ing industry and financial markets did not allow for external financing 
for firms. The approach has had lasting popularity, however, and it is 
currently used by 90 percent of firms with 1,000 or more employees 
that offer pension plans (table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Percentage of Large Employers With Different Types of 
______Funding and Benefit Arrangements in Germany, 1990____
Percentage of companies offering
Plan characteristic benefit plans with the characteristic 
Type of funding
Book reserve 9.0 
Support funds 34.6 
Pension funds 15.5 
Direct insurance 12.7 
Type of benefit
Integrated with social security 10.9 
Final pay plan 47.3 
Flat amount plan 36.4 
Defined contribution 11.8
SOURCE: Ahrend, Forster, and Walkiewicz (1990).
NOTE: This table is for firms with 1,000 or more employees. The percentages do not sum to 100 
percent because an employer can offer more than one type of plan and because other less impor 
tant characteristics are not listed.
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In calculating book reserves, firms must use a discount rate of 6 per 
cent. The government has proposed raising this to 7 percent to reduce 
tax deductions and increase tax revenues, but thus far that has not been 
done (Steinmeyer 1993). The value of book reserves account for 58 
percent of the assets accumulated for pensions in Germany (table 6.2).
Table 6.2 Percentage Distribution of Assets in Different Types of Private 
______Pension Plans in Germany, 1991_________________
Percentage of total pension assets 







When a firm can take a tax deduction for unfunded pension liabili 
ties, as it can in Japan, Germany, and Austria, it may prefer not to fund, 
since the pension liabilities, in effect, become a cheap source of bor 
rowing. Although this form of pension finance is widely popular in 
Germany, it is most advantageous for financially distressed firms. 
However, it is less advantageous for the workers in such firms because 
of its riskiness.
The second way of financing German pensions is via a support fund, 
which is a separate legal entity that may invest pension fund assets. 
Support funds are financed by transfers from employers. No legal 
restrictions limit the investment of fund assets. The funds are com 
monly invested as an interest-bearing loan to the sponsoring company.
The third funding method is the pension fund or "pensionskasse." 
Such funds are regulated in the same way as insurance companies, with 
the same investment restrictions. In addition to employers, employees 
also generally contribute to these funds. Support funds are permitted to 
make loans to the sponsoring company, but only against collateral and 
to a limited extent.
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A fourth funding method is direct insurance through an insurance 
company. Since company contributions are taxable income to workers, 
retirement benefits are tax free if paid as a lump suni, and taxable only 
to a certain extent if paid as a pension. This approach is most popular 
with small companies, and is used by 52 percent of small companies 
that offer pension plans (Ahrend, Forster, and Walkiewicz 1990). They 
prefer this approach because it is easy to administer and the required 
payments are predictable. The risks arising from the benefit commit 
ment are borne by the life insurance company.
Funded Systems
In the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and some other 
countries, all plans receiving preferential tax treatment are required to 
be funded. The goal of U.S. policy is for all private pension plans even 
tually to be fully funded. Federal regulations control both the allowable 
overfunding and underfunding of pension plans.
Statistics on the funding ratios of underfunded plans, however, indi 
cate the ineffectiveness of U.S. funding regulations. 5 In 1988 there 
were $1.9 billion in unfunded liabilities in plans with termination fund 
ing ratios of 10 percent or less.6
There are several ways that U.S. plans can become highly under 
funded. First, firms can receive a funding waiver from the Internal Rev 
enue Service if they argue that they are temporarily unable to make 
their required pension contributions. Second, firms with flat rate 
defined benefit plans create unfunded past service liability every time 
they raise benefits levels, since the law prohibits them from advance 
funding for future increases. By contrast, advance funding is allowed 
in Canada. Third, firms in serious financial trouble sometimes do not 
make the legally required contributions to their plans.
In the United Kingdom, while contracted-out plans must be fully 
funded, there are no minimum funding standards for other plans. In 
1993, the Pension Law Reform Committee, chaired by Professor Roy 
Goode, recommended that minimum funding standards be established 
for all British private-sector pension plans. A governmental study 
found that 86 percent would meet the proposed standard, but that the
Pension Financing 99
14 percent that did not meet the standard included a significant number 
of large plans (Cohen 1994a).
In the United Kingdom and Japan, employers can fund private pen 
sion plans with money saved by opting out of part of the social security 
system.7 In the United States and the United Kingdom, the reverse is 
also possible as social security payments can be used to reduce pension 
payments. Through integration with social security, an employer can 
reduce pension liabilities for low-wage workers.
The amount that can be contributed to overfunded pension plans in 
the United States is restricted. If a plan's assets exceed 150 percent of 
its termination liabilities, the firm can no longer make tax-deductible 
contributions to the plan. Termination liabilities are calculated as if the 
plan were to terminate immediately. Current wages are used to deter 
mine liabilities rather than projected future wages, which more accu 
rately reflect the actual wages of workers when they retire.
In Canada, employer contributions are not tax deductible if the plan 
has assets 10 percent greater than its liabilities. However, the liabilities 
are calculated assuming future increases in benefits, and for most plans 
are less restrictive than under the U.S. funding regulations.
Diversification
In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, most plans are 
required to reduce portfolio risk by diversifying their asset holdings. 
The diversification requirement in the United States does not apply to 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). ESOPs are similar to 
plans funded by the book reserve method in that they are undiversified; 
both types basically invest in a single asset. In the case of ESOPs, the 
asset held by the plan is corporate equity of the sponsoring firm rather 
than corporate debt. 8
The diversification requirement also does not apply to support funds 
in Germany. A support fund is a legal entity separate from the plan 
sponsor, but it may lend the entire amount of its assets back to the plan 
sponsor.
Adequate diversification is not available within the asset markets of 
some small countries. For example, in Ireland there are thirty stocks 
that are suitable for pension funds to invest in. Diversification can be 
achieved by international investments, however.
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International Investments
Foreign investments of pension plans increase portfolio diversifica 
tion, which is especially important in smaller countries that do not have 
a wide range of industries. Even in large countries, however, it is 
impossible to diversify away macroeconomic risks. Those risks can be 
reduced by international investments, since macroeconomic risks are 
weakly correlated across some countries.
Many countries restrict the foreign asset holdings of their pension 
plans, which limits the extent those can diversify. They are concerned 
about pension plans exporting domestic capital through their foreign 
investments. However, if pension plans reduce their demand for 
domestic assets, the price of those assets will fall and other domestic 
investors, as well as foreign investors, will increase their demand for 
those assets.
In Canada, pensions funds are allowed to invest up to 20 percent of 
the book value of their assets in foreign securities. In Japan, pension 
plans can invest up to 30 percent of their assets in foreign denominated 
securities (including Japanese securities denominated in dollars). The 
Japanese regulation is in terms of foreign denomination in order to 
limit the foreign exchange risk that plans can have. There is no fixed 
percentage limit on the extent of pension investments in foreign securi 
ties by U.S. pension plans, but the requirements of diversification and 
prudence apply. The European Union is considering a directive that 
would prohibit countries establishing limits on foreign investments by 
pension funds within the European Union. Since the United Kingdom 
abolished foreign exchange controls in 1979, British pension funds 
have been increasing their foreign investments (Minns and Martin 
1995).
Foreign investments of pension plans have grown considerably in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of pension portfolios around the 
world. In 1993, the world's 300 largest pension funds invested 7 per 
cent of their $2 trillion assets in foreign securities. That percentage is 
expected to grow to 12 percent by the mid-1990s (Group of Ten 1993).
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Portfolio Restrictions
Japan and some other countries limit the percentage of pension port 
folios that can be held in corporate equities. In Japan, the limit is that at 
most 50 percent of the pension portfolio can be invested in domestic 
and foreign equities. This limit reduces risk in plans that would other 
wise have invested more in equities, but also reduces the rate of return 
on pension portfolios. Such restrictions raise the cost of financing pen 
sions, because higher employer contributions are required to provide a 
given level of benefits.
The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and others limit for 
some plans the portfolio share held in securities of the sponsoring 
employer. This is based on concern over conflicts of interest between 
the employer and plan participants and in an attempt to assure adequate 
diversification. In the United States and in Spain, no more than 10 per 
cent of the assets of a pension plan can be invested in the sponsoring 
employer (Ruano 1995). In the United Kingdom, the limit is 5 percent.
In most countries, employers can eliminate financial risk from their 
pension plans by purchasing insurance company products. Insurance 
companies frequently are insured by other insurance companies or 
governmental entities.9
Paying for Pensions
This section analyzes trends in pension financing in nine countries: 10 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Reflecting both its large 
economy and the general requirement that its pensions be fully funded, 
the United States had nearly 70 percent of world private pension assets 
in the late 1980s (table 6.3). The countries with the next largest pension 
assets were Japan and the United Kingdom, both with about 8 percent 
of world pension assets.
During the 1980s, U.S. private pension assets grew at an average 
real annual rate of 8 percent. 11 Canada and the Netherlands had similar 
average real growth rates of their pension assets. Japan's pension assets 
grew fastest among the nine countries considered at 16 percent. These
Table 6.3 Total Assets of Private Pension Plans in Selected Countries, 1970-1989 

























































































































SOURCES: Dailey and Turner (1992) and U.S. Department of Labor (1993).
NOTES: Assets for the Netherlands and for the United Kingdom include only nonmsured private pension plans. Assets for Germany include support
funds, pensionskassen and direct insurance. Book reserves are not included for Germany and Japan.
a. Data-are partially estimated by the author.
b Interpolated by the author from data for 1973 and 1978.
c. Data are partially estimated by the author for this year from data available for 1976.
— Data not available.
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growth rate comparisons use assets valued in national currencies and 
are adjusted for changes in the consumer price level in each country. 
They are thus unaffected by exchange rate fluctuations or inflation.
Average pension assets per participant indicate the level of pension 
funding. The figure is low when pension benefits are low, when a pen 
sion system is new, or when the pension system is underfunded or 
unfunded. It is lower in countries with high coverage rates because 
low-income workers with low benefits are covered in those countries. 
The United States had pension assets per participant of $28,800 in 
1988 (table 6.4). 12 France, with its pay-as-you-go system, had assets of 
$700 per participant.
The Netherlands had the highest pension assets per participant at 
$33,100. Canada and the United Kingdom had assets per participant of 
$29,100 and $27,000. The asset figures for the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands, however, are understated because they exclude 
insured private pension assets. The Government Actuary's Department 
in the United Kingdom estimates that insured pension assets at the end 
of 1987 equaled 66 billion pounds, a figure that increases total British 
pension assets by 50 percent.
Australia and Japan have roughly half the U.S. level of pension 
assets per participant. Australia's low level reflects its relatively new 
pension system. Japan's reflects its use of book reserve assets, not 
included in the figures reported here.
Changes in aggregate private pension assets can be divided into 
changes in assets per participant and changes in the number of partici 
pants. Rapid growth in pension assets in Japan in the 1980s resulted 
from a large increase in pension assets per participant, up more than 
400 percent between 1980-89. While this large increase was due in part 
to the strong Japanese stock market during that period, the effect of the 
stock market increase and subsequent decline on the value of pension 
portfolios was lessened by the limits on pension plan holdings of equi 
ties. The large increase in pension assets per participant was also due in 
part to a move towards funded pensions. In comparison, U.S. pension 
assets per participant grew 87 percent during the same period.
The percentage of private pension assets held in corporate equities 
varies considerably across countries. The United States has 26 percent 
of its pension assets in corporate equities (table 6.5). 13 Switzerland has 
the lowest level, at 7 percent. The United Kingdom, by comparison,
Table 6.4 Average Assets of Private Pension Plans per Participant in Selected Countries, 1970-1989 £ 












































































































SOURCES: Dailey and Turner (1992) and U.S. Department of Labor (1993). 
NOTE: Participant is the total of active participants (workers) and beneficiaries. 
~ Data not available.





















































































































Type of asset Australia
Size of assets included 































SOURCE: Dailey and Turner (1992).
a. Foreign stocks and foreign bonds are combined.
b. Domestic and foreign stocks are combined.
c. Domestic and foreign bonds are combined.
d. Includes loans and contributions to government investment.
e. Pooled funds includes mutual funds, investment funds, insurance company managed funds and similar vehicles for pooled pension assets.
- Data not available.
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has 70 percent of its private pension assets invested in corporate equi 
ties.
Reasons for the variation across countries in the percentage of pen 
sion portfolios held in equities have not been studied. Nonetheless, 
some factors can be identified as probable causes. In the United States, 
larger pension plans and defined benefit plans have higher proportions 
of equities in their portfolios than do smaller plans and defined contri 
bution plans. Thus, the mix of plan type across country may have some 
effect, with the United States having a higher percentage of pension 
assets in defined contribution plans than some other countries.
The high percentage of pension portfolios held in equities in the 
United Kingdom is likely due in part to that country having very few 
domestic corporate bonds in which to invest. It also may be affected by 
the relatively favorable tax treatment British pensions receive for the 
corporate equities they hold.
Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have all 
invested 10 percent or more of their pension assets in foreign corporate 
equities. Pension plans also may diversify their portfolio risk interna 
tionally by investing in domestic companies that export or that have 
facilities in foreign markets.
All of the countries considered here had more assets in defined ben 
efit plans over this period than in defined contribution plans (Dailey 
and Turner 1992). Despite rapid growth in U.S. defined contribution 
plans for more than a decade, 66 percent of pension assets were still in 
defined benefit plans. In Canada, which experienced slower growth in 
defined contribution plans, 87 percent of pension assets were in defined 
benefit plans. In Germany and Japan, nearly all private pension assets 
were in defined benefit plans.
Conclusions
Countries have developed different methods for financing private 
pensions. The underlying financial risks can best be minimized by 
diversifying the underlying financial base of a plan. This can be done 
by purchasing insurance products, by holding a diversified portfolio, or 
by having multiemployer plans. In most countries, employers have a
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variety of options for providing pensions. Expanding the range of pen 
sion options allows firms and workers more flexibility to meet diverse 
individual needs.
NOTES
1. This section is taken largely from Dailey and Turner (1992).
2. All pension systems are subject to the economywide risks facing firms that sponsor pen 
sions.
3. Doescher and Turner (1988) show that this raises the "price" of providing pension benefits.
4. All references to Germany are to West Germany before German reunification, or to that part 
of Germany following reunification.
5. A funding ratio is the ratio of a pension's assets to its liabilities. Assets are generally valued 
at market value, but there are different possible measures of liabilities. A commonly used measure 
is the liabilities that a plan would have if it were to terminate immediately.
6. Figures on unfunded liabilities refer to single employer plans with 100 or more participants.
7. Before the passage of the U.S. Social Security Act in 1935, the Clark amendment would 
have allowed employers with plans meeting certain criteria to opt out of social security.
8. ESOPs must invest primarily in the stock of the sponsoring employer.
9. In the United States and elsewhere, insurance companies are insured by government agen 
cies or by consortiums of insurance companies.
10. This section is based largely on Dailey and Turner (1992).
11. The averages are geometric means.
12. Participants here include both workers and beneficiaries.
13. This figure is for plans with 100 or more participants. See Papke (1992).
7 
Labor Market Issues
To better understand the important role that private pensions play in 
labor markets, this chapter examines the experience of selected coun 
tries concerning pension coverage, portability of pension benefits, and 
retirement. These three topics are the issues of who is in a pension 
plan, what happens when they change jobs, and how does their pension 
plan affect their decision to retire.
Pension Coverage
Most private pension participants in the world are found in nine 
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This section 
discusses pension coverage in these countries over the period 1970- 
89. l While other countries provide private pensions, and other small 
countries have high coverage rates, no other country with a voluntary 
system has a sizable number of participants.
Countries differ in their pension coverage rates in part because of 
the generosity of their social security systems. The finding that one 
country has higher private pension coverage than another may simply 
indicate differing roles for the public and private sectors. It may also 
indicate differences in the roles of employer-provided and individual 
plans in those countries. The adequacy of retirement income can only 
be determined by examining all of its sources.
Private pension coverage rates are basically calculated as the ratio of 
private pension-covered workers to the private-sector labor force, but 
they vary depending on the definitions of a pension plan, covered 
workers, and the relevant labor force. Private pension-covered workers 
are defined as current employees who are members of a private pension 
plan.2 The private-sector labor force includes wage earners and salaried 
employees of private-sector employers, plus the unemployed. Part-time 
employees are included to the extent they appear in labor force statis 
tics. Employees of government and all government-owned agencies
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and corporations are excluded. Self-employed persons and unpaid fam 
ily workers are also excluded.
Pension coverage rates differ depending on the categories of work 
ers included. The pension coverage rates considered here for interna 
tional comparisons include unemployed and part-time workers in the 
definition of the labor force because excluding them would cause dis 
tortions in coverage statistics over the business cycle. Unemployed and 
part-time workers typically have low pension coverage rates unless 
coverage is mandated for them. An increase in unemployment among 
low coverage-rate groups would raise the coverage rate. 3
A pattern of increasing pension coverage rates since the early 1970s 
runs across most of the nine countries (table 7.1). In Canada, pension 
coverage increased only slightly, from 26 percent in 1970 to 29 percent 
in 1989. By comparison, France and Switzerland had increases in cov 
erage of 20 percentage points or more. They historically have had high 
coverage rates, and both now have mandatory private pension plans. In 
France, virtually all workers are covered, including part-time and tem 
porary workers. The Swiss coverage rate of 92 percent is less than 100 
percent because employees under age 18, part-time employees with 
low wages, temporary employees, and the unemployed are not cov 
ered.
The Netherlands had the largest increase in coverage among coun 
tries without mandatory plans; its coverage rate rose 16 percentage 
points to 66 percent. The Netherlands is the only country with a volun 
tary private pension system that covers more than half of the labor 
force. Their pension system is not entirely voluntary, however. In some 
industries, firms are required by industrywide agreements to provide 
pension coverage.
The coverage rate for Japan is for participants in funded plans only; 
most other full-time career employees are in unfunded severance pay 
plans.4 There has been steady growth in the number of participants in 
funded plans, but that growth includes a shift from unfunded to funded 
plans.
The United Kingdom is the only country with a major decline in 
coverage rates during the past 20 years. This decline occurred in the 
early 1970s, with only a minor decline since then.
Changes in marginal tax rates may have affected coverage in some 
countries. In the United States, marginal tax rates declined during the
Table 7.1 Active Participants in Private Pension Plans as a Percentage of the Private Sector Labor Force in 







































































































































SOURCE: Dailey and Turner (1992).
NOTE: There are significant differences in the categories of participants included.
-- Data not available.
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1980s and appear to have been a negative factor on coverage rates 
(Reagan and Turner 1995). Women have historically had lower cover 
age rates than men, and the increasing percentage of the workforce that 
is female may have had a depressing effect on pension coverage rates. 
Coverage rates are higher in large firms than in small firms and are 
higher in manufacturing than in services.
Even among countries with well-developed private pension systems, 
few provide coverage for a majority of the private sector workforce. 
Though the level of U.S. pension coverage is frequently a topic of pub 
lic policy concern, that rate is higher than for the other English-speak 
ing countries. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia had 
coverage rates of 29, 29 and 30 percent in 1989. Starting in 1992, how 
ever, all employers in Australia must contribute to a defined contribu 
tion plan for their employees.
Pension Portability
Pension portability refers to arrangements for preserving the retire 
ment benefits of workers who change jobs. An international perspec 
tive on pension portability is particularly useful; several countries have 
policies that greatly reduce pension portability losses, while other 
countries have done relatively little.
This section focuses on four countries: Canada, Japan, the Nether 
lands, and the United Kingdom.5 Each country has a well-developed 
private pension system where employers voluntarily provide pension 
benefits. Portability provisions in other countries are summarized.
Pensions in Canada are regulated by provincial governments, with 
each province having separate standards for its pension plans. Ontario 
has led in pension reform, with other provinces frequently copying it. 
For this reason, and because it has 40 percent of the Canadian labor 
force, Ontario's pension policy is discussed here.
The United Kingdom and Canada both provide tax advantages for 
individual retirement accounts, which may substitute for an employer- 
sponsored pension. Those plans are called Personal Pension Plans in 
the United Kingdom and Registered Retirement Savings Plans in Can 
ada. Workers may use these plans for pension portability, because they
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can transfer preretirement distributions from employer-sponsored 
plans to their individual plan. Also, workers may choose individual 
plans as a portable alternative to participating in an employer-spon 
sored plan.
In Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, defined bene 
fit plans are often contributory—meaning employees as well as 
employers contribute. This creates portability problems with regard to 
employee contributions that are not confronted in the United States, 
where contributory defined benefit plans are rare. In Japan and the 
Netherlands, almost all plans are defined benefit plans. Canada and the 
United Kingdom have some defined contribution plans, but they are 
not as prevalent as in the United States. In defined contribution plans, 
workers do not lose accrued vested benefits with job change because 
account balances are unaffected.
Pension Vesting
Pension coverage rates mean little if covered workers do not have a 
vested right to their benefits. Vesting occurs when a worker has been 
employed long enough to have earned a legal right to a pension. The 
countries considered, except Japan, all have mandated minimum vest 
ing (table 7.2).




Canada 2 years 
France Immediate 
Germany 10 years 
Japan None 
Netherlands 1 year 
Switzerland Immediate 
United Kingdom 2 years 
United States 5 years
*Except as indicated in the text.
114 Labor Market Issues
The length of time a worker must be employed to vest in the Nether 
lands, the United Kingdom, and Canada is shorter than in the United 
States. In the Netherlands, vesting must occur after participating one 
year in the plan, although participation may be restricted until age 25 
or later. The United Kingdom requires vesting after two years' partici 
pation, but employees are usually eligible to participate at age 19 after 
one year of service. The Canadian province of Ontario requires vesting 
after two years' participation in the plan.
Japan is alone among the nine countries in having no legislated 
vesting rules, but Japanese pension plans still provide quick vesting. 6 
By comparison, plans in the United States frequently required fifteen 
or more years of participation for vesting before ERISA mandated 
minimum vesting requirements (Turner 1993a).
Employers in Japan generally require longer service for vesting for 
employees who quit voluntarily than for employees whom they fire. 
Fewer than 15 percent of employees are in plans that require more than 
two years of participation if their separation is employer-initiated. By 
contrast, over 60 percent of employees are in plans that require more 
than two years if they quit. Even for long service, lurnp-sum payments 
are typically higher if the firm rather than the worker terminates the 
job.
The cause of separation (voluntary or involuntary) is generally con 
sidered in computing pension benefits in Japan. This creates an incen 
tive for employers to induce workers to quit rather than to lay workers 
off, while employees have the incentive to induce employers to fire 
them rather than to quit. However, both employers and employees 
would suffer a loss of reputation by pursuing such strategies, and they 
are thus constrained from doing so.
Employers in the United States may provide quicker vesting for 
workers whom they layoff. This is done by providing extra years of 
service to those workers in computing vesting. This practice is not as 
prevalent in the United States as it is in Japan.
In Australia, workers must vest immediately for benefits earned 
under collective bargaining agreements. Employee contributions also 
must vest immediately. However, there is no mandated vesting require 
ment for employer-provided benefits accrued outside of collective bar 
gaining agreements.
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In Germany, vesting must occur after ten years of participation for 
workers aged 35 and older, and after twelve years for younger workers. 
Germany is the only country among the nine considered here that has 
longer vesting requirements than the United States. Vesting require 
ments in Germany are particularly unfavorable to workers wishing to 
change jobs. Alternatively, those rules can be thought of as rewarding 
to long-tenure workers.
In France, workers vest immediately. In Switzerland, vesting must 
be immediate for mandatory pension benefits. However, most employ 
ers provide additional pension benefits beyond those required and there 
is no vesting requirement for these additional benefits. In the United 
States, single-employer plans must provide full vesting after five years 
or choose a graded vesting schedule that provides full vesting after 
seven years. Multiemployer plans must provide full vesting after ten 
years. Most single-employer defined benefit plans provide full vesting 
after five years, while most single-employer defined contribution plans 
provide full vesting after two or three years.
There is a trend among countries without vesting requirements to 
add those requirements. For example, Ireland added vesting require 
ments in the early 1990s (Hughes 1994). However, no legal vesting 
provisions exist in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, New Zealand, 
or Belgium (for self-administered funds) (Jolliffe 1991).
Preretirement Indexation
Workers who change jobs generally suffer a portability loss if their 
former job provided a defined benefit plan. This loss occurs because 
the earnings used to calculate workers' retirement benefits usually are 
frozen in nominal terms at the date of job change. Those earnings, and 
the benefits they produce, erode in real value over time due to inflation.
When deferred benefits are inflation-indexed, the employer pays for 
much of the portability loss that otherwise occurs with job change. In 
the Netherlands, most plans voluntarily index deferred vested benefits. 
If the pension plan increases benefits or gives cost-of-living adjust 
ments to its retirees, it must grant the same increases to separated 
workers with deferred pensions. Plans are not required to grant 
increases to retirees in the Netherlands, but that practice is widespread 
(Keizer 1991).
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In Ireland, for early leavers (workers changing jobs) benefits accru 
ing since January 1, 1991 must be inflation-indexed up to an inflation 
rate of 4 percent. Perhaps for reasons of simplicity, many firms have 
voluntarily indexed all benefits of early leavers up to the 4 percent 
maximum (Hughes 1994).
British law requires pension plans to inflation index deferred vested 
benefits. Legislation requires indexation up to 5 percent annually, 
based on increases in retail prices. Because of the caps, the Irish and 
British systems only partially index benefits most years.7
Plans rarely index deferred vested benefits in Canada and the United 
States. Many pension analysts in these countries believe that indexing 
past vested benefits would be too costly for plan sponsors, although 
that is not true in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
Japanese Tax-Qualified Pension plans do not index deferred vested 
benefits. Job changers receive their accrued benefits as a lump-sum 
payment at job termination. Japan considers lifetime employment with 
one company as the most desirable career pattern.
Portability Clearinghouses
Plans in the Netherlands transfer deferred vested benefits through 
five portability clearinghouses called transfer circuits. Most large pen 
sion plans choose to participate in a portability clearinghouse. The 
clearinghouses were established in 1987 by a private-sector initiative 
under pressure from the government. The Dutch government had indi 
cated that if the private sector did not develop a solution to pension 
benefit losses for job changers, it would mandate a solution.
Establishing industrywide portability clearinghouses in the Nether 
lands was simplified by the fact that their pension plans have uniform 
benefit formulas. Most Dutch defined benefit plans are based on final 
average salary. It was also simplified by a law that requires all Dutch 
pension plans to use a 4 percent interest rate for calculating pension 
liabilities. The clearinghouses require all plans involved to have benefit 
formulas based on final average salary and years of service. Both 
insured and noninsured plans can participate. In 1988, 78 percent of 
employees in a pension plan (including government employees) were 
in a plan belonging to a portability clearinghouse (Keizer 1991). Work 
ers have the option of leaving their vested rights with the former
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employer's pension plan or using a clearinghouse to transfer them to 
the new employer's plan.
Small pension plans in the Netherlands provide portability differ 
ently from large plans. Most small pension plans are insured through 
the purchase of individual policies under a group arrangement. Job 
changers may purchase an annuity from an insurance company by 
transferring the paid-up policy to the former employee.
Key to reducing workers' portability losses through an employer- 
based system is determining who pays for the losses—the former 
employer or the new employer. In calculating the transfer payment 
from the former employer, assumptions about interest rates and wage 
growth rates strongly affect the calculated value of pension liabilities.
The Netherlands is the only European Union country where the new 
employer has a liability for the effect of future price increases on pen 
sionable service with a previous employer. In all other countries, the 
employee loses the effect on previous pensionable service of pay 
increases from his new employer (Jolliffe 1991).
Japan also has a portability clearinghouse for contracted-out benefits 
under the Employees' Pension Fund. The clearinghouse is run by the 
Pension Fund Association, to which contracted-out pension plans must 
belong. When an employee changes jobs after less than ten years' work 
for the employer, the relatively small accumulated benefits are trans 
ferred to the Pension Fund Association. At the request of a plan, the 
present value of benefits for employees with ten to fifteen years of 
work will also be transferred. The amount transferred by the employer 
to the Pension Fund Association is the present value of benefits based 
on the nominal career average earnings to the point of the job change. 
Because the benefits transferred to the clearinghouse are small, some 
employees who are eligible for benefits at retirement do not claim 
them.
The actuarial assumptions used in calculating the transfer amount 
are controlled by the Pension Fund Association. An interest rate of 5.5 
percent is used for discounting. Though higher than the rate used in the 
Netherlands, historically this has been a low discount rate for calculat 
ing pension liabilities. Because a low interest rate results in larger lia 
bilities, its use has assured the Pension Fund Association that adequate 
assets are transferred to it. 8 Once the transfer amount is paid to the Pen 
sion Fund Association, the employer has no additional obligation. 9
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Japan also has a portability clearinghouse for small plans (Smaller 
Enterprise Retirement Allowance Mutual Aid plans). In 1987, however, 
less than 3 percent of eligible plans used it.
In the United Kingdom, some nationalized industries operate "trans 
fer clubs," where an agreed-upon set of actuarial factors is used to cal 
culate the accrued vested benefit from one plan to another. Few 
corporate plans have joined these arrangements (Atkins 1991).
A job-changing employee in the United Kingdom may transfer his 
or her benefit to an approved individual insurance policy. The benefit 
value must be calculated using a current long-term interest rate. It does 
not have to consider future pay increases, but does have to consider 
statutory preretirement indexing.
Portability of service is a feature of the Israeli pension system, 
because most workers are covered under a single pension plan spon 
sored by the major labor union. When workers change jobs, they do not 
lose benefits because they generally do not change pension plans.
Preservation of Benefits Versus Preretirement Distributions
When workers change jobs and receive their pension benefits as a 
lump sum, often they do not save the funds until retirement. In the 
United States, this is a major cause of lost retirement income.
In the province of Ontario, Canada, statutorily vested pension bene 
fits generally cannot be received in a preretirement lump-sum distribu 
tion. They are locked in, with the requirement that they can only be 
received as annuity payments during retirement. 10 Exceptions are made 
for persons with disabilities and for benefits below a low stipulated 
value. When benefits are only plan-vested, rather than statutorily 
vested (which may occur when the plan has more rapid vesting than 
the law requires), such amounts may be refunded if allowed by the plan 
rules. Employee contributions plus interest that have not resulted in 
entitlement to a deferred pension when employment ends are also 
refundable.
Transfers of assets in Canada can be made to a Registered Retire 
ment Savings Plan (RRSP), similar to an Individual Retirement 
Account in the United States. Assets in a Registered Retirement Sav 
ings Plan are locked in with no possibility of withdrawal until retire 
ment age. In theory, assets can be transferred to a new employer's plan,
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but most employers will not accept such assets. In addition, if plan 
rules specify, the present value of the deferred pension can be used to 
purchase a life annuity from an insurance company. The annuity must 
not begin payment before the date the plan member would have been 
eligible for an early retirement pension. A divorced spouse who has 
received an order under the Family Law Act of 1986 must have the 
same choices relating to the spouse's benefit as the participant does 
with respect to his or her benefit.
The Netherlands only permits preretirement lump-sum distributions 
of the employee's contributions before vesting of employer contribu 
tions, transfer of funds to another plan, or emigration.
In the United Kingdom, only unvested contributions can be returned 
to the job-changing participant. 11 All other benefits are locked in. Thus, 
after two years of service in a plan (when vesting occurs), employees 
cannot receive preretirement distributions. Pension law does provide 
opportunities to the job changer who wishes to transfer funds, however. 
Preretirement distributions may be transferred to another plan, placed 
in a Personal Pension Plan, or used to buy back into the national social 
security system, if the distribution represents contracted-out contribu 
tions. They can also be used to purchase an insurance policy or annuity 
contract. Any member of a pension plan can ask for a transfer value or 
cash equivalent of his or her accrued pension rights in the plan, if he or 
she is more than one year from the plan's normal pension age. The 
trustees of the plan must arrange for the cash equivalent to be trans 
ferred to a statutorily approved alternative chosen by the member. This 
transfer usually occurs at a job change, although it may occur anytime.
The United Kingdom offers two options for portable individual 
retirement savings. First, private pension plan members are entitled to 
purchase Free-Standing Additional Voluntary Contributions from an 
insurance company, provided the combined benefits to which they are 
entitled do not exceed statutory limits for tax exemption. Free-Stand 
ing Additional Voluntary Contributions allow members of employer- 
sponsored plans to increase their retirement benefits through individual 
contributions. Such benefits, like benefits in individual account plans, 
are portable, since they are not tied to an employer. These benefits are 
available only to participants in an employer plan. The second portabil 
ity option is that workers covered by a private pension may opt out of 
their private pension and set up a Personal Pension Plan.
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Some British plans reject asset transfers or only accept transfers for 
employees below a certain age. This is particularly likely where the 
employer would be forced to subsidize previous service in a salary- 
related plan. Some plans guarantee indexation of pension rights in line 
with earnings. If the member has reduced pay in a new job, he or she 
may decide to retain rights in his previous plan. Someone who changes 
jobs frequently may wish to use a Personal Pension Plan so as to not 
change pension plans with each job change.
The United Kingdom offers job changers many pension options 
because of a political philosophy that highly values individual choice. 
The more options available, the more serious are the effects of adverse 
selection. The positive side is that workers can choose benefits that are 
relatively advantageous to their personal situations. The negative side 
is that it increases the costs of providing benefits when workers choose 
the pension arrangements most favorable to their life expectancy or 
their income. Another problem is that workers may make poorly 
informed choices or be poorly advised by service providers having a 
financial stake in the decisions they make.
Conclusions
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada have done more 
than the United States to eliminate portability losses. These countries 
require short vesting periods and restrict lump-sum distributions. The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom index vested benefits for most 
early leavers.
Japan and the United States statutorily allow virtually unrestricted 
lump-sum distributions at job change, although defined benefit plans in 
the United States frequently do not provide the option. In the other 
countries, retirement benefits are preserved by requiring workers to 
retain benefits with the previous employer, transfer vested benefits to 
the new employer, or transfer benefits to a portability vehicle similar to 
an Individual Retirement Account, where the benefits are locked in 
until retirement.
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Pensions And Retirement
In most countries, three labor market institutions affect retirement 
income: social security, employer-provided pensions, and disability 
programs. 12 Often social security programs and private pensions are 
not age-neutral, but provide an incentive either to retire early or to 
delay retirement. The value of retirement wealth can be affected by 
retiring earlier or later than the "normal" retirement age, or by special 
provisions such as early retirement bonuses.
As background, this section first surveys the demographic and labor 
force participation trends that make retirement age an important issue. 
It then discusses aspects of pension plans that affect the age at which 
older workers retire. 13
Demographic Trends and Labor Force Participation Rates
Along with population aging, perhaps the most important change in 
the labor markets of industrialized nations over the last two decades 
has been a massive movement among older workers toward early 
retirement. Across OECD countries, labor force participation rates of 
males age 55 and older have declined for at least the last twenty years 
(table 7.3). The levels and downward trends differ among countries, 
but in all cases the majority of males are now out of the full-time labor 
force several years before the age of legal entitlement to full social 
security retirement pensions. For females, the movement is not as 
strong; it is offset to some extent by the trend for more females to have 
long-term commitments to the labor force.
While the labor force participation rate of males aged 55-59 
declined in every OECD country between 1975 and 1989, there was a 
larger decline in percentage point terms for males aged 60-64. In most 
countries, few men remain in the labor force past age 65. 14 Less than 5 
percent of men over age 65 are working in the European Community as 
a whole, with the highest rates in countries with a large agricultural 
sector (IDS 1993).
Austria provides a dramatic example of the declining labor force 
participation of older males. That country currently has one of the
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lowest labor force participation rates of older males. This is especially 
true of the age group 60-64, whose rate has fallen below 15 percent, 
compared to more than 30 percent in most other countries. During the 
period 1955-1985, the labor force participation rate for this age group 
fell 58 percentage points (Zweimuller 1991).
Table 7.3 Labor Force Participation Rates by Sex and Age in Selected 


































































































































































SOURCE: U.S Department of Commerce (1993).
In contrast, Japan has a high labor force participation rate for older 
males. There, 36 percent of men aged 65 and older were in the labor 
force in 1989. Many male workers retire from their career jobs with a 
lump-sum pension and move to another, usually lower-paying job for
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several years (Schulz, Borowski, and Crown 1991). This pattern of 
employment is called "bridge employment" in the United States, refer 
ring to the subsequent job as a bridge between the career job and retire 
ment. Bridge employment is less prevalent in the United States, but is 
still opted for by a sizable minority of workers.
In the United Kingdom, the proportion of men aged 60 to 64 in the 
labor force dropped from 86 percent in 1971 to only 53 percent in 
1990. Smaller cross-national differences occur for men age 55-59, with 
labor force participation rates of 65 percent in Austria and 92 percent 
in Japan.
Labor force participation rates among older women are much lower 
than for older males, but the downward trend is less apparent. The pro 
pensity for successive cohorts of women to have higher labor force par 
ticipation rates at younger ages has counteracted a trend for earlier 
retirement among working women. In fact, the labor force participation 
rate of women aged 55-59 has increased in a number of countries over 
the past twenty years.
The rise in unemployment among industrialized nations is well 
known, and the increase in long-term unemployment for workers aged 
55 and over has been substantial. A general deterioration of labor mar 
kets, especially in Europe, may be a factor in increased early retire 
ment, as some portion may be involuntary labor force withdrawal, 
which for older workers is labeled retirement.
The trend toward earlier retirement has been supported by social 
security and disability policies. In effect, social security and disability 
programs have become forms of long-term unemployment compensa 
tion for some older unemployed workers. A growing number are 
claiming disability benefits, apparently in response to unemployment. 
This has occurred particularly in countries, such as the Netherlands, 
where entitlement to a disability benefit is based on whether the appli 
cant can find suitable work in the prevailing labor market, as well as on 
his or her physical capability.
Retirement Decisions
Social security and private pensions can be made to affect the age at 
which workers retire through four mechanisms. First, for pensions, if 
the wage-pension tradeoff is less than dollar for dollar, a higher level of
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benefits raises the real income of the worker, which induces a demand 
for greater leisure. For social security, workers may receive wealth 
transfers by receiving generous benefits. Second, the age and condi 
tions of eligibility for benefits can be liberalized. Third, benefits need 
not be actuarially reduced if a worker retires early, nor raised for late 
retirees. Finally, if there is an earnings test for receipt of benefits, cur 
rent benefits may be reduced by the earnings of retirement-eligible per 
sons who continue working.
Age of eligibility for both social security and pension retirement 
benefits are key parameters that affect the age at which pension-cov 
ered workers retire. Because social security benefits are considerably 
larger than pension benefits for most workers, social security's age of 
eligibility may have a major effect on the age at which some workers 
retire. Firms that wish to encourage workers to retire at ages different 
from the age most favorable under social security must establish incen 
tives in their pensions sufficient to offset the retirement incentives 
imbedded in social security.
Defined benefit private pension plans typically contain incentives 
for workers to postpone retirement at least up to the plan's age of eligi 
bility for retirement benefits. Defined contribution plans are less likely 
to have a minimum age of eligibility, since they pay benefits solely 
based on the amount in the worker's account. However, some countries 
set minimum ages at which workers can withdraw money from their 
defined contribution plans in order to discourage early retirement.
In addition, the generosity of the benefits affects workers' decisions 
to retire. For example, when firms subsidize benefits at early retirement 
relative to those received later, and when firms provide limited time 
special incentives to workers for retirement at the earliest age of eligi 
bility, workers are more likely to be induced to retire.
Rather than describe all features of institutions that affect workers' 
retirement age in different countries, selected features from various 
countries are highlighted to indicate the range of practices.
Eligibility for Social Security Benefits
The earliest age at which an individual can receive social security 
retirement benefits within the European Union ranges from age 60 
(men and women in France, Belgium, and Germany; women in
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Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom) to 67 (men and women in Den 
mark) (Keesing 1992).
Five European Union countries—Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
and the United Kingdom—have lower retirement ages for women than 
men. There is a gradual trend for countries to equalize retirement ages 
for men and women. Japan has a lower age of eligibility for social 
security for women than men, but that difference is being phased out, 
with the age for women's eligibility gradually rising from 55 to 60 by 
the year 2001. It was age 57 in 1994 (table 7.4).
Table 7.4 The Earliest Age for Receipt of Social Security Retirement 


























a. A December 1992 law increases pensionable age gradually until in the year 2002 it becomes
65 for men and 60 for women.
b. It will gradually be raised to age 60 by the year 2001.
A European Court of Justice decision requires the European coun 
tries to have the same retirement ages (and equal benefits) in private 
pension plans for both men and women. This decision brings pressure 
on social security systems to adopt the same retirement ages for both 
sexes as well. The United Kingdom announced that it would gradually 
raise the social security retirement age for women from 60 to 65, which 
is the age for men.
In nearly all industrialized countries, the minimum age for retire 
ment in the mid-1990s was lower than when the social security systems 
were started (see Pilcher, Ramirez, and Swihart 1968). The minimum 
retirement age has generally been lowered by allowing early retirement 
with reduced benefits. This permits a more flexible approach to retire 
ment. It raises the cost of a pension system, however.
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Eligibility for Private Pension Benefits
Age Requirements
In the province of Ontario, Canada, employer-provided plans cannot 
set the normal retirement age later than the participant's 66th birthday. 
Participants may choose to retire at any time within 10 years of the 
normal retirement age specified in the plan documents. Participants 
may postpone retirement and continue accruing benefits, but if they 
choose to receive benefits while continuing to work for the same 
employer, no future benefits can be accrued (Pension Commission of 
Ontario 1993).
In Germany, a pension-covered worker receiving an early retirement 
benefit from social security is legally entitled to early retirement bene 
fits from the private pension as well (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991).
For personal pension plans that meet qualifying restrictions, the 
pension can be taken at any age between 50 and 75 in the United King 
dom. 15 For certain workers whose occupations require physical skill, 
for example cricketers and trapeze artists, the pension may be taken as 
early as age 40.
Tenure Requirements
In Canada, usually a worker in a defined benefit plan whose employ 
ment ends before the minimum age for subsidized early retirement 
cannot receive those benefits. That practice gives workers an incentive 
to stay with the firm until the minimum retirement age. The trend in 
Canada, however, is toward pension plan provisions that favor early 
retirement (Pesando and Gunderson 1987).
Some firms in Canada encourage early retirement by waiving the 
early retirement benefit reduction, provided certain age and service cri 
teria are met. In such a case, the retiring employee would receive a 
pension calculated with the formula used at normal retirement age. 
Some plans provide unreduced early retirement after thirty years of 
service, or when an individual reaches age 62. Another possibility is 
for plans to subsidize the early retirement benefits of long-tenure work 
ers, so that rather than a reduction of 7 percent a year for years before 
the normal retirement age, which would be roughly fair actuarially, 
benefits may be reduced only 2 percent a year.
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Such provisions selectively encourage early retirement for long-ser 
vice workers. The existence of such practices suggests that some firms 
have a target tenure level, as well as age, at which they feel it is optimal 
for workers to retire.
The theory that firms care about the tenure of their older workers 
receives support in the United Kingdom, where most pension plans 
offer early retirement, provided the worker has been employed a mini 
mum number of years. This minimum may differ from that which 
applies to eligibility for a pension at normal retirement age. Early 
retirement may require the employer's consent (Haberman 1991).
In Germany, a range of collective agreements between unions and 
employers makes early retirement possible. For example, older work 
ers in most breweries are permitted to accumulate overtime that can be 
used as a credit toward years of work required for early retirement 
(Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991).
In 1988, 47 percent of all Dutch firms with pension plans offered a 
preretirement option to their employees. These options generally 
resulted from bargaining between a union and a firm or industry. A 
large segment of the working population—especially in small firms— 
had no early retirement option through a pension plan. In 80 percent of 
the plans, workers needed to have worked at least ten years in the firm 
or industry and had to be at least 60 years old before they were entitled 
to benefits. Part-time workers were frequently excluded from eligibility 
(de Vroom and Blomsma 1991).
Special Inducements
An inducement to early retirement used in the United States, Can 
ada, Japan, and the United Kingdom is sometimes called the "open 
window policy." In this situation, participants are given a limited time 
in which to take advantage of special early retirement rules. For exam 
ple, for a three-month period participants may be allowed to retire with 
no reduction in their pension if they are more than 55 years old and 
have at least twenty years of service. After three months, the window is 
closed and the plan reverts to its normal rules (Jobin et al. 1991). 
Inducements to early retirement are often used by firms as a way to 
reduce their workforce without resorting to layoffs. In periods of 
higher unemployment, many Japanese companies offer early retire 
ment packages to their older employees.
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While many employers in the United Kingdom use early retirement 
to manage workforce reduction, there is a trend away from open-access 
early retirement inducements toward closed-access programs. Closed- 
access programs are aimed at a particular target population, usually 
defined by the type of job or specific individuals. Such arrangements to 
encourage retirement of older workers are used to facilitate organiza 
tional and technological change (Laczko and Phillipson 1991). In addi 
tion, some pension plans provide for early benefits if the worker is laid 
off (Haberman 1991). These are permanent features of the pension 
plans, and thus differ from "open window" policies, which are tempo 
rary.
It is sometimes argued that the flexibility of defined benefit plans as 
a personnel tool for selectively encouraging early retirement is an 
advantage over defined contribution plans. The generosity of defined 
contribution plans could also be manipulated in these ways, however, 
simply by employers making special contributions to those plans. 
Legal restrictions on the maximum amount that can be contributed to 
defined contribution plans limit their flexibility for this purpose, but 
firms with defined contribution plans could also achieve the same goal 
by offering severance pay.
Adjustment of Benefits for Postponed Retirement
When workers postpone retirement, the annual pension benefit they 
receive at retirement generally increases. There are four ways in which 
postponed retirement benefits can be adjusted: (1) the continued 
accrual of pension benefits, with no actuarial increase of previously 
accrued benefits; (2) no further accrual, with an actuarial increase of 
previously accrued benefits; (3) continued accrual, with an actuarial 
increase of previously accrued benefits; and (4) no further accrual and 
no actuarial increase.
An actuarially fair increase provides the worker the same lifetime 
expected present value of benefits for a given number of years of work, 
regardless of the age at which the worker retires. An actuarially fair 
benefit increase takes into account three factors when a worker post 
pones retirement: (1) benefits are received for a shorter period of time, 
(2) benefits are received at a later date, and (3) the worker has greater 
risk of dying before receiving benefits.
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For demographic groups with a high life expectancy at retirement 
age, the actuarial adjustment is lower than for groups with low life 
expectancy because the percentage reduction in the expected period of 
benefit receipt with a one-year postponement of retirement is relatively 
low. The actuarial adjustment increases with age because at progres 
sively older ages an additional year of postponed benefits is a progres 
sively larger reduction in the expected period of benefit receipt.
The actuarially fair increase in benefits with postponed retirement is 
smaller when benefits are indexed for inflation after retirement than 
when they are not. When benefits are unindexed, the worker compares 
the benefit he or she could receive at a later age with the amount he or 
she would have if the benefit had been taken at an earlier age and 
invested at the market interest rate. The higher the market interest rate, 
the greater must be the increase in benefits with postponed retirement. 
Thus, the actuarially fair increase of social security benefits with post 
poned retirement, which is 6.7 percent between ages 62 and 65 in the 
United States, is too low for private pension benefits that are not fully 
indexed.
Whether actuarially fair or not, the adjustment of benefits with post 
poned retirement presumably will affect the age at which workers 
retire. Workers with higher than average mortality risk would maxi 
mize the lifetime income from their retirement benefits by retiring 
early.
If there are neither actuarial adjustment nor the continued accrual of 
benefits, the pension plan delivers a strong incentive for retirement. On 
the other hand, the greater the increase in benefits with postponed 
retirement, the greater the incentive will be for workers to postpone 
retirement.
Provision (1)—the continued accrual of benefits, with no actuarial 
increase of previously accrued benefits—is the most prevalent in Can 
ada. This degree of accrual creates an incentive for retirement at the 
early retirement age because of the lack of actuarial increase in benefits 
to take into account that postponed benefits are received for a shorter 
period. Provision (3), which would fully compensate workers for the 
benefits lost due to postponed retirement, is the least common. Provi 
sions (2) and (4) are about equally common (Pesando and Gunderson 
1987).
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In Germany, it is common for firms to increase benefits by 0.5 per 
cent for each month, or 6 percent per year, of postponed retirement up 
to the normal retirement age (Ahrend and Walkiewicz 1991). This 
compares to the 6.7 percent increase per year for postponed social 
security benefits in the United States for workers ages 62 to 64.
In the United Kingdom, worker contributions to contributory 
defined benefit plans generally cease at the normal retirement age, and 
subsequent service does not enter into the calculation of the pension 
benefit. However, the pension eventually awarded is increased to allow 
both for the amount of pension foregone during the further service and 
for the interest earned on the reserves backing the pension during the 
deferment period (Haberman 1991).
Both employer-provided and personal pensions in the United King 
dom provide for flexibility in retirement. Nearly all (95 percent) of 
employer-provided pensions allow early retirement (Laczko and Phil- 
lipson 1991). However, in both employer-provided and personal pen 
sions, early retirement results in benefit reduction. The extent of the 
reduction varies according to age, length of service, and, in the case of 
personal pension plans, the amount contributed. Many defined benefit 
plans provide enhanced benefits in the case of early retirement due to 
ill-health.
Virtually all private-sector plans in the United Kingdom base early 
retirement benefits on accrued service and then apply a reduction fac 
tor based on age at retirement. Some plans feature an immediate pen 
sion on early retirement based on accrued service and without 
reduction, but such pensions tend to be available under restricted con 
ditions. For example, the eligibility may be limited to members over 
age 60 and with a long minimum period of service.
Many plans in the United Kingdom offer a pension at normal retire 
ment based on a formula that incorporates a deduction to allow for the 
pension benefits to be provided by social security. Many of these plans 
do not apply this deduction when calculating the pension available on 
early retirement, but only reduce it when social security commences. 
In a few plans, the person retiring early can choose to exchange a pen 
sion at a certain level for one at a higher rate until social security 
begins, and then at a lower rate thereafter.
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Mandatory Retirement
In some countries, firms that offer pension plans frequently also 
have mandatory retirement ages. While mandatory retirement because 
of age is not allowed in the United States and has been banned by Can 
ada in some jurisdictions, it is allowed in Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and elsewhere. In the United Kingdom, a firm can have different man 
datory retirement ages for different classes of workers. For example, 
one private school has mandatory retirement at age 60 for teachers and 
at age 65 for maintenance staff.
In Japan, many workers expect lifetime employment with their com 
panies. 16 An important aspect of the lifetime employment system is 
mandatory retirement. The percentage of employers with a compulsory 
retirement age of 60 increased from 68 percent in 1988 to 82 percent in 
1992 (table 7.5). Employers with a compulsory retirement age of 61 or 
over only increased from 1.3 percent in 1988 to 2.4 percent in 1992. 
The government has tried to persuade employers to postpone the com 
pulsory retirement age to 65, but employers have strongly resisted 
because of the high cost of employing older workers who have 
received seniority-based wage increases. Japan does not have an Age 
Discrimination Act that would prevent employers from forcing older 
workers to retire.
Table 7.5 Mandatory Retirement Ages in Japan, 1988 and 1992 
Year Percent of employers with compulsory retirement at age 
5556 57 58 59 60 61+
1988 12 32 5A 6^23?7 673 O 
1992 9.5 - 3.6 2.4 - 82.1 2.4
SOURCE: Japan Employers' Association.
NOTE: A dash indicates that there were no firms m the survey indicating that response.
In countries where mandatory retirement is allowed, pensions tend 
to be structured differently with respect to retirement age from coun 
tries where it is illegal. In the latter countries, firms that would other 
wise have mandatory retirement may adjust the benefit formula so that 
it more strongly favors early retirement.
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At the same time that Japanese firms have increased the age of man 
datory retirement, they have increasingly offered early retirement 
options (Seike and Shimada 1986). By doing so, they may be able, 
within a voluntary framework, to approximate the retirement age pat 
tern that they formerly achieved through earlier mandatory retirement.
Conclusions
Countries have developed a wide variety of restrictions and incen 
tives affecting retirement and the employment of older workers. If gov 
ernments decide they wish either to encourage early retirement or 
discourage it, they have examples of such policies on which to draw. 
Around the developed world, labor force participation rates of older 
men have declined, while participation of older women has been more 
stable. A country's policies concerning retirement age naturally evolve 
with changing economic and demographic circumstances. With the 
aging of populations and the trend toward earlier retirement, several 
countries have changed their social security programs to encourage 
employment of older workers. Whether employers will do likewise 
with their private pension plans, and whether the employment of older 
workers will increase, remain to be seen.
Private pension plans can affect labor market decisions of workers. 
The loss of future pension benefits at job change may deter some work 
ers from making otherwise desirable job changes. Many countries have 
legislated requirements for pension plans to reduce the benefit losses at 
job change. These include maximum periods for vesting and required 
indexation of benefits between date of job change and retirement. The 
ultimate goal of such programs is to assure the adequacy of retirement 
benefits, which is discussed in the next chapter.
NOTES
1. The section is drawn largely from Dailey and Turner (1992).
2. For the United States only, the data on covered workers also includes all nonvested plan 
participants who have left employment in the past year (Nonvested workers have not worked suf 
ficiently long to have a legal right to a pension benefit. Starting with the data for 1988, this 
requirement is changed to five years.) Plans are required to report these workers on the annual
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report to the Internal Revenue Service (Form 5500). Although reliable data on the size of this 
group are unavailable, it appears to have little effect on U.S. coverage rates.
3. The pension coverage rate statistics considered here were developed by Lorna Dailey of 
Bedford Research Consultants. For a full description of the methodology and data sources used, 
see Dailey (1992).
4. The exclusion of those workers from these coverage statistics has been criticized as being 
inconsistent with the treatment of Germany, where workers in book reserve plans are included in 
the coverage rate statistics.
5. The section is based largely on Turner (1993), Turner and Dailey (1991), and Andrews 
(1991). It focuses on portability policies in countries with private pension systems similar to that 
of the United States. For a discussion of portability in the United States, see Turner (1993) This 
section does not discuss the issues of pension portability across national borders, which European 
pension policy analysts are currently discussing because of the creation of a single European labor 
market (see Jolliffe 1990).
6. For a discussion of portability in Japan, see Murakami (1991).
7. In the United Kingdom, the statutory requirement to revalue vested benefit rights originally 
existed only for benefit rights that accrued after January 1, 1985. Under the Social Security Act 
1990, the requirement now applies to all accrued benefits
8. For a further discussion, see Watanabe, Turner, and Rajnes (1994a).
9. The social security Employees' Pension Insurance program continues to be responsible for 
indexing benefits by providing a benefit based on the difference between indexed and unmdexed 
earnings.
10. For a discussion of portability in Canada, see Conklin (1991).
11. The following discussion of portability in the United Kingdom is drawn largely from Bir 
mingham (1991).
12. Unemployment compensation programs are another institution that may affect the transi 
tion between work and retirement, but they are not considered here.
13. This section is based largely on Dorsey and Turner (1995).
14. Japan is a notable exception.
15. This applies only to personal pensions bought with contributions additional to the con- 
tracted-out rebate.





The adequacy of pension benefits is the fundamental measure of 
success of a retirement income system. This chapter considers evi 
dence on the adequacy of retirement income in several countries.
Japan
In Japan, the social security National Pension provides three types 
of benefits: (1) an old-age pension, (2) a disability pension, and (3) a 
survivor's pension. The earliest age at which workers can receive full 
benefits is 65. The National Pension in 1992 provided average benefits 
of 35,000 yen a month (about $330, or about $4,000 a year) to benefi 
ciaries age 65 and older. The Employees' Pension Insurance paid aver 
age monthly benefits of 151,000 yen in 1992 (about $1,400 a month or 
$17,000 a year). Thus, in Japan the flat benefit pays about 20 percent of 
the total social security benefit on average, with the earnings-related 
benefit providing the remaining 80 percent.
The two benefits combined are higher than the benefits received 
from social security in most other countries. For example, the average 
annual social security benefits in the United States in 1993 were 
$7,300, which is about a third that received in Japan. The maximum 
social security benefits a U.S. worker retiring at age 65 could receive 
were less than the average social security benefits received by Japanese 
workers. These comparisons, however, are affected by the cost-of-liv- 
ing in different countries, so comparisons made solely by adjusting for 
the exchange rate give only a rough comparison of the standard of liv 
ing that social security benefits can support.
In Japan, the average amount provided annually by an Employee's 
Pension Fund plan in 1990 was about $4,500. The average amount pro 
vided by a Tax-Qualified plan in 1992 was about $8,100 (Watanabe 
1995). This compares with average pensions in the United States in
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1989 of $6,400 (Dailey and Turner 1992). However, in the United 
States, defined benefit pension plans are required to provide survivor's 
benefits, unless the spouse signs a written statement waiving them, 
while survivor's benefits are rarely provided in Japan.
Germany
In Germany, employer-provided pensions make a relatively small 
contribution to retirement income. The benefits provided by the Ger 
man social security system are nearly 70 percent of German retirement 
income. By comparison, for households aged 65 and older in the 
United States, social security provides about 40 percent of income 
(Grad 1994). The benefits provided by the German social security sys 
tem are more than ten times as large as those provided by the private 
pension system (table 8.1). When the public employer pensions are 
included, however, the total of employer-provided pension benefits is 
about a third as large as the benefits provided by social security.
Table 8.1 Percentage of Retirement Income Received From Different 
Sources in Germany, 1992
Source Percentage of retirement income
Social security 68.8 
Public employer pensions 14.4 





In the United Kingdom, the economic well-being of retirees has 
improved considerably over the past thirty years. Pensioners repre 
sented 40 percent of the poorest tenth of the population in 1961, but 
only around 20 percent in 1991. However, when comparing over a
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more recent period, an increasing number are living below the poverty 
threshold, which is half the national average income. 1 Between 1984 
and 1991, the number of pensioners in poverty in the United Kingdom 
rose from 1 million to 3.4 million. This happened in part because the 
government indexed the flat rate pensions to prices rather than earnings 
starting in 1980. In 1994, the flat rate pension paid 4,789 pounds per 
year (about $7,200) to married couples. Strong earnings growth after 
1984 thus put more elderly into poverty when measured relative to 
earnings (Jenkins 1994).
Employer-provided pensions are much more important in the United 
Kingdom than in Germany; they are similar to those provided by social 
security. In 1989, the average weekly basic pension from social secu 
rity was 42 pounds. In 1987, the average weekly pension was 48 
pounds from employer-provided plans—57 pounds for plans for pub 
lic-sector employees and 38 pounds for plans for private-sector 
employees (apRoberts and Reynaud 1992). However, because only 
roughly half the labor force is covered by an employer-provided pen 
sion, many retirees do not receive that type of benefit.
Table 8.2 presents a slightly different view of retirement income in 
the United Kingdom, averaging benefit amounts over all household 
units that receive a retirement pension, and including the earnings- 
related pension in the measure of social security benefits. The percent 
age of retirement income from social security has declined over time, 
but in 1988 still accounted for slightly over half of the income of fam 
ily units receiving a pension. The percentage of retirement income 
from occupational pensions has increased considerably, and in 1988 
was nearly half as large as that provided by social security.
United States
Wide differences persist in the economic well-being of older Ameri 
cans. Such differences occur across age, race, gender, and marital sta 
tus. While the economic well-being of the aged has improved 
considerably, the poverty rate for the aged is greater than for other 
adult age groups.
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Table 8.2 The Percentage of Retirement Income Received From
Different Sources in the United Kingdom, 1980,1984,1988 















































SAMPLE: Family units receiving retirement income.
SOURCE: Family Expenditure Survey, compiled in Daykin (1994).
This section evaluates the adequacy of cash retirement income for 
U.S. retirees.2 Special attention is paid to characteristics of retirees 
whose retirement income may be inadequate.
Even as older Americans have seen their income from earnings 
decline, their economic status has been improving, both absolutely and 
relative to the rest of the population. This improvement is largely due 
to social security, which was enacted in 1935 as the foundation of 
retirement income in the United States. Though social security is not 
universal, more than 90 percent of retirees aged 65 and older receive 
social security benefits, and it is now the most important source of 
retirement income for most retirees.3
As in other developed countries, the system of providing retirement 
income in the United States is often described as a three-legged stool, 
meaning that there are three primary sources of retirement income. 
However, except for white married couples, less than half of all race 
and marital status groups receive retirement income from all three 
sources (Grad 1992). Roughly 60 percent of nonmarried males and 70
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percent of nonmarried females receive no income from an employer- 
provided pension.
The probability of pension coverage differs greatly between 
employment in the public and private sectors. Employer pensions are 
almost universally provided to federal, state, and local government 
employees, who are 17 percent of the labor force. Pension coverage is 
much less common among private-sector workers.
The pattern of pension coverage repeats in the receipt of benefits. In 
1992, 92 percent of "aged households" received social security retire 
ment benefits, 32 percent received private pension benefits and 15 per 
cent received a pension based on government employment. "Aged 
households" refers to a married couple living together where at least 
one is age 65 or older or to a nonmarried person age 65 or older. The 
statistics on employer-provided pensions imply that no more than 47 
percent of aged households received income from an employer-pro 
vided pension. In addition, 67 percent of aged households received 
income from savings, and 20 percent received earnings from a job 
(table 8.3).
Table 8.3 Percentage of Aged Households Receiving Income From 
______Different Sources in the United States, 1962-1992_____ 




































SOURCES: Grad (1992, 1994), Chen (1992).
NOTE: "Aged household" refers to a household where at least one member is age 65 or older.
Another way to look at sources of retirement income is to rank them 
according to the total dollars they provide. In 1992, the three primary 
sources of retirement income—social security, asset income, and 
employer-provided pensions—provided 40, 21, and 19 percent, respec 
tively, of the income of aged households. Earnings from a current job
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also accounted for 17 percent of income (Grad 1994). Thus, while 
earnings from employment are excluded from the image of the retire 
ment income stool, they are nonetheless an important source of income 
for older Americans.
Only in the highest income quintile is social security not the domi 
nant source of income. It accounts for more than three-fourths of 
aggregate income for retirees in the lowest two income quintiles. How 
ever, the percentage of retirement income provided by social security 
declined from 39 percent in 1980 to 36 percent in 1990, but jumped to 
40 percent in 1992.
The Internal Revenue Code prohibits benefits from a defined benefit 
plan while a participant is working on the job providing the pension. 
However, employment earnings are received by 50 percent of married 
couples age 65 to 69 from jobs taken following retirement from a 
career job or from a working spouse.4
Less than half of older Americans receive retirement income from 
an employer-provided pension.5 However, that percentage has grown 
steadily since the mid-1970s. The percentage of aged households 
receiving income from an employer-provided pension increases with 
age for Americans age 55 to 64 as active workers retire, while the per 
centage of aged households receiving income from an employer-pro 
vided pension declines with age for Americans age 65 and older.
A major distinguishing characteristic between the poor and affluent 
aged is that the poor generally do not receive employer-provided pen 
sion benefits, while the affluent do. Pensions are an important supple 
ment to social security for both middle- and upper-income elderly. 
They accounted for 16 percent of aggregate income for those in the 
middle-income quintile and 38 percent of income of those in highest- 
income quintile. In the top-income quintile, 30 percent received bene 
fits from a pension based on government employment, and 45 percent 
received a pension based on private-sector employment. This compares 
to 2 percent for a government-sector pension and 5 percent for a pri 
vate pension in the bottom-income quintile. The top-income quintile of 
the older population received 57 percent of all employer pension pay 
outs, while the bottom two income quintiles of the older population 
received only 4 percent.
Even though private pensions are an increasingly important source 
of retirement income, they are not about to supplant social security as
The Adequacy of Retirement Income 141
the major source. In 1992, private pensions were 50 percent or more of 
retirement income for only 3 percent of aged households. Pension 
income among the aged that receive it is generally a small proportion 
of their income. In comparison, social security accounted for 50 per 
cent or more of retirement income for 59 percent of aged households 
and accounted for 90 percent or more of retirement income for 23 per 
cent of aged households. For households aged 75 and older, social 
security accounted for 90 percent or more of income for 24 percent.
Traditionally, retirees in the United States have received pension 
benefits as an annuity, rather than as a lump-sum payment. The receipt 
of retirement benefits as a lump sum, however, is increasingly com 
mon. This trend is at least partly due to the increasing popularity of 
defined contribution plans. For pension recipients age 60 to 64 in 1989, 
60 percent received an annuity only, 29 percent received a lump sum 
only, and 12 percent received both (Beller and McCarthy 1992).
While the real pension benefits of men have increased, the real pen 
sion benefits of women declined during the 1980s. Comparing pen 
sioners who first received private pension benefits in 1978 and 1989, 
median real benefits of men rose 6 percent, while median real benefits 
of women fell 17 percent. These changes caused the median benefits of 
women to fall as a percentage of men's from 47 percent in 1978 to 37 
percent in 1989. This fall was not caused by a relative decline in the 
earnings of women covered by pensions, nor by a decline in their rela 
tive job tenure. The median earnings of these women rose from 58 to 
65 percent of the median for men. The causes of the fall have not been 
determined (Beller and McCarthy 1992).
Over the 1980s, real benefits declined in manufacturing industries, 
while they rose in nonmanufacturing. Analysis by industry indicates 
that, for reasons not yet deciphered, female pensioners suffered greater 
losses than males in real pension benefits in the manufacturing sector.
One measure of the adequacy of pension benefit levels is the per 
centage of a worker's final earnings replaced by the pension. Using this 
measure, private pensions in the United States provide a median wage 
replacement rate of 23 percent. Most private pension recipients older 
than age 62 also receive social security benefits. For them, the median 
replacement rate for both benefits combined is 66 percent (Beller and 
McCarthy 1992).
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The median private pension wage replacement rate for men was 26 
percent, compared to 17 percent for women. The lower replacement 
rate for women is at least partly due to their shorter job tenure, which 
occurs in part because women change jobs more frequently than men. 
However, the combined replacement rate for private pension benefits 
and social security benefits was higher for women (a median of 63 per 
cent) than for men (59 percent). The explanation for this reversal is that 
social security provides higher replacement rates for lower-wage work 
ers than for higher-wage workers.
Comparisons
The percentage of retirement income accounted for by employer- 
provided pensions varies across countries (table 8.4). In the mid-1980s, 
it was nearly twice as high in the Netherlands as in the United States. 
The level in Canada and the United States is about the same. In all 
countries, single women receive a somewhat smaller percentage of 
their retirement income from employer-provided pensions than do 
other elderly households.
Table 8.4 The Percentage Employer-Provided Pension Benefits Are of 
Income for Households Aged 65 and Older in Selected 
Countries, 1985-1987
Pension benefits as a percentage 























SOURCE: Smeeding, Torrey, and Rainwater (1993).
A comparison of retirement income levels across countries shows 
that married retired couples in the United States have relatively high
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retirement incomes, while older single women fair relatively poorly 
(Smeeding, Torrey, and Rainwater 1993). The gap between the top and 
the bottom of the aged income distribution is larger in the United States 
than in other developed countries. Receipt of pensions is much more 
prevalent among couples than among singles and among younger 
households than older.
Conclusions
There are major differences across gender and marital status groups 
in the probability of receiving an employer-provided pension. Data for 
the United States clearly indicate that the image of retirement income 
as a three-legged stool only applies for white married couples. It does 
not apply for the majority of the members of all other race and marital 
status groups. For all other groups, less than 50 percent receive retire 
ment income from an employer-provided pension. Because for most 
other countries the percentage of the labor force covered by a private 
pension and the percentage of total retirement income provided by a 
private pension are at the same level or lower than the United States, it 
probably also holds that the prevalent image of retirement income as 
having three parts generally does not apply, except for privileged 
groups.
NOTES
1. The poverty threshold in the United States is calculated as three times minimum food 
expenditures.
2. A complete evaluation of the economic status of the aged would also discuss noncash 
income, such as the value of government- or employer-provided health insurance or the imputed 
rental value of owner-occupied housing. When noncash income is also considered, the measured 
relative economic status of the aged generally improves. Further considerations include the wealth 
holdings of the elderly and their consumption needs.
3. Civilian employees of the federal government were not covered by social security until Jan 
uary 1, 1984, when coverage was required for those hired after that date. Since 1950, state and 
local government employees have been covered under social security at the option of the govern 
mental entity for which they work Approximately seven in ten state and local government 
employees are covered by social security. Those not covered generally have pension plans that 
substitute for both social security and private pensions.
4. The statistics in this section are taken from Grad (1994).
5. Employer-provided pensions include private pensions and pensions provided by federal, 




Retirement income systems evolve with changes in the economic 
and demographic environment that shapes them. The trend away from 
reliance on family and toward reliance on government that marked the 
middle years of this century, following the Great Depression and the 
end of World War II, is being replaced by a trend toward greater reli 
ance on private sector individual or employer-provided pension plans. 
This change is occurring in the United States, Japan, the United King 
dom, and many other countries.
It is useful to examine how policy makers have responded to similar 
problems in different countries. Pension systems can be highly com 
plex, and sometimes policy makers have a large number of options to 
consider when facing a particular problem. Policy makers in different 
countries have developed a great variety of incentives and regulatory 
structures in an effort to encourage the accrual of adequate private pen 
sion benefits and to control the risks that are inherent in such systems.
Cultural differences in attitudes toward savings, work, and retire 
ment may cause pension systems to have different economic effects on 
the behavior of workers and firms in different countries. For example, 
cultural differences in family responsibility for the elderly may cause 
the demand for private pensions to differ across countries. Cultural dif 
ferences in responsibility to society and its rules may cause differences 
in the extent to which regulatory safeguards and legal enforcement of 
pension laws are required across countries. For these reasons, not every 
aspect of foreign experience is useful in analyzing domestic pension 
policy issues. Nonetheless, in all countries firms and workers respond 
to economic incentives imbedded in pension systems.
A Selective Summary of Pension Trends
First, there appears to be a long-term trend towards greater privatiza 
tion of retirement income. Chile has a system of retirement income that 
is nearly entirely privatized, and other countries have adopted partial
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versions of its system. The United Kingdom and Japan both allow for 
partial privatization of their social security systems through an 
approach they call "contracting out," but which is known in the United 
States (in the context of health care) as "pay or play." Sweden plans to 
partially privatize its social security system starting in 1996 by estab 
lishing mandatory funded individual accounts. Germany has a priva 
tized system of pension benefit insurance. The United States does not 
have explicit institutions for privatizing aspects of retirement income, 
though in the more general sense its tax subsidy for private pensions 
has the effect of partial privatization. The integration of pension bene 
fits in the United States, however, is a means of de-privatizing retire 
ment income.
Second, the aging of populations in developed countries is raising 
the cost of social security systems, but it is also making the tax subsi 
dies to support private pension systems more expensive. Presumably in 
response to cost increases, a number of countries have reduced the gen 
erosity of their tax subsidies for pensions. At the same time they have 
reduced the generosity of their social security systems.
Third, in many countries, there is a trend towards defined contribu 
tion plans. In some cases, this is at least partly the result of increasing 
regulation of defined benefit plans. In other cases, it is the result of 
government policy mandating the provision of defined contribution 
plans.
Fourth, more countries are providing insurance or a guarantee of 
pension benefits. These guarantees usually apply to defined benefit 
plans, but also apply to defined contribution plans in some countries. 
However, only two countries—the United States and Japan—insure 
funded defined benefit plans, and the United States has the only 
national program that has had an insurance claim for underfunding. 
Other countries insure book reserve funds against firm bankruptcy. The 
province of Ontario has a benefit insurance program similar to that of 
the United States and has had claims against its system.
Fifth, increasingly pension plans are investing in foreign securities. 
The regulations inhibiting foreign pension investments in some coun 
tries have been reduced or eliminated. In other countries, the increase 
seems to be driven by a realization of the financial benefits afforded by 
the greater diversification that international investing provides.
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Sixth, many countries have taken steps to reduce the loss of benefits 
suffered by workers who change jobs. Portability has been enhanced 
by reducing the years required for vesting, and in some countries by 
indexing (up to a ceiling inflation rate) the benefits of workers leaving 
a job before retirement age.
Seventh, in most countries with pension systems the coverage rate 
of workers has increased over the past twenty years. In some countries, 
this trend has stabilized or perhaps slightly reversed in more recent 
years.
Conclusion
This book provides policy makers in various countries with informa 
tion on a wide range of approaches for resolving pension policy issues. 
Providing an adequate, secure, and equitable retirement income for all 
elderly individuals and families should be the goal of every retirement 
income system. Because resources are limited, accomplishing this goal 
efficiently is a challenge facing policy makers. A careful analysis of the 
pension policies and practices of other countries can aid policy makers 
in their efforts to develop or improve their private pension systems.
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